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ABSTRACT

National Innovation Systems (NISs) are a source of considerable policy interest,
especially when used to enhance nations’ innovative capacity and competitiveness. The
study develops a framework for assessing the status and performance of NISs based on
concepts of policy adoption, implementation, and evaluation. The study then examines
the case of Thailand, which is building its national innovative capacity using the NIS
approach. The issues relevant to Thailand’s NIS are reviewed and the assessment
framework is applied. A comprehensive model of the Thai NIS is also conceptualized,
and recommendations for Thai innovation policy are made. These recommendations
include minimizing conflicts in resource allocation, incentivizing private sector
innovation, encouraging universities’ participation in the NIS, and rationalizing the
public sector components. Based on these policy recommendations, the study offers a
“country-specific” framework for assessing the status and performance of Thailand’s
NIS. It is shown that the NIS is a sophisticated yet useful approach to encouraging
innovation in the economy. Both commonality and uniqueness exist in developing and
individual country NIS, therefore each country has to acknowledge these factors and
create an NIS that best fits within its development context.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

With globalization, the pace of international economic integration has accelerated
during the last two decades through innovations in communications, information
processing, and other advanced technologies. Thomas Friedman (2005) refers to
globalization as a process that is “shrinking and flattening the world” (p. 11). One of the
important characteristics of globalization has been the reduction of domestic impediments
that expose actors1 at national and sub-national levels to the pressures of economic
competition at the international level. These conditions make it increasingly inevitable for
actors to seek the most innovative technologies and methods of working in order to
compete globally.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), innovation is now the key driver for economic growth in developed countries,
with at least 50% of growth directly attributable to it (OECD, 2005). Innovation is the act
of bringing something new into use, including a new product, process, or method of
production. These trends now mean that the creation and exploitation of innovation and
an understanding of the processes that stimulate it are fundamental to nations’ economic
growth, development, and social welfare (Kayal, 2008; OECD, 2005).
Figure 1.1 below presents countries’ rankings in global competitiveness matched
with rankings of their capacity for innovation. Several countries, including Denmark,

1

Actors refer to enterprises and firms, their clients and suppliers, universities and centers of productivity,
research institutes, government and standard-setting bureaus, and banks (OECD, 1997b).
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Finland, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United
States are among the top performers in both categories. These countries are typified by
conditions that are conducive for advanced technology development, such as high levels
of investment in research and development (R&D) activities, often as much as 2% of
GDP.
Figure 1.1 Competitiveness and Capacity
for Innovation Ranking of Selected Countries
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Many of these leading countries take a holistic approach to encouraging modern
technological innovation in their economies through the implementation of strategic
public policies. The “National Innovation System (NIS)” is a conceptual framework used
by many of these countries for developing policies that coordinate and stimulate
innovative activities in the economy (EU, 1995; OECD, 1997a; OECD, 1997b). The NIS
approach holds that the process of technological innovation is enhanced with the
interaction of public and private institutions and the coordination of relevant policies,
incentives, and initiatives (Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 1982; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993;
Smith, 1997).
The innovation system approach takes the view that private firms are the primary
innovators in the economy. Innovating firms undertake R&D activities in pursuit of
“new-to-the-world” products and processes for markets and/or for internal use. However,
firms also face the risk that innovative efforts might not turn out as they intended or that
or their benefits may spill over to others. Firms therefore face disincentives to
undertaking innovative activities.
To help in the innovative process, government can play an important role.
Government can stimulate technological innovation in firms by providing supportive
institutions and rules, targeted incentives, R&D collaboration and investment, and a
coordinating infrastructure. Measures such as these can be incorporated in a systemic
approach, which government can use to create an environment that is conducive for
innovation in firms. This is the idea of the NIS.

3

Statement of the Problem
The systemic approach to the promotion of innovation in the economy has gained
popularity in both developed and developing countries. Governments around the world
are aware that countries pursuing a systemic innovation development strategy have
technological advances and a competitive edge. Therefore, several countries are adopting
the NIS approach in an attempt to repeat these same successes. This is the idea of “policy
diffusion” and “best practice.” Moreover, the OECD, which promotes international
standards and best practices for economic development policy, has promoted the NIS
concept among both its member and non-member countries.2
For policymakers in developing countries, however, the adoption of the NIS as a
policy framework may pose challenges. Developing countries often lack the scientific
and technological foundation and the institutional components necessary to close
innovation development gaps through the NIS approach (Shulin, 1999). Studies of NIS
implementation in developing countries have therefore focused on facilitating NIS “best
practices” as well as identifying “country-specific” aspects. This may require the design
and implementation of NIS to be based more on domestic needs, capabilities, structures,
and intuitions instead of “one-size-fits-all” international standards (Intarakumnerd, 2007;
Kayal, 2008; OECD, 2005; Shulin, 1999).
From these experiences, national-level policymakers, especially those in
developing countries, need a solid understanding of the NIS concept. Critical questions
emerge for policymakers in evaluating the potential of the NIS. What are the necessary
2

http://www.oecd.org/innovation/strategy
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components of a fully-functioning NIS? How should NIS be structured and implemented
in a given country? What criteria should policymakers use in determining the status of the
NIS and how can the status and performance of the NIS be assessed? Few governments,
even in developed countries, appear to have established systematic evaluation
mechanisms for innovation policies. A framework for making a comprehensive
assessment of the NIS approach could be particularly helpful to developing-nation
policymakers.
To demonstrate how an assessment framework can be created and applied in a
developing country context, a detailed case study of the NIS of Thailand is presented.
Thailand is in the “efficiency-driven” or “investment-driven” stage of economic growth,
and is in the process of transitioning to upper-middle-income status (WEF, 2010). To
compete successfully with other countries and move into the “innovation-driven” stage,
Thailand must build capacity to absorb complex technologies, accelerate productivity
through innovation, and develop and commercialize new products (Brimble, 2003, p.
340; USAID, 2011; WEF, 2010). Since 2008, Thailand has been formally consolidating
its policy to enhance the nation’s competitiveness by encouraging innovation in firms
under the NIS concept. Applying the assessment framework to the Thailand case helps to
show: (1) why the country adopted the NIS approach; (2) the specifics of the system
including its history, structure, and function; and (3) ways of evaluating the overall
performance of the system in terms of fostering innovation. Moreover, perspectives of
key government officials involved in Thailand’s NIS, gathered through interviews,
compliment the assessment.
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Purpose of the Study
The above questions demonstrate the need for a comprehensive analysis of the
NIS approach. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to develop a broad framework for
assessing NIS which will investigate several key issues. First, an understanding of the
NIS concept itself is required. What are the basic concepts of the NIS approach for
encouraging innovation and what are the fundamental components of a system? Second, a
comprehensive assessment should address the rationale for the adoption of the NIS
approach. What motivates policy selection and what are the goals the policy is intended
to address? Third, the assessment must investigate real-world organizational and
institutional practices involved in designing and implementing the system. Finally, a
comprehensive NIS assessment should provide guidance on ways to determine its
effectiveness. Once NIS is adopted and implemented, how can its performance be
measured? How do we know the system is working?
The following chapters develop and apply a framework for NIS assessment. In
Chapter 2 the study reviews the scholarly literature on the role of technology in the
economy, technological innovation, and the theoretical underpinning of NISs. Chapter 3
reviews relevant literature on the adoption and diffusion of public policy, and policy and
program implementation and evaluation. It also presents three cases of NIS in innovationleading countries, Finland, Korea, and Singapore, and reviews the techniques and
measurements recommended by the OECD, the World Bank, and the World Economic
Forum for evaluating countries’ innovative performance. Chapter 4 presents and
discusses the methods used in this study and includes the fully-formed NIS assessment

6

framework. Chapter 5 provides a case study of Thailand focusing on relevant economic
development trends and the formulation of science and technology policy including the
country’s NIS program. Chapter 6 provides an assessment of Thailand’s NIS
performance based upon a number of assessment criteria adapted to the Thailand case. As
a result, the impediments to innovation in Thailand become clear, and policy
recommendations to address these impediments are discussed. Finally, Chapter 7
summarizes the study, presents a “country-specific” assessment framework for
Thailand’s NIS and draws conclusions about NIS in developing countries generally.
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CHAPTER 2
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE NIS

In the global economy, technology, innovation, and national economic progress
have become closely connected. It has been widely mentioned that technological
innovation is an important source of competitiveness, economic development, and
prosperity (Kayal, 2008; OECD, 2005; Roos, Fernstrom, & Gupta, 2005). It is said that
“if you don’t have innovation, you have nothing.”3
This chapter begins developing an assessment of NIS by addressing several key
points. First, the idea of innovation and its place in the economy is presented. Next, the
role of government in encouraging innovation for economic development is discussed.
The concepts of the systemic approach to innovation and the evolution of the NIS idea
are then presented. Finally, the need for developing countries to catch up in the global
economy and the possibility that NIS can assist this process is noted.

Technology and Innovation
Technology is a process or technique embodied in products, designs,
manufacturing, or service provision which transforms inputs of labor, material, capital,
information, and energy into outputs which are distributed to the market by firms
(Burgelman, Christensen, & Wheelwright, 2004; Christensen & Bower, 2004). Firms
adopting and exploiting the same technology can be grouped into industries, for example

3

Mandel, M. (2001, February 16). Obama’s innovation push: Has US really fallen off the cutting edge?
Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0216/Obama-sinnovation-push-Has-US-really-fallen-off-the-cutting-edge
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the automobile industry or the pharmaceuticals industry. Emerging technologies can
create new industries when a technology embedded in a new product progresses from
entering the market to growing, maturing, and ultimately declining from the market
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). This process is referred to as the technology life cycle or
the product life cycle.
Innovation is the act of bringing something new into use. This definition of
innovation is differentiated from the idea of “invention,” which is the act of bringing
something new into being. In commercial or industrial applications, an innovation is a
new product, process, or method of production. In organizational terms, innovation can
mean the process of generating and implementing new ideas (Mohr, 1969; Rogers, 1995;
Schumpeter, 1934; Smith-Doerr, Manev, & Rizova, 2004; Tidd, 2002).
Technology is often viewed as an integral part of innovation. Many examples of
technological innovations can be identified, such as the first microprocessors or digital
cameras, which were new products based on new technologies. The MP3 player is also
considered an innovation because it was a new product based on existing technologies.
Using GPS for tracking transportation and delivery is an example of an innovative
process. Introducing new management systems such as supply-chain management or
quality-management systems is an organizational innovation (OECD, 2005).
This study views innovation primarily as the generation and implementation of
new ideas that involve new technologies. However, innovation dealing with non
technological applications is also recognized (OECD, 2005).

9

The Role of Technological Innovation in the Economy
Successful technological innovation has been described as the creation of value
through transforming new knowledge and technologies into products and services for
national and global markets (IBM, 2004). Increasingly higher rates of innovation
contribute to economic growth in a pattern described as a “cycle of innovation”
(Schumpeter, 1939) or “innovation waves.”

Figure 2.1 Innovation Waves

Source: http://www.naturaledgeproject.net/Keynote.aspx
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Figure 2.1 above shows that through time individual innovation waves introduce
new technologies and therefore set up the following wave by stimulating new innovation
opportunities. This ripple effect of continued innovation enables further economic growth
by creating more technological advance, markets, business development, spinoff products
and firms, jobs, and continued innovation.
Potential increases in productivity in an economy are seen by some to be heavily
influenced by technological innovation and technological learning (Koh, 2006; OECD,
2005). National economic growth is viewed as a progression through “stages” of
technological change and expanded productivity.4 Three stages of economic growth have
become well-known: (1) the factor-driven stage of growth, (2) the investment-driven (or
efficiency-driven) stage of growth, and (3) the innovation-driven stage of growth (Koh,
2006; WEF, 2010).
Countries in the factor-driven growth stage produce commodities based on natural
endowments and low cost labor or very simple products designed by others. Typically,
firms in these countries compete through resource extraction, assembly, or simple
manufacturing. Moreover, productivity and wages are typically low. Technological
learning comes from imitation, imported technology, and foreign investment (Koh, 2006;
WEF, 2010).
In the investment-driven growth stage, countries emphasize accumulating
technological, physical, and human capital. Physical infrastructure and economic
regulations are improved, and investment incentives are offered. Foreign investment and
4

See Rostow (1959) as one well-known example of this literature.
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technology flows more easily into countries in the investment-driven stage. Domestic
technological improvements are also facilitated. Science and technology policy
emphasizes applied research, and productivity increases through efficiency gains (Koh,
2006; WEF, 2010).

Figure 2.2 Stages of Growth and the Global Technology Frontier

Innovationdriven stage
Investmentdriven stage
Factordriven stage

Source: Based on WEF, 2010

Finally, countries in the innovation-driven stage of growth place emphasis on
R&D, entrepreneurship, and innovation. These countries create new knowledge and new
and unique products. Investments, incentives, and institutions in the economy enable
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firms to produce innovative products using state-of-the-art processes. Science and
technology policy emphasizes basic research and significant investment in R&D is made
by the public and private sectors. Science-based learning and the ability to shift rapidly to
new technologies are significant to competitiveness in the innovation-driven stage (Koh,
2006; WEF, 2010).
Figure 2.2 above shows countries’ progress through these economic growth stages
toward the “global technology frontier.” Moving from stage to stage involves
transitioning from a technology importing economy; which relies on endowments,
infrastructure, capital accumulation, and technology imitation; to a technology generating
economy. This means that the country is innovating at the global technology frontier in
some sectors (Koh, 2006; Porter, Sachs, & MacArthur, 2001; WEF, 2010).

The Role of Government in Promoting Innovation
Previously, innovation was thought of as a linear process where science, human
capital, fiscal capital, and R&D were the inputs; and innovation was the output. In today
with intense and complex global competitiveness, however, a simple linear process for
creating innovation is not sufficiently productive. In developed countries, improvements
to innovation performance means enhanced competitiveness at the global level. In
developing countries, improved innovation creates the potential to compete after first
catching up.
Countries are now taking control of innovation by imposing a systemic approach
to the process. In the systems approach to the process of innovation, government plays a
key role because of the public goods aspects of innovation itself. According to Brimble

13

(2003), the investments in human resources and R&D needed for innovation are
indivisible and the returns may not be seen until the long term (p. 342). Under these
conditions, markets will have difficulty efficiently allocating the resources required for
innovation. The process of innovation also contains risks. It involves R&D under
uncertainty, where outputs may not yield the expected benefit. It also includes spinoffs
and externalities where the benefits that are created may spill out from the innovating
firm. Because of these circumstances, firms may underinvest in innovation and R&D and
levels of innovation will be lower than society would prefer.
The above discussion provides a rationale for government involvement to
promote innovation. As Kenneth Arrow (1962) pointed out, the market for innovation can
fail due to the existence of externalities and spillovers related to the nature of
information, which is what Arrow sees as the key commodity involved in innovation.
These external effects are uncertainty, inappropriability, and the indivisibility of
innovation. Uncertainty means there will be risks involved with innovation,
inappropriability means innovators may not be able to capture the full benefits of their
innovations, and indivisibility means an innovation is non-rival because the quantity
available does not diminish with use.
Because of these characteristics, the market on its own will not supply a socially
optimal level of research and innovation. Government often intervenes in the market to
correct market failures and also to provide public goods and protecting property rights.
Government’s reason for intervening in the market with respect to innovation therefore is
to correct the market failures inherent in research, information, and innovation.

14

Table 2.1 Public Policy Effects on Innovation
Policy
R&D funding

Technology
transfer
Human
resource policy

Tax policy

Standards

Procurement

Antitrust

Intellectual
property (IP)
Market access

Employment
and
manufacturing
initiatives

Effects on Innovation
R&D funding impacts scientific direction and production of scientists and
engineers.
R&D funding supports innovation infrastructure of universities, research
centers, federal labs, and industry research.
R&D funding supports pre-competitive collaboration, small
manufacturers, and tech-based start-ups.
Public R&D goals and administrative procedures can conflict and misalign
with private sector goals, expectations, and management requirements.
Technology transfer impacts the incentive for industry-university
collaboration and rate of knowledge flow to innovators.
Federal education and training programs, education subsidies and research
funds to support universities are a determinant of the supply of qualified
workers needed for scientific research, development and
commercialization of innovation.
A policy provides R&D incentive.
Rate of depreciation affects transfer of knowledge embedded in new
capital.
A policy provides level of incentives for consumers to adopt innovation.
Standards can facilitate platform technologies, including internet,
computing systems, and software.
Standards can also function as a barrier to technical change and can
restrict markets.
Government can stimulate market and standards development through
large scale aggregation.
Design specifications can restrict introduction of new technologies.
Antitrust can encourage industry innovation collaboration and new market
entrants.
Antitrust can delay innovation introduction.
IP acts as incentive for innovators.
IP can restrict entry of competitors.
IP protection can be weak globally, reducing return to innovation.
Choice and access to foreign markets, export conditions and foreign direct
investment influence market potential, risk and growth.
Export controls can inhibit competitiveness.
Political pressures add to protectionist risks, constraints on global
investment, domestic purchasing provisions, employment transition costs,
and higher skill standards.

Source: Based on IBM, 2004
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Government can act to overcome these circumstances and help to manage the
risks of innovation for firms. Government can encourage innovation with policies that
define and enforce rights so that benefits of innovation can be captured by firms; provide
incentives to encourage R&D in firms; assist in the incubation of new innovative firms;
help to modernize technology in existing production facilities; build technology centers;
and increase the supply of technologists, scientists, and engineers through university
programs and other related policies (Atkinson, 1993; Eisinger, 1988; Lugar, 1987;
Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1987). Table 2.1 above notes these public policy measures and
their potential effects on innovation.

NIS: Historical Background
Implementing the policies above requires understanding the relationship between
technological innovation, industry, firms, R&D, and government. Various ideas have
evolved over time concerning the best way for countries to facilitate these relationships to
undertake innovation in their economies. The NIS approach has evolved from these
trends of thinking. The most fundamental of these ideas is the linear model of innovation,
mentioned above.
Similar to the linear model, neoclassical growth theory sees innovation as the
result of market forces in perfect competition, in which information and knowledge are
equivalent commodities and automatically diffused at no cost. Firms have full
information and similar technology. The optimal level of innovation is achieved when
property rights are fully defined, resources flow freely, and the market is in equilibrium
(Solow, 1956).
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Although some countries achieved levels of innovativeness and economic growth
by implementing policies based on the linear model and neoclassical growth theory, in
other countries innovation and economic development lagged. For these countries,
endogenous growth theory addressed some issues absent in the earlier theories. In this
theory, investments; capital accumulation; and incentives for R&D, the education system,
and entrepreneurship determine long term economic growth (Romer, 1990). Emphasizing
these factors leads to the view that innovative performance can be shaped by the
institutional make-up of the economic system.
The systemic approach to innovation is more integrated with economic policies.
This means that the flows of technology and information among people, enterprises, and
institutions are the key to the innovative process. The systemic approach puts emphasis
on the role of system-specific institutional factors that encourage innovation and
technological change (Edquist, 2001; Lundvall, 1992; OECD, 1999). It shows how the
components for fostering innovation are connected to each other, the system, and the
environment. In this way, strengths and weaknesses in the system can be revealed. As
Aronson (1997) notes,
Systems thinking . . . can play a key role in producing the understanding of
the overall system needed to target innovation efforts more effectively (it)
does so by providing a methodology and a set of tools for constructing
maps of systems and determining the points at which change can have the
greatest impact on . . . performance (p. 1).
With this new paradigm, innovation is the result of the complex set of
relationships among actors in the system, including enterprises and firms, their clients
and suppliers, universities and centers of productivity, research institutes, government
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bureaus, and banks (OECD, 1997a). These actors comprise a system that contributes to
innovation in a country. Actors and the linkages that connect them are the important
components of the innovation systems approach when viewed at the national level.
Moreover, policies conducive to innovation are also essential. The so-called National
Innovation System (NIS) operates at this broadest level (Dosi, Freeman, Nelson,
Silverberg, & Soete, 1988; Edquist, 1997; Feinson, 2003; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall 1992;
Nelson, 1993; Niosi, 2002).
Freeman (1987) states that an NIS is “the network of institutions in the public and
private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new
technologies” (p. 1). Its key features are the organization of R&D and production in
firms, inter-firm relationships, the role of government, and the interactions among these
(Freeman, 2004). Lundvall (1988) focuses on the design of innovation-supporting
institutions and the process of technological learning. Nelson (1987) focuses on the role
of private firms, government, and universities in the production of new technology within
the NIS. Edquist (1997) considers the innovation system most broadly by examining all
important actors and interactions in economic, social, political, organizational, and
institutional realms with influence on the development, diffusion, and use of innovations.
Components of a “Good” NIS
With the theoretical basis for NIS described above, what does an NIS look like
and what is it supposed to do? A well-functioning NIS should produce several important
outputs, including: (1) the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, products, processes,
and technological opportunities; (2) innovation resources, including fiscal capital,
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financing options, a competent labor force, and supportive educational structures; (3)
guidance for technology, market, and partner research; (4) networking and linkages for
knowledge exchange; (5) facilities, equipment, and administrative support; (6) research
and development; and (7) rules and regulations that enhance market access and protect
innovators’ rights (Edquist, 2001; Feinson, 2003).
To produce the outputs described above, some fundamental components of the
NIS are required. Recent studies have attempted to demonstrate the necessary elements in
the NIS concept and their effectiveness (e.g. Kayal, 2008; Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001;
OECD, 1997b; OECD, 1999; Speirs, Pearson, & Foxson, 2007). From these studies, two
models of NIS format are reviewed: the Innovation Policy Terrain Model and the Generic
Model.

Innovation Policy Terrain Model
The “Oslo Manual” is one of the guideline documents developed by the OECD
for analyzing innovation (OECD, 1997b; OECD, 2005). The manual examines factors
that contribute to the innovative capacity of firms and groups them into four domains: (1)
framework conditions, (2) the science and engineering base, (3) transfer factors, and (4)
the innovation dynamo. Together these domains are referred to as the Innovation Policy
Terrain Model (OECD, 1997b). They are presented in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2 below.
Framework conditions compose the larger environment that surrounds the
innovating firm, including: (1) the educational system; (2) transportation and
communication infrastructure; (3) financial institutions; (4) the legislative and economic
setting, including patent laws, taxation, corporate governance rules, and trade policy; (5)
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market accessibility, including market size, access, and customer relations; and (6)
industry structure and the competitive environment, including the existence of supplier
firms.
The science and engineering base provides knowledge and skills to support
innovation and includes: (1) technical training systems, (2) the university system, (3)
support for basic research, and (4) various R&D activities.

Figure 2.3 Innovation Policy Terrain Model

Source: OECD, 1997b

20

Table 2.2 Innovation Policy Terrain Model
Components
Framework conditions

Innovation dynamo

Science and engineering base

Transfer factors

Description
Basic educational system
Communication infrastructure
Financial institutions
Legislative and macro-economic settings
Market accessibility
Industry structure and competitive environment
Market strategy
R&D
Non-R&D
Technical training system
University system
Basic research
Public good R&D activities
Strategic R&D activities
Direct innovation support
Linkages between innovating units
Technological expert
International links
Mobility of expert technologists
Access to public R&D
Spin-off company formation
Trust and openness
Codified knowledge

Source: Based on OECD, 1997b

Transfer factors include: (1) formal and informal linkages between firms, such as
user-supplier relationships, industry clusters and networks of firms, regulatory agencies,
and research institutions; (2) technological “gatekeepers,” i.e. individuals who are up to
date on technological innovations and facilitate the flow of knowledge; (3) networks of
international experts; (4) mobility of expert technologists/scientists; (5) access to public
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R&D capabilities; (6) the formation of spin-off companies; (7) ethics, value systems, and
trust; and (8) codified knowledge through patents and publications in scientific journals.
The innovation dynamo is the set of factors that shape the firm’s innovative
capacity, including: (1) strategic decisions about which markets to serve or create
innovation for; (2) basic research, strategic research, and product concept development;
and (3) other factors, such as opportunity identification, production facility development,
capital investment and technical information, patent rights, human skills, and
management systems (OECD, 1997b; Speirs et al., 2007).

Generic Model
The OECD also presents a more specified model of system components called the
Generic Model, focusing more on the innovating firm and its interactions in the national
system of supporting institutions (Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001; OECD, 1999). The
components of the model emphasize the market and non-market knowledge interactions
between firms, institutions, and other human resources involved in a national system
(Speirs et al., 2007). These are presented in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 below.
The Generic Model highlights the importance of six components necessary for
innovation. Demand includes the need for innovations on the part of consumers and other
producers in the economy. The industrial system is all sizes of firms in the economy,
including large companies, SMEs, and new technology-based firms. Intermediaries are
research institutes and other brokers of information or knowledge, such as government
agencies. The education and research system includes higher education, job skills
training initiatives, and also research conducted by public sector organizations. The
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political system involves the government and its policies, especially those that involve
science, technology, and innovation policy. Infrastructure includes standards and norms,
venture capital, intellectual property rights, and other supporting structures for potentially
innovating firms. These components all interact within broad framework conditions,
which include fiscal and tax policy, worker mobility rules, and other incentives that affect
the occurrence of firms’ innovation.

Figure 2.4 Generic Model of NIS Components

Source: Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001
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Table 2.3 Generic Model of NIS Components
Components
Framework conditions

Demand
Industrial system

Intermediaries
Education and research system

Political system

Infrastructure

Description
Financial environment
Taxation and Incentives
Propensity to innovations and entrepreneurship
Mobility
Final consumers
Intermediate producers
Large companies
Mature SMEs
New technology-based firms
Research institutes
Brokers
Professional education and training
Higher education and research
Public sector research
Government
Governance
Science, technology, and innovation policies
Banking and venture capital
Intellectual property and information
Innovation and business support
Standards and norms

Source: Based on Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001

The Innovation Policy Terrain Model and the Generic Model suggest the main
necessary components of a well-functioning NIS that can produce many, if not all, of the
desired outputs reviewed earlier. These components can be placed into three broad
categories: innovators, linkages, and environment as illustrated in Figure 2.5 below as a
conceptual model of NIS. Innovators in the NIS include: (1) innovating firms; and (2)
public, private, and academic institutes involved in technological R&D and innovation.
The linkages in the NIS include, for example: (1) industrial clusters; (2) organizations that
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Figure 2.5 Conceptual Model of NIS

assist potential innovators in accessing opportunities and knowledge, such as research
councils or technology transfer offices; (3) business, scientific, and academic
conferences, and other forums for knowledge exchange; and (4) government agencies
that set goals and directions and provide funding in support of firm innovation. The
environment component refers to the playing field on which innovators interact through
linkages. It includes, for example: (1) incentives for innovation such as taxes and
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subsidies, (2) rules and regulations governing market access and the use and mobility of
innovation capital, (3) regimes for securing intellectual property, and (4) important public
services, such as a supportive educational and human resource development system.

NIS as a Means of Focusing on Innovation for Developing Countries
The NIS is seen as a framework for organizing and coordinating policies that
stimulate innovation in a nation’s economy. Using NIS, countries no longer use a linear
input-output process to achieve innovation. The advantage of the NIS approach is the
systemic view that it takes of innovators, linkages, and the environment in the economy.
The remainder of this chapter concerns developing countries and NIS. These
countries were noted earlier as most in need of an assessment of NIS status and
performance. Is NIS a means for developing countries to effectively participate in the
global economy? And what are the benefits to developing countries of this participation?
By participating in the global economy, developing countries can take advantage
of international and domestic economic opportunities. In the global economy, developing
countries have the opportunity to supply goods and services to the global marketplace,
which can create growth in export sectors. They also have the opportunity to acquire
goods and services from the global marketplace, which can provide valued imports to
producers and consumers. Finally, participation in the global economy means developing
countries can attract investments of global capital, which can lead to increased
employment and business development opportunities (Wolf, 2005, p. 3).
Developing countries can also create domestic opportunities for themselves by
participating in the global economy. As Wolf (2004) notes “. . . the determinants of
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economic success are predominantly if not overwhelmingly domestic” (p. 5). These
determinants are the capacity of the state to supply the needed conditions for a market
economy (Wolf, 2004, p. 5). Friedman (1999) describes this as the “hardware,”
“software,” and “operating system” of good economic governance (p. 150-153). Effective
participation in the global economy requires adjustments to economic and governing
policies. For developing countries, these may include making the economy more open
through structural adjustments, securing property rights, implementing appropriate
regulatory oversight, and conforming to international standards.
Positive externalities are associated with these adjustments because they prepare a
country for participation in the global economy, and also enhance domestic economic
performance and governance. Friedman (2005) states,
More open and competitive markets are the only sustainable vehicle for
growing a nation out of poverty, because they are the only guarantee that
new ideas, technologies, and best practices will easily flow into your
country and that private enterprises, and even government, will have the
competitive incentive and flexibility to adopt those new ideas and turn
them into jobs and products (p. 399).
Friedman’s comments indicate the benefits to developing countries of acquiring
knowledge and technology from the global economy. Without sufficient domestic
capabilities, a country is unlikely to benefit from this knowledge and runs the risk of
continuously lagging behind. “Upgrading” the economy through technological innovation
can better position a developing country to catch up and compete in the global economy
(Aubert, 2004; Doner, 2009; Verspagen, 1991). As Juma et al. (2001) note,
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Many of the developing countries will have to move from natural resource
extraction economies to knowledge-based ventures that add value to these
resources. All these changes require a shift in public policy . . . Domestic
innovation will not be possible without access to international markets;
access to international markets will not be possible without technological
innovation (p. 638).
Without innovation, developing countries can become trapped in lower growth
stages, and opportunities for economic development are unlikely to emerge. Developing
countries are increasingly aware of these circumstances so creating and managing
technology and innovation is a prime concern. Chen and Dahlman (2005) note,
There are many ways for developing countries to avoid reinventing the
wheel and tap into, adopt, and adapt technical knowledge that was created
in other developed countries. Therefore a key element of a developing
country’s innovation strategy is to find the best ways to tap into the
growing global knowledge base and decide where and how to deploy its
domestic R&D capability (p. 7).
For developing countries, the NIS could be a part of the adjustment and upgrading
process described above. Moreover, the NIS can help these countries to innovate and
move to higher stages of economic growth.
Finally, a study of national innovation policy in a rapidly industrializing Southeast
Asian country would not be complete without a discussion of the Flying Geese model of
Asian development. The Flying Geese model is a set of interconnected concepts about the
pattern of national industrial and technological development that also includes spillover
effects for international economic development. According to its originator, the Japanese
economist Kaname Akamatsu,
the wild-geese-flying pattern of industrial development denotes the
development after the less-advanced country’s economy enters into an
international economic relationship with the advanced countries
(Akamatsu, 1962, p. 11).
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Akamatsu originally developed the theory in the 1930s to explain the process of
development and “catch-up” in Japanese industry. The work was published in English in
the 1960s. More recently, the Flying Geese model has been used to explain industrial
development experienced in other East Asian economies during the post-war period
(Kojima, 2000).
The theory includes three models of industrial and technological development: An
intra-industry development model, an inter-industry development model, and a regional
development model (Kojima, 2000). In the first model, intra-industry development occurs
by (1) importing foreign goods from more advanced countries, (2) domestic learning and
adaptation to produce similar goods to compete in local markets with the imported goods,
and (3) efficient mass production of goods that can be exported to foreign markets.
Government assists this process by taxing imported foreign goods during the period when
domestic industries are learning to produce the goods themselves (Akamatsu, 1961,
1962). Akamatsu noticed that the growth curves for the three stages of industrial
development took on an inverted V-shape and looked like a flock of geese flying in
formation, so he named the theory accordingly.
In the second model, inter-industry development occurs when producers first
master production in more labor-intensive, less technologically-demanding industries.
After this period, producers “graduate” to higher-order industries that require more
advanced skills and technology. Value is added and comparative advantage is gained with
each shift to more advanced industries (Kasahara, 2004). In Japan, the inter-industry
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development sequence can be seen in the progression from textiles, to chemicals, to iron
and steel, to automobiles, and to electronics (Kwan, 1996).
Akamatsu’s third model in the Flying Geese theory focuses on regional industrial
development and gained attention during the 1980s and 1990s as a conceptual framework
for explaining the catching-up process in East Asia (Kasahara, 2004). The third flying
geese model follows the transfer of industries from the leading economy in the region,
Japan, to the lesser-developed, follower economies of the region. As Japan continued to
pursue more advanced, higher value-added industrial production, it abandoned less
advanced industries. However, to the follower economies, the industries Japan had left
behind were more advanced. Adoption of these industries by the followers helped to
stimulate their own industrial and technological development.
Viewed in this way, the economic development of the entire region resembled the
flying geese pattern, with Japan as the “lead goose,” and the “follower geese” formed into
three tiers behind. The first tier behind the leader is composed of the countries referred to
as the “newly-industrialized economies (NIEs),” including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore. The next tier is composed of a core group of countries in the
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. Finally, the last tier is composed of the least developed
countries in the region such as China, Vietnam, and others. As Akamatsu noted,
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. . . with regard to this sequence . . . the underdeveloped nations are
aligned successively behind the advanced industrial nations in the order of
their different stages of growth in a wild-geese-flying pattern (Akamatsu,
1961, p.208). The less advanced . . . geese are chasing those ahead of
them, some gradually and others rapidly, following the course of industrial
development . . . the advanced . . . geese . . . are flying in the lead onward,
incessantly achieving technological innovations . . . (Akamatsu, 1962,
p.17-18).
Figure 2.6 below depicts the hierarchy of the East Asian economies described in
the third Flying Geese model. As this figure is based on earlier applications of the model,
it is important to note that, today, China would not be considered a Fourth tier goose. At
the time of this writing, China’s industrial development has become increasingly more
sophisticated. As such, it could be argued that China currently fits into at least the Third
tier in the region.

Figure 2.6 The Third Flying Geese Model
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The textile industry appears to follow the sequence of third Flying Geese model,
beginning in Japan and then moving to each of the three follower tiers in succession.
More recently, mass production of textiles has mainly occurred in Third and Fourth tier
countries such as the Philippines, China, and Vietnam (Kwan, 1996). Japan remains the
regional leader in more advanced industries such as automobiles and electronics.
However, some Second Tier countries like Korea have begun to challenge the lead goose
in these areas. Indeed, the third Flying Geese model suggests that as their industries and
economies advanced, follower geese could move to higher tiers in the regional formation.
Since the lower tier countries in the region were further behind in terms of industrial
development, the adoption and adaptation of new foreign goods and technology meant
that rapid rates of economic growth could be realized (Kojima, 2000). In this pattern of
constantly striving to catch leading geese, all of the geese in the formation fly forward
together toward higher levels of industrial, technological, and economic development.
The Flying Geese theory can have implications for public policies related to
innovation in catching-up economies. These countries may direct research and
development efforts toward product adaptation so that technological learning can occur.
Relatively weaker intellectual property rights may also be implemented to help domestic
firms to more easily adopt, reverse engineer, and modify imported foreign goods and
technology. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational corporations (MNCs) have
been identified as the key mechanisms to transfer industrial know-how and technology
between countries (Kojima, 1978). Therefore, catching-up countries may welcome
foreign firms and investment to spur their economic development.
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CHAPTER 3
NIS ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EVALUATION

In building an NIS assessment framework, this chapter examines the adoption and
implementation of NIS and the evaluation of its performance. It reviews: (1) the scholarly
literature on adoption, implementation, and evaluation of public policies and programs;
(2) adoption, implementation, and evaluation of NIS in three innovation-leading
countries, Finland, Korea, and Singapore; and (3) innovation system evaluation methods
utilized by three international organizations, the OECD, the World Bank, and the World
Economic Forum.

Why Organizations Adopt Policies
Policy scholars, political scientists, and sociologists have been prominent in the
study of policy adoption patterns. A well-known model of policy adoption classifies
adopters by their willingness to change as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late
majority, and laggards (Rogers, 1995). Innovators are the first group to adopt new ideas
with high motivation, needs, and expectations. They are followed by early adopters, the
majority adopters, and finally laggards who are the last group to adopt new ideas, if at all.
Some other theories of policy adoption focus on adopter’s motivation and
resources (Mohr, 1969); position in social networks (Berry, 2008; Walker, 1969);
political, social, economic, demographic, and path-dependent characteristics (Berry,
2008; Berry & Berry, 1990; Walker, 1969); and technological advancement, power and
resources, and familiarity with the considered policy (Wejnert, 2002). Other theories
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focus on the policy itself, including the costs and benefits of alternative policies and their
public and private consequences (Wejnert, 2002). Other characteristics are considered,
including relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability of
alternative policies (Rogers, 1995). The deciding factor is the advantage that the new
policy will deliver.
Conditions in the external environment can also influence the policy adoption.
These conditions include focusing events, triggering mechanisms, windows of
opportunity, and punctuations of the status quo (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Cohen,
March, & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1995); policy entrepreneurs (Grinstein-Weiss, Edwards,
Charles, & Wagner, 2009; Kingdon, 1995); learning from or imitating other successful
adopters (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Shipan & Volden, 2008); regional
diffusion (Berry & Berry, 1990; Grinstein-Weiss et al, 2009; Wejnert, 2002); economic
competition (Shipan & Volden, 2008); and the growth of multinational corporations
(MNCs) and global networking via ICT (Wejnert, 2002).
In these theories, policy adoption is influenced by: (1) adopter’s readiness for the
new policy, (2) advantages of the proposed policy, and (3) new opportunities or threats
that make policy change attractive. It is possible that these influences may combine to
move a policymaker to adopt a new policy. These concepts can help to understand why
countries adopt NIS as a framework for innovation policymaking.

NIS Adoption in Finland, Korea, and Singapore
Shulin (1999) states that it is important to ask how innovation activities in
national economies begin (p. 44). Understanding the process of identifying and
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considering potential solutions to policy problems is a first step in NIS assessment. Why
do countries decide to put NIS into effect? Events leading to the adoption of NIS in
Finland, Korea, and Singapore are reviewed here.

Finland
The NIS in Finland has been referred to as a “showcase” and is seen as a learning
example for other countries (Roos et al., 2005). According to Georghiou, Smith,
Toivannen, and Ylä-Anttila (2003), the development of NIS in Finland is linked to
changes in the national economy, adaptation to the policy environment, and learning from
other countries. They find Finland’s NIS to be an “outcome of adopting policy
organizations and models from various countries and adjusting them to the national
frameworks . . . Policies have also reacted to the changes in industrial structures both in
the home country and internationally” (p. 56).
Innovation policy in Finland evolved through three phases: (1) creating the basic
structures in the 1960s and 1970s, (2) greater technology orientation in the 1980s, and (3)
developing a knowledge-based society and the NIS in the 1990s (Georghoiu et al., 2003).
In the first phase, the Science Policy Council (later renamed the Science and Technology
Policy Council) was established for coordinating S&T policy guidelines. New
mechanisms for planning, coordinating, and financing university research were also
established and development of higher education increased. Conditions also improved for
industrial R&D (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 58).
In the second phase, Finland’s innovation policy was designed by OECD
guidelines. During the 1980s, Finland experienced strong growth and an expanding
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international market. However, exports could not keep pace with domestic demand and
could not support rising living standards. Eventually there was a recession (Georghiou et
al., 2003, p. 39). During this period, technology policy in Finland targeted ICT, and key
programs were initiated. The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation
(TEKES) was established and took charge of R&D loans and grants. Nokia, Finland’s top
firm and a world leader in telecommunication, played a key role in national technology
programs. Moreover, nationwide networks of science parks and centers of expertise
became important for transfer, diffusion, and commercialization of research results
(Georghiou et al., p. 58).
In the third phase, “NIS” and “knowledge and know-how” became important
ideas for innovation policy. Four areas are emphasized: (1) knowledge creation and
utilization, (2) R&D and education, (3) development and absorption of new technology,
and (4) national and international cooperation (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 59). Finland
became a major exporter of electronics and high-tech products and its productivity,
exports, and R&D were very strong by international comparison. Finland went from
being one of the least R&D intensive countries in the OECD to one of the most. Finland
leapfrogged in world exports, production, and R&D of ICT. These successes were due to
changes in technology policy priorities, the role of the business sector, and decentralized
decision-making (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 47).
By the end of the 1990s, Finland had more high-skilled and high-tech industries
and lower dependence on raw material and energy-intensive industries. Finland became
the first country in the world to formally adopt the NIS approach, and the economy
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entered the innovation-driven growth stage (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 57, 60; Roos et al.,
2005).

Korea
Korea’s economic transformation has been profound,5 and its NIS has been a key
factor in the country’s growth and development (Bartzokas, 2007; Kim, 1993; Suh, 2000;
Wong, 1999; Yim, n.d.). Historically, Korea lacked natural resources and began its
modern development with no technological base. With its NIS, the Korean government
has created policies that allowed a transition to technology-based economy. The Korean
NIS is characterized by active learning; restricted foreign direct investment (FDI); use
and diffusion of R&D; an export orientation; and high investment in human capital
(Feinson, 2003; Shulin, 1999).
Three stages of economic growth in Korea have been identified: (1) a factordriven stage during the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s, (2) an investment-driven
stage from the 1970s through the mid 1990s, and (3) an innovation-driven stage from the
1990s through the present. Three phases of S&T policy correspond to these growth
stages: (1) the imitation phase in the 1960s and 1970s, (2) the transformation phase in the
1980s, and (3) the innovation phase in the 1990s (Kim, n.d, p. 3).
In the 1960s, Korea developed by a government led strategy to grow large-scale
industry for export. Key industries and banks were nationalized. The government took
control over credit and used a strong license and permit system. During this time, the
5

In the 1950s, per capita income in Korea was under US$100. Between 1966 and 1996, per capita income
grew by 6.8% annually. Between 1962 and 2002, GDP grew by approximately 7% annually. During parts
of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, GDP growth averaged approximately 19% (Bartzokas, 2007, p. 5; Choi,
2003 as cited in Yim, n.d., p. 2; World Bank, 2000, p. 1, p. 16; Yim, n.d., p. 16).
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Science and Technology Promotion Act, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the
Korean Institute of Science and Technology, and other government research institutes
(GRIs) were all established (Kim, n.d., p. 4).
Industry grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s. Heavy industries and chemicals
were emphasized and large family-owned conglomerates called chaebols6 were the
dominant type of firm. In this transformational period of S&T in Korea, industry began
its own research efforts in response to the National R&D Program which provided tax
incentive for private firm’s R&D. Universities began to provide higher quality human
resources (Yim, n.d., p. 13) and the Daedeok Science Town (later renamed Daedeok
Innopolis) in Daejeon was also created (Kim, n.d., p. 6).
In the 1990s, the development goal was to promote high-tech innovation and
transition to a knowledge-based economy with policies to support technology
development and information infrastructure. However, due to structural weaknesses in
the economy and the corporate sector and the 1997 regional financial crisis, GDP growth
in Korea declined -6.7% (World Bank, 2000, p. 7). According to Chung (2003), the crisis
“. . . became a driving force to increase the innovation potential of the Korean NIS” (p.
484), and overcoming the crisis and adjusting to policy shifts “prompted Korean firms to
make a great leap in technological capability” (Lee, 2003, p. 233).
The economy was reformed, restructured, and liberalized (Kim, n.d.; World Bank,
2000, p. 6). Highly skilled human resources in information technology and biotechnology
were developed. Highly Advanced National Projects (HAN) were undertaken, including
6

Some of the well-known chaebols are Hyundai, Daewoo, Sumsung, and LG.
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biomedical, biotechnology, electronics, next-generation vehicular, semiconductors,
materials technology, and others.7 Government also played a leading role by enhancing
university research capacity, promoting cooperative research, and coordinating policy.
Important S&T measures for innovation took place, including: (1) the five-year plan for
innovation in 1997; (2) the creation of the National Science and Technology Council in
1999; (3) the creation of the Office of Minister of Science, Technology, and Innovation
to coordinate the NIS in 2004; (4) the promotion of university-based research; (5) the
formation of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology; and (6) the
strengthening of the GRIs by placing them within a “research council” system (Kim,
n.d., p. 6, 14; Lee, 2003, p. 233). Following the crisis, Korea became competitive
through innovation (Kim, n.d., p. 3).

Singapore
Singapore’s NIS has contributed to its status as a regional and global innovation
leader (Wong, 1999). Singapore is a small city-state with a service oriented knowledgebased economy and one of the world’s busiest ports. Singapore’s GDP averaged 8%
annual growth through the 1990s (Koh, 2006). It developed with an open economy and
strong government involvement in land, labor, and industrial development (Koh, 2006, p.
143). Singapore’s NIS has been based on government facilitation of technological
learning from MNCs. This has resulted in a large supporting industry for MNCs and
“substantial technological capability . . . among many local subcontracting . . . firms”

7

See the list of HAN from
http://park.org/Korea/Pavilions/PublicPavilions/Government/most/policye2.html
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(Wong, 1999, p. 20). Over time, technological innovation capability has shifted from
MNCs to local high-tech firms (Wong, 1999).
Wong (2003) refers to four stages of Singapore’s growth: (1) the industrial takeoff stage from 1965 through the mid 1970s, (2) the local technological deepening stage
from the mid 1970s through the late 1980s, (3) the applied R&D expansion stage from
the late 1980s through the late 1990s, and (4) the high-tech entrepreneurship and basic
R&D stage from the late 1990s onward.
Because of a lack of natural resources, the industrial take-off stage was
characterized by low cost labor-intensive manufacturing, dependence on technology
transfer from MNCs, and export led growth (Wong, 2003; Wong & Singh, 2005). During
the 1960s and 1970s, tax incentives and grants were offered to MNCs to locate in
Singapore and produce for global markets (Koh, 2006, p. 143). The strategy successfully
accelerated growth, however, local firms had no incentive to invest in indigenous
innovation (Yeung, 2006). During this time, Singapore’s government began to emphasize
technical education (Koh, 2006).
In the technological deepening stage, MNCs operations were upgraded and local
supporting industries developed. Multinational corporations provided significant
investments in technology.8 Government policy emphasized developing technological
infrastructure and human resources to support innovative capacity, including the
Singapore Science Park and programs for skill upgrading, high-tech start-ups, and
entrepreneurialism (Koh, 2006, p. 146). After a recession in 1985, government assisted
8

Foreign investment contributed 26% of gross domestic fixed capital formation during this period, which
was one of the highest rates among Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) (Yeung, 2006, p. 263).
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the development of the venture capital industry, initiated an open-door immigration
policy, and liberalized business regulations (Koh, 2006, p. 156).
In the R&D expansion stage, rapid growth of applied R&D activities by MNCs
and public R&D institutions to support MNCs innovation occurred. Knowledge-intensive
services and manufacturing became key drivers for growth (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 3).
A five-year national technology plan was created. It allocated US$2 billion to build R&D
infrastructure, provided incentives to attract private sector R&D, and developed technical
manpower to support R&D (Koh, 2006, p. 146; Yeung, 2006). The plan identified key
research areas for development, including biotechnology, food and agro- technology, IT
and telecommunication, microelectronics, and semiconductors. The National Science and
Technology Board (NSTB) was formed and tasked with development of new research
institutes in these strategic areas (Monroe, 2006). Also during time, the Ministry of Trade
and Industry (MTI) coordinated economic and financial policies, tax regimes, loan
regulations, and stock market rules to support of Singapore’s innovation strategy. The
MTI coordinates with other innovation policies from the Economic Development Agency
(EDA), which engages in economic promotion, and the Agency for Science and
Technology

Research

(ASTAR)

which

coordinates

research

programs,

commercialization, and licensing (Koh, 2006, p. 155).
In the fourth stage, policy emphasized indigenous technological innovation
capability, local high-tech start-ups, and science-based industry. In 1996, the Innovation
Program was created to develop indigenous creative capability widely. Moreover the
government created research institutes in IT, microelectronics, and life sciences to
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encourage MNCs to locate their R&D activities in Singapore. The 1997 regional financial
crisis caused an economic downturn in Singapore and showed that a “higher
technological competitive edge” was needed (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 21). Government
increased its R&D investments to 2.6% of GDP in 1998, and the Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT), Information and Communication
Development Authority (IDA), and Media Development Authority (MDA) were all
formed. In 1999, the government removed regulations on high-tech entrepreneurialism
and allocated US$1 billion for high-tech venture capital activities (Wong & Singh, 2005,
p. 21). The One-North R&D complex was created as a S&T research “community” with
research facilities, schools, amenities, and public transportation. It adopted the idea of a
Silicon Valley funded at US$8.6 billion over 15 years. It focused on R&D innovation and
business networking in biosciences and IT (Monroe, 2006). The National Science and
Technology Plan for 1996-2001 sought to develop domestic capabilities in biomedicine
to complement existing capability in electronics, chemicals, and engineering. The longterm strategy was to become a world class hub for biomedical science and a regional
leader in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, healthcare services, and biotechnology R&D
(Koh & Wong, 2005).

How Organizations Implement Policies
Once new policies are adopted to address problems or capitalize on opportunities,
they must then be implemented. Policy implementation is the process of going from
concept to end-product. It is a critical step for policy success. In developing countries,
research has shown that program implementation and administration were the critical
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problems influencing policy effectiveness (Patton, 1997, p. 199). Implementing a new
policy may mean that the adopter has little or no experience with the policy, so assessing
its design and implementation becomes important (Wholey, 1979). Examining
implementation helps to understand the functioning of policy or program components,
and whether the policy or program is operating as it is supposed to (Patton, 1997).
Ideally, policies are implemented rationally by putting operations in place that
meet intended policy goals. Agencies that implement government policies are created and
staffed by civil servants with technical expertise in relevant policy and program. This
staff develops, implements, monitors, and improves programs that serve the public good.
Government agencies should be apolitical, efficient, and effective policy implementers,
with clear lines of hierarchy (Roth & Wittich, 1978).
Some research indicates that policy implementation may not work as smoothly as
the ideal case predicts. Wholey, Scanlon, Duffy, Fukumoto, and Vogt (1970) say, “We
cannot predict . . . which results will follow from particular policies, nor should we be
confident that policy implementation will conform to plan” (p. 21). Implementation
problems include limited resources or understanding, lack of flexibility, situational
decision-making, principal-agent problem including moral hazard and adverse selection.
Implementation problems can also occur because policymakers may only have a vague
idea of what they want, so policies may be poorly conceptualized and infeasible before
the actual implementation (Lindblom, 1959; Lipsky, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973;
Simon, 1997; Wilson, 1989; Wood & Waterman, 1994).
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According to Doner (2009) effectively implementing innovation policies in
developing countries requires consultation, credible commitments, and monitoring (p.
72). Consultation means actors exchange information on their preferences, capabilities,
and intentions. Credible commitment means actors comply with their preferences and
agreements. Monitoring means evaluating performance and outcomes and revising
policies and responsibilities as needed (Doner, 2009, p. 73).
Technology, products, processes, and practices that are new to developing country
firms can be complex, costly, and their benefits are uncertain (Doner, 2009, p. 74).
Therefore, the role of government is to help potentially innovative firms manage expected
risks and uncertainties “. . . where the agency elicits information from firms regarding
key externalities and their management in an ongoing process of information exchange,
goal setting and adjustment, and mutual monitoring” (Doner, 2009, p. 75). This requires
consultation and credibility among all parties and monitoring of performance so that
agreements can form. Therefore, developing countries will require ever-greater levels of
these three institutional capacities to successfully implement innovation policy.

NIS Implementation in Finland, Korea, and Singapore
The components and the implementation of the Finnish, Korean, and Singaporean
NIS are presented in this section. The actors, interaction, and organizational structure of
each of these systems are discussed below and also depicted in Figure 3.1-3.3. The
objective is to find what happens in these countries’ NIS to encourage innovation, and
what organizations are responsible.
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Finland
A “full systems approach” is taken in Finland by examining all elements of NIS,
including

customers,

government

and

regulatory

bodies,

technology

transfer

organizations and incubators, R&D bodies, financial institutions, and others (Roos et al.,
2005). According to Roos et al. (2005), key organizations involved in the Finnish NIS
are: (1) the Academy of Finland, (2) the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and
Innovation (TEKES), (3) public R&D organizations, (4) technology transfer agencies,
and (5) capital providers. These are shown in Figure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1 Organization of Finland’s NIS

Source: Roos et al., 2005
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The Academy of Finland finances scientific research in all disciplines and
provides expertise in science policy development. Funding is provided for projects and
programs; research centers of excellence; research positions and training; foreign visiting
professors; and international networking and collaboration between universities, research
institutes, and business. Annual funding for projects from the Academy accounts for 16%
of government R&D spending.9
The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES) is in the
Ministry of Trade and Industry and is responsible for implementing technology policy. It
provides financing to universities and research institutes projects, and also to firms’
product development where risk is present. It funds and coordinates joint programs
implemented by firms, research institutes, and universities, and coordinates international
cooperation in research and technology (Roos et al., 2005).
Universities, polytechnics, national research institutes and the Technical Research
Centre of Finland (VTT) are major public R&D organizations. These organizations spend
approximately 30% of the nation’s budget for R&D. There are strong links between
business and university R&D and other public sector R&D groups. The Finnish
Innovation Fund (SITRA) provides start-up capital for technology firms and funds
research projects for existing firms, training projects, and foreign venture capital, and
matches SMEs with “business angels” (Roos et al., 2005).
The Science and Technology Policy Council (STPC) facilitates innovation
policymaking. The council is chaired by the Prime Minister and develops guidelines for
9

http://www.aka.fi/en-GB/A/Academy-of-Finland/
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the government’s R&D funding. It coordinates R&D issues among the other ministries
and provides consultation between industry, funding agencies, government organizations,
and universities (MEE, 2009).
The National Innovation Strategy of 2008 identifies measures to meet the goals
defined for the NIS (MEE, 2009). These measures include: (1) establishing large,
modern, and flexible higher education entities; (2) supporting interaction between
universities, trade, industry, and research institutes; (3) developing management training
to meet world standards; (4) introducing entrepreneurship, creativity, and innovation into
teaching; (5) providing incentives and opportunities for life-long learning; (6) motivating
investors to commit to business growth by taxation; (7) motivating venture capital
investment through public-private cooperation; and (8) using public procurement to
enhance demand for innovations (Vuegelers, et al., 2008).
Universities provide two types of innovation-support structures for firms,
including industry-academia research clusters and business incubators. These structures
help to develop linkages with international firms and indigenous firms. Between 1995
and 2000, venture capital investments increased by 10 times. Approximately one-third of
private equity investment went into ICT. Today, the venture capital market has been
described as “vibrant” with “unparalleled” financing opportunities for high-tech firms
(Roos et al., 2005).
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Korea
Government policy and programs, government-sponsored research institutes, and
private industry have played important roles in Korea’s NIS (ISI, GIGA, & STIP, 2008;
Yuh, 2006). Figure 3.2 below shows the organization of Korea’s NIS.
Figure 3.2 Organization of Korea’s NIS

Source: ISI et al., 2008

The National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC) was established in
1999 to prioritize the S&T budgets and coordinate national S&T and R&D programs. The
NSTC is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister of Science and Technology and composed
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of thirteen S&T related ministers and nine representatives from the S&T community
(Bartzokas, 2007, p. 31).
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is the secretariat for NSTC. It
is responsible for managing and coordinating policy concerning S&T, industry, human
resources, and national R&D (Bartzokas, 2007). The MOST coordinates R&D initiatives,
human resource development and education, internationalization policies and activities of
science-based ministries, and government supported research institutes. It is also
responsible for Korea’s Centers of Excellence (COE), which implement programs that
encourage basic research in major universities. These centers are the Science Research
Centers, the Engineering Research Centers, the Medical Science and Engineering
Research Centers, and the National Core Research Centers.
The Office of Science and Technology Innovation (OSTI) within MOST forms a
science and technology R&D system for future development. It promotes efficient
investment and budget allocation, the development of future growth industries, and
human resources in S&T. The President’s Council on Science and Technology is made
up of nongovernmental science experts and corporate leaders in various S&T areas. The
council plays an important role in policymaking as the government has taken a more
market-oriented approach. The Korean government wants “science policy to satisfy more
of the private sector’s needs, so it has become more open to its views” (Bartzokas, 2007,
p. 31).
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The role of universities in Korea’s NIS has expanded.10 Universities contributed
approximately 83% of scientific publications between 1995 and 2000 (ISI et al., 2008).
Recently, patenting, technology transfer, and commercialization of innovations have all
improved among Korea’s universities. Through the COE model, government has
supported research groups with specific capabilities at universities across the country.
Currently, there are 150 COEs in engineering, medicine, science, and core national
objectives.
The Science and Technology Framework Law of 2001 grants authority for S&T
policy and R&D coordination within the MOST. The law provides rules and regulations
governing S&T, and enables the development of policies for R&D. It is the framework
for 31 STI-related laws in areas such as human resource development (HRD), nuclear
energy, R&D promotion, and technological development support. The S&T Framework
Law is seen as fostering an “innovation-driven culture” in Korea (Bartzokas, 2007, p. 31;
ISI et al., 2008, p. 259). The law has facilitated recent changes to the IP regime, and also
has been helpful in supporting Korea’s regional targeting policy for innovation.
The Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) is the central body for patentrelated policies and activities. The KIPO has streamlined innovation activities by
separating patent and utility model applications. It has also accelerated commercialization
and transfer of patented technology. In 2005, KIPO registered the fourth-highest number
of patents in the world (ISI et al., 2008).

10

From 1970-2004, the number of higher education institutes grew from 142 to 411 and the number of
enrolled students grew from approximately 200,000 to 3.5 million.
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A regional targeting policy is also used to support innovation. Free economic
zones (FEZs) provide tax breaks, deregulation, financial incentives, and enhanced
services in targeted regions of the country. Companies in these regions must attract a
minimum amount of foreign investment to qualify for benefits. The FEZs offer an
inducement for foreign companies to invest in Korean firms. Currently, FEZs exist in
Busan-Jinhae, Gwangyang, and Incheon.
Since the 1970s, the Korean government has sponsored a levy-grant program to
assist firms in technological HRD. The program is an inducement for firms to invest in
HRD and tech-skill development (Arnold, Bell, Bressant, & Brimble, 2000, p. 110).
Firms contribute a mandatory levy to a fund that can be used for HR training and skills
development. Because the contribution is mandatory, firms have no reason not to invest
in human resource development (Arnold et al., 2000).11

Singapore
Singapore’s Science and Technology Plan indicates a transformation to researchdriven and knowledge-intensive economy (MTI, 2006). The plan defines the roles for
organization and administration of Singapore’s NIS. Figure 3.3 below shows the
organizational structure of Singapore’s NIS.
The Research, Innovation, and Enterprise Council (RIEC) is chaired by the Prime
Minister and includes other ministers, industry leaders, and scientists and academics. It
advises the government on research, innovation and enterprise strategies. The RIEC
11

Levy and grant amounts, firm size for program exemption, and sponsored training activities, have varied
over time. The levy is typically some predetermined proportion of the wage bill. Firms with less than a
minimum number of employees are exempted. If grants to firms for HRD activities exceed their
contribution level, government makes up the difference (Arnold et al., 2000, p. 110-112).
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promotes these functions with new initiatives in S&T and knowledge-based economic
growth. These functions are implemented by the National Research Foundation (NRF).
NRF funds programs that meet the objectives of these strategies, coordinates national
research efforts, and develops policies for implementing the national R&D agenda (MTI,
2006).
Figure 3.3 Organization of Singapore’s NIS

Source: MTI, 2006

The Agency for Science, Technology, and Research (ASTAR) and the Economic
Development Board (EDB) are located in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The
ASTAR fosters scientific research and talent by setting priorities for public research and
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developing the research labor force. It enables commercialization of research outputs,
attracts research-intensive projects from MNCs, and enhances capabilities of industry
clusters and local enterprises. The EDB identifies technologies and growth areas,
promotes private sector R&D in local enterprises, and attracts MNCs to locate R&D
activities in Singapore (MTI, 2006).
The Ministry of Education (MOE) oversees and funds basic research for
knowledge creation in universities. Universities are primarily engaged in independent and
collaborative research projects to create new knowledge for future innovations.
Polytechnic institutes perform developmental research and joint projects with industry
and local enterprises. This will strengthen domestic private sector innovation. The
Academic Research Fund (AcRF) also funds basic research in universities and strategic
research for independent researchers. The AcRF attempts to attract world-class
researchers to Singapore who can “seed ideas and new breakthroughs” and enhance
graduate education (MTI, 2006).
The Science and Technology Plan attempts to develop an “open platform that
allows the free flow of ideas among the players in the research landscape” (MTI, 2006, p.
29). The plan emphasizes collaboration among the performers of R&D. Linkages
between research institutes, universities, public research agencies, and disease centers and
hospitals facilitate the flow of research from basic to applied research and then to
commercialization. These linkages are formed through joint programs, seminars,
conferences, project supervision, and appointments, and facilitated by ASTAR and NRF.
The NIS also supports linkages to the private sector through two programs. One is a
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government incentive for MNCs to help local engineers acquire new technical skills. The
other is the Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP) which encourages MNCs to help
local suppliers to upgrade their procedures and technologies (Wong & Singh, 2005).
Singapore has three science parks that provide infrastructure for R&D. The first
two parks include government agencies, several private firms involved in IT and
telecommunications, and high-tech R&D institutes. The third one is One-North as
mentioned above (Finegold, Wong, & Cheah, 2004; Wong & Singh, 2005). Besides the
science parks, there are seven technopreneur incubation centers that facilitate networking
for over 400 technology-related firms. The program is managed by a group of public and
private sector operators (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 41).
Singapore funds firm-level human resource development with a levy-grant
program called the Skill Development Fund.12 The training provision comes from inhouse, local training organizations, and foreign providers of specialized training. The
training and skill types have focused on ICT fields and the needs of SMEs (Arnold et al.,
2006, p. 109-112).
Multinational corporations (MNCs) provided finance in the early stage of
Singapore’s high-tech development. In 1999, the government provided the US$1 billion
Technopreneurship Fund to induce venture capitals to Singapore. The fund attracted
several leading venture capitalists from the United States. The requirements on the
national stock exchange were simplified for new ventures to access market funding. The

12

The program has used a levy rate between 1-4% of the wage bill, depending on firms’ needs for
technological skill upgrading.
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Start-up Enterprise Development Scheme (SEEDS) was also created to fund early stage
business development over 100 new start-ups (Wong & Singh, 2005).

How Organizations Evaluate Policies
Policymakers must evaluate the performance of policies after implementation.
They need to know how the policy is performing to meet the goal. Policy evaluation is
the way to provide this important information. Evaluation measures the effects of a policy
against the goals where the analysis of performance data indicates when policies work
well, when improvements are needed, or when a policy should be discontinued. It also
contributes to subsequent decision-making about programs (Shadish, Cook, & Leviton,
1991).
Evaluations have been developed for assessing the utility, the feasibility, and
other missions of policies and programs in a wide range of fields. Many different types of
evaluations exist. The generic “program outcome” evaluation model, for example,
analyzes: (1) inputs, which are the resources put into a program; (2) activities, which are
the things the program actually does; (3) outputs, which are the products that are
produced; (4) outcomes, which are the results of the activities and outputs; and (5)
impacts, which are the program’s long term consequences (World Bank, 2007, p. 161).
Another well-known evaluation framework is the CIPP model, which investigates four
elements, including context, inputs, process, and products (Stufflebeam, 1971).13

13

See Stufflebeam (1971), the model was originally designed for evaluating the utility of educational
curricula.
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Nowadays, performance measurement is seen as a necessary tool for the
evaluation of public policies (Thomas, 2006). The policy evaluation has become
increasingly popular in the public sector in recent years with ideas of re-inventing
government, total quality management (TQM), performance-based management and
others (Thomas, 2006, p. 1). However, evaluating the performance of public policies
through formal evaluations can be difficult. According to Thomas (2006), the problem is
“. . . measurement . . . in terms of linking outcomes in society to programs” (p. 21).
Performance indicators can be both quantitative and qualitative and vary in terms
of validity and reliability (Patton, 1997). Choice of indicators can be affected by
availability of resources for data collection, and the time frame associated with the
interest (Patton, 1997, p. 159-160). Patton (1997) says, “some kind of indicator is
necessary . . . to measure the degree of outcome attainment . . . the key is to make sure
that the indicator is a reasonable, useful, and a meaningful measure of the intended client
outcome” (p. 160-161).
International Organizations Evaluation of NIS Performance
Some international organizations regularly evaluate nations’ innovation
performance, including the OECD, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum.
They use proxy variables referred to as “innovation indicators,” to evaluate and rank
national innovation performance. The evaluation practices of these organizations are
discussed below.

56

The OECD
The OECD is comprised of 34 member countries.14 It has established many
guidelines on the measurement of science, technology, and innovation activities at
national and regional level. Some of these include: (1) Frascati Manual for surveys of
research and experimental development, (2) TBP Manual for the measurement and
interpretation of technology balance of payments (TBP) data, (3) Oslo Manual for
collecting and interpreting technological innovation data,15 (4) Patent Manual for using
patent data as science and technology indicators, and (5) Canberra Manual for the
measurement of human resources devoted to science and technology (OECD, 2002). This
section discusses the Oslo manual, which identify innovation indicators and best practices
for NIS.
The Oslo Manual is a series of works produced in 1992, 1997, and 2005, by the
OECD which serves as a methodological reference for the analysis of innovation impacts
in national economies. The Oslo Manual “provides guidelines for collecting and
interpreting innovation data in an internationally comparable manner” (OECD, 2005, p.
10). It recommends using firm-level surveys and provides guidelines for developing
survey instruments (OECD, 2005).

14

Current members are advanced and emerging countries including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
15
The Oslo Manual also inspired the development of the manual for the standardization of technological
innovation indicators in Latin American and Caribbean countries, called the “Bogota Manual” produced by
many institutions including Organization of American States (OAS), Ibero-American Network of Science
and Technology Indicators (RICYT), Ibero-American Program of Science and Technology for
Development (CYTED), Andrés Bello Convention (SECAB), and Colombian Observatory of Science and
Technology (OCYT). The manual focuses on specific characteristics of innovation systems and firms in
less developed countries.
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Firm surveys provide qualitative data on innovation activities. Surveys collect
data on the source of knowledge relevant to firms’ innovation activities, firms’ R&D
expenditure and performance, inter-industry collaboration, numbers of innovative
products, return on investment on innovation effort, the presence of linkage between
public and private research sectors, personnel movements, and other innovation-relevant
data (OECD, 2005; Stahl-Rolf & Hamann, n.d.). The manual recommends collecting
quantitative data on firm expenditures for innovative activities for a given period (rather
than expenditure data for a specific innovation) (OECD, 2005, p. 98). The manual also
recommends collecting information on how firms protect their innovations, such as
patents, copyrights, registration of designs, trademarks, or confidentiality agreements
(OECD, 2005).

The World Bank
Currently, the World Bank evaluates 146 countries’ innovation systems in terms
of their readiness for the knowledge economy. The Knowledge Assessment Methodology
(KAM)16 was developed by the World Bank as a “knowledge economy benchmarking
tool.” The KAM uses 148 structural and qualitative variables to evaluate performance in
the knowledge economy. Each variable is ranked on an ordinal scale and serves as an
indicator. These variables are grouped into four pillars: (1) the economic and institutional
regime, (2) education and skills, (3) information and communication infrastructure, and

16

The KAM uses data from World Bank databases and also UNCTAD, UNESCO, and WEF. The World
Bank continuously updates the KAM data and expands coverage when possible. The details of KAM can
be retrieved from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/KFDLP/EXTUNIKAM/0,,menu
PK:1414738~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1414721,00.html
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(4) the innovation system. The innovation system pillar of the KAM has 29 variables, as
shown in Table 3.1 below. The KAM evaluates the innovation system for countries by
using data on these variables.

Table 3.1 KAM Innovation System Pillar
Pillar 4 The Innovation System
FDI outflows as % of GDP
FDI inflows as % of GDP
Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.)
Royalty and license fees payments
(US$/pop.)
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.)
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.)

S&E journal articles
S&E journal articles/mil. people
Availability of venture capital
Patents granted by the USPTO
Patents granted by the USPTO/mil. people
High-technology exports as % of manuf.
exports
Private sector spending on R&D
Firm-level technology absorption
Value chain presence
Capital goods gross imports (US$ mil.)
Capital goods gross exports (US$ mil.)
S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%)
Avg. Number of citations per S&E article
Intellectual property protection

Royalty payments and receipts (US$ mil.)
Royalty payments and receipts (US$/pop.)
Science and Engineering enrollment ratio (%)
Science enrollment ratio (%)
Researchers in R&D
Researchers in R&D/mil. people
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP
Manuf. trade as % of GDP
University-company research collaboration
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012

However, of these 29 indicators, only 3 are used by the KAM to develop
innovation rankings for countries: (1) total royalty and license fees payments and receipts
in million USD, (2) patent applications granted by United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), and (3) scientific and technical journal articles.17

17

http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp
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The World Economic Forum
The World Economic Forum (WEF) evaluates countries’ innovation capacity in
relation to their competitiveness in the global economy. It annually publishes these results
in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). The report examines factors leading to
sustained economic growth and prosperity, and provides “benchmarking tools for
business leaders and policymakers to identify obstacles to improved competitiveness thus
stimulating discussion on the best strategies and policies to overcome them” (WEF, 2010,
p. 3).
The GCR uses an extensive set of indicators which are grouped into 12 pillars, and
“innovation” is one of them (WEF, 2012, p. 4).18 The competitiveness of countries was
evaluated using these indicators and pillars, and countries are ranked accordingly. The
2012-2013 GCR measures competitiveness using surveys distributed by the WEF to
business leaders in 144 countries. Survey questions ask them to evaluate various aspects
of the operating environment in their country on an ordinal scale (WEF, 2012).
According to the WEF, to enhance living standards in a country for the long term
requires improvements to the innovation pillar (WEF, 2012). It is comprised of the
following indicators: (1) capacity for innovation, (2) quality of scientific research
institutions, (3) company spending on R&D, (4) university-industry collaboration on
R&D, (5) government procurement of advanced technology products, (6) availability of

18

The other pillars are institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary
education, higher education training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness, market size, and business sophistication.
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scientists and engineers, (7) utility patents, and (8) intellectual property protection.
Survey questions correspond to these indicators, and are shown in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2 GCR Questions Corresponding to Innovation Indicators
Question

How to Answer

In your country, how do companies obtain
technology?

How would you assess the quality of scientific
research institutions in your country,?
To what extent do companies in your country
spend on R&D?
To what extent do business and universities
collaborate on R&D in your country?
Do government procurement decisions foster
technological innovation in your country?
To what extent are scientists and engineers
available in your country?
How would you rate intellectual property
protection, including anti-counterfeiting
measures, in your country?

1 = exclusively from licensing or
imitating foreign companies
7 = by conducting formal research and
pioneering their own new products
and processes
1 = very poor
7 = best in their field internationally
1 = not at all
7 = heavily
1 = not at all
7 = extensively
1 = not at all
7 = extremely effectively
1 = not at all
7 = widely available
1 = very weak
7 = very strong

Source: Based on WEF, 2012 (Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013)
Note: Besides these above questions, the GCR also used the number of patents for inventions per
millions of population in 2009 as an additional innovation indicator.

The GCR notes that less advanced countries can improve productivity by adopting
existing innovation or making incremental improvements. However, countries in an
innovation-driven stage of growth; such as Finland, Korea, and Singapore; must innovate
new products and processes to be competitive (WEF, 2012, p. 7). The GCR recommends
that countries create an environment that is conducive to innovation and supported by the
public and private sectors. This environment includes high levels of investment in R&D,
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especially by the private sector; high quality scientific research institutions; extensive
research collaboration between university and industry; and secured property rights.

NIS Evaluation in Finland, Korea and Singapore
Below are three tables presenting the results of innovation performance evaluation
for Finland, Korea, and Singapore from the Knowledge Assessment Methodology
(KAM) and the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). These countries’ scores and
rankings on innovation performance are among the best in the world and reflect
positively on the NIS in each country.

Table 3.3 Innovation Rankings and Scores for Innovation-Leading Countries
KAM

GCR

Country
Finland
Korea
Singapore

Innovation Rank

Innovation Score

Innovation Rank

Innovation Score

3
21
4

9.66
8.80
9.49

2
16
8

5.75
4.94
5.39

Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 and WEF, 2012

Table 3.4 GCR Innovation Indicator Rankings for Innovation-Leading Countries
Indicator

Finland Korea

Capacity for innovation
Quality of scientific research institutions
Company spending on R&D
University-industry collaboration in R&D
Government procurement of advanced technology products
Availability of scientists and engineers
PCT patents, applications/mil pop.*
Intellectual property protection

4
13
3
4
14
1
3
1

Source: Based on WEF, 2012 (values on 7-scale for 146 countries except PCT*)
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19
24
11
25
33
23
9
40

Singapore
20
12
8
5
2
13
13
2

Table 3.5 KAM Innovation Indicator Scores for Innovation-Leading Countries
Indicator

Finland

Korea

Singapore

FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008

6.95
2.64

6.41
0.79

9.53
9.64

Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.), 2009

7.92

9.36

9.68

Royalty and license fees payments (US$/pop.), 2009
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.), 2009

9.68
9.21

9.04
9.37

9.92
9.05

Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.), 2009

9.60

8.57

9.44

Royalty payments and receipts(US$ mil.), 2009

8.72

9.28

9.52

Royalty payments and receipts(US$/pop.), 2009

9.60

8.48

9.92

Science and engineering enrollment ratio (%), 2009

9.55
6.44
6.71

9.44
4.89
9.18

10.00
9.00
5.89

10.00
9.90
5.95

8.08
9.60
8.83

8.77
8.91
9.91

S&E journal articles, 2007
S&E journal articles/mil. people, 2007

9.85
8.41
9.79

8.40
9.38
8.28

9.62
8.00
9.38

Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2010
Patents granted by USPTO, avg. 2005-2009
Patents granted by USPTO/mil. people, avg. 2005-2009

9.85
8.97
9.59

3.21
9.73
9.66

9.85
8.56
9.18

High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2009
Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2010

8.02
9.69

9.47
9.24

9.92
9.47

Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2010

9.24

9.54

9.24

Value chain presence (1-7), 2010

9.39

9.01

9.39

Capital goods gross imports(US$ mil.), 2005-2009
Capital goods gross exports (US$ mil.), 2005-2009

5.67
8.73

7.16
9.40

9.93
10.00

S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%), 2008

2.29

0.49

2.01

Avg. number of citations per S&E article, 2008
Intellectual property protection (1-7), 2010

8.96
10.00

6.88
6.87

8.54
9.85

FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008

Science enrollment ratio (%), 2009
Researchers in R&D, 2009
Researchers in R&D/mil. people, 2009
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2008
Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2009
University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2010

Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 (scores on 10-scale for 146 countries)
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Besides international surveys and indicators discussed above, there are other ways
in evaluating NIS performance such as in-house evaluation, as in the case of Finland; or
independent observations and secondary data, as in the case of Korea and Singapore.
These are discussed below.

Finland
Finland is a continuing global leader in innovation, however, a new innovation
strategy was adopted in 2008 to redirect the NIS and focus on problems of the system
(Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 21). In 2009, a panel of domestic and international experts was
assembled by Finland’s Ministry of Education and Ministry of Employment and
Economy to evaluate the performance of the NIS and its future prospects.
The panel commissioned several in-depth studies including a firm-level survey,
and concluded that Finland’s NIS “has an admirable track record and its current
performance is still good” (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 88). According to the panel,
however, “good is not enough” (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 9). The system is too complex
and not user friendly. Private firms require too much time and effort in dealing with NIS
actors, related policies, and initiatives (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 17-18). Therefore, the
NIS should be simplified. The number of policy instruments should be reduced by 90%
and the number of public innovation policy organizations should also be reduced
(Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 88).
The panel also found there is a shortage of educated labor in Finland’s high-tech
companies (ISI et al., 2008; Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 18). It therefore recommended
several changes to the higher education system, including redefined tasks for
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polytechnics and universities; financial incentives for high-quality research, education,
and internationalization; and repositioning academically-oriented research into the
universities and commercially-oriented research into a small number of public R&D
organizations (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 88).

Korea
Evaluation of firm-level innovation shows that Korea is restructuring from a
manufacturing-led economy to a knowledge-intensive one and transitioning from
imitation to innovation (Lee, 2003, p. 221). A firm survey in 2002 showed that 43% are
technologically innovative (Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, & Tangchitpaiboon, 2002). In
2003, the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) ranked Korea first
in the world for IT infrastructure and third for S&T achievement (Yim, n.d., p. 2). The
long-term innovation vision plans for 2025 and 2030 continue current NIS policies and
targeted sectors, including a shift to private sector driven innovation and international
competitiveness and openness.
However, several challenges for Korea’s NIS have been identified; including
enhancing efficiency and interactions through strengthened links among R&D institutes
both domestic and foreign ones; more joint research and manpower exchange; more
technical cooperation between foreign and domestic firms; and implementing enhanced
FDI regimes, cross-licensing, and strategic alliances (Bartzokas, 2007, p. 7-8).
In 2008, the Institute for Systems and Innovation (ISI), the German Institute of
Global and Area Studies (GIGA), and the Georgia Tech Program in Science, Technology
and Innovation Policy (STIP) also identified strengths and weaknesses in Korea’s NIS.
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The performance of S&T administration, the GRIs, and the educational system was seen
as critical. Korea’s tax incentive system was described as complex with many elements.
Patent registration adjustments, the creation of spinoff firms, and improved university
efforts have resulted in better technology diffusion, patenting, and commercialization.
However, innovation linkages through science parks have not been achieved and
chaebols have not reached the desired innovation capacity (ISI et al., 2008).

Singapore
Singapore has scored highly on key innovation indicators in international
evaluations (Wong, 2003). However, Wong and Singh (2005) claim that insufficient
attention has been given to promoting innovation collaboration among local enterprises.
They find that despite some examples of promoting R&D consortia, inter-firm
collaboration in Singapore lags behind countries such as Finland and Taiwan. This
situation is identified as a major weakness in Singapore’s NIS (Wong & Singh, 2005, p.
34).
Moreover, venture capital deals are lagging despite government initiatives to
establish Singapore as the preferred venture capital location in Southeast Asia (Wong,
2003). Approximately US$13 billion (S$16 billion) in venture funds were managed in
2004, but there was weak high-tech start-up formation in the country (Wong & Singh,
2005, p. 43).
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS FOR NIS ASSESSMENT

This chapter presents a framework that could be used by policymakers for
assessing the status and performance of national innovation systems in fostering
technological innovations in a given country, especially a developing one. The
framework is based on a few fundamental questions that would likely be of interest to
policymakers and policy analysts. In this way, the framework enables a broad-based
examination of NIS as an approach for organizing policies and institutions in multiple
domains as they are brought into the production of technological innovation.

A Conceptual Framework for NIS Assessment
The findings of the previous two chapters are synthesized into this framework.
The framework calls for an understanding of, first, what the NIS is, i.e. its theoretical
conceptualization and its basic system components; second, why the NIS approach is
adopted, i.e. the rationale for incorporating the approach in encouraging innovation; third,
its implementation in terms of the organizational structures and functions in place; and
fourth, potential methods by which the performance of the NIS can be evaluated. Put
simply, the assessment framework asks: What is NIS? Why is NIS adopted? How is NIS
implemented? And how can NIS performance be evaluated? Table 4.1 presents these
four questions as well as the responses that have been uncovered so far through the
reviews of NIS and public policy-related theory and the NIS practices of innovationleading countries.
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Table 4.1 NIS Assessment Framework
Question

Explanation

What is NIS?

Concepts of
NIS; basic
components of
the system

Why is NIS
adopted?

Rationale and
goals

How is NIS
implemented?

How can NIS
performance
be evaluated?

Theory

Best Practice

Criteria

A system for
stimulating
technological
innovation in the
private sector of
a national
economy;
innovators,
linkages,
environment

Private firms
innovate, R&D
institutes,
universities and
government
agencies support;
funding, clusters,
science parks,
rules, regulations,
and institutions
enable innovation
Global
competitiveness,
economic crisis,
learning
from/replicating
successful
practices of
others

Presence/absence
of necessary
system
components

Government
agencies/private
organizations
fund and link
innovators;
government rules
incentivize
innovators;
institutions
provide technical
and capital
resources to
innovators
Quantitatively
using
international and
domestic
indicators;
qualitatively
using expert
opinion

Organizational
and institutional
structures and
capacities

Adopter
predisposition;
motivation/
obstacles; Costs
and benefits;
Threats and
opportunities;
Imitation;
Learning
Structure and
Rational
function to
bureaucracy;
achieve intended muddling
outputs;
through;
organization of
consultation,
the system and
monitoring,
the instruments
credibility
that make it
work

Means of
understanding
how well the
policy or
program is
doing in terms
of meeting
intended goals

Measurement of
actual vs.
expected
performance to
aid in decisionmaking; can be
vague in respect
to public
agencies and
policies
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Historical details
of policy
development

R&D expenditures
and manpower,
patents and
publications, new
to the world
products and
processes;
commentary and
experience of
local system
experts

The framework presents three dimensions that build on each other and lead to
criteria for answering these questions. The dimensions include explanation, theory, and
best practice. The explanation dimension provides a brief concept of each question and
indicates what to look for. Understanding the questions points policymakers in the right
direction for finding criteria for an answer. Each question has a unique concept that
requires background or theories related to NIS. The theory dimension provides
policymakers an empirical basis for understanding the concepts, evolution, and
components of the NIS; the adoption and diffusion of public policy; and policy and
program implementation and evaluation. Theories can be used to develop guiding
principles which can help to translate NIS concepts into practice. The best practice
dimension reflects real-world NISs using short cases of three innovation-leading
countries: Finland, Korea, and Singapore. It examines their NIS adoption,
implementation and evaluation against the theory. The selection of these three countries
is based on their success in applying the NIS approach and stage of economic
development as innovation-driven economies. Finland was the first country to adopt NIS
and that led to positive changes to its economy up to present, Korea turned crisis into
opportunity in the transition to a technology-based economy using NIS and has become
competitive in the global economy, and Singapore is a regional and global innovation
leader. Additionally, the evaluations of NIS by the OECD, the World Bank, and the
World Economic Forum are also reviewed to provide policymakers techniques and
measurements for evaluating their countries’ innovative performance.

69

Criteria bring together these dimensions. Understanding the questions, the
theories behind them, and real-world experiences provides guidance for policymakers in
acquiring relevant data to create their own indicators for NIS assessment. Some criteria
could be based on presence or absence of necessary system components, while other
criteria could be based on organizational and institutional structures and capacities. This
study does not attempt to create uniform sets of indicators for a given country’s NIS
assessment. Instead, it gives policymakers a framework for finding their own indicators
that are “made to measure” their specific system.

Application of the Framework: A Case Study and Interviews
The remainder of this study demonstrates how the NIS framework can be applied
to assess the status and performance of an individual country’s NIS. In the next chapter,
the case study of Thailand’s NIS is presented, including a background of the country, an
overview of recent socioeconomic trends and STI policy developments, and the details of
its NIS. Thailand is in the efficiency-driven stage of economic growth and is in the
process of structuring its NIS. History, size and endowments, and economic development
stage have shaped Thailand with a different set of institutions, various government roles,
and the relations among them as well as different national focuses. These make Thailand
a suitable candidate among developing countries for an in-depth review of the NIS.
In addition to reviewing the Thailand case, the interview method is used to obtain
insightful information about Thailand’s NIS. Individuals with knowledge and experience
in Thailand’s NIS were asked for their evaluations of the system. These individuals are
officials from different departments of Thailand’s national government; including Mr.
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Alongkorn Ponlaboot, Deputy Minister of Commerce (MOC); Prof. Dr. Soottiporn
Chittmittrapap, Secretary General of National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT);
and Dr. Yada Mukdapitak, Deputy Secretary General of National Science Technology
and Innovation Policy Office (STI). Open-ended interviews were conducted and based on
the following questions:
1. In your view, is the NIS approach being implemented effectively?
2. How can NIS be improved?
3. What is your agency’s role in this system?
4. How would you evaluate the status and the overall performance of NIS?
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CHAPTER 5
A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND’S NIS
This chapter presents an in-depth case study of Thailand’s NIS. It includes a brief
background of the country itself, a discussion of its stages of economic growth and
technological developments. It examines preconditions to Thailand’s NIS, provides a
broad description of the NIS, and notes some important outputs of the system.
Thailand’s shift from an agricultural-based to a higher-technology path stemmed
in part from a conscious national development strategy. Thailand, like many other
developing nations, has recognized that facilitating the transition to an innovation-based
economy is an important public policy priority. A brief overview of the nation’s path to
economic development and technological progress helps to contextualize this case
study’s review of the NIS.

Background
Thailand (Figure 5.1 below) is centered on the Chaophraya River basin, where an
agrarian and feudalistic society originally developed. Bangkok is the capital of Thailand
and is the largest city with a population of 9.6 million in 2009 (USAID, 2011). It is a
modern, international city experiencing rapid growth and is the center of government,
business, finance, industry and culture in the country.
After World War II, Thailand became a modernizing democratic nation with a
market-based economy and strengthening international cooperation (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2005; Chairatana, 2006; Krishna, n.d.; USAID, 2011). Today, Thailand is a
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newly industrialized country with a population of 67.8 million. Most of the population is
employed in agriculture. However in recent decades, industrial manufacturing has also
contributed significantly to GDP and has become an engine of growth and investment
(CIA, 2010).

Figure 5.1 Map of Thailand

Source: CIA, 2011
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Government in Thailand
Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932. The current king, His
Majesty Bhumibol Adulyadej, assumed the throne in 1946 and is the world’s longest
reigning monarch. The king, prime minister, and the cabinet compose the executive
branch of government. The prime minister is typically the leader of the party which gains
a majority in parliament from direct elections. The prime minister forms a government by
nominating 35 ministers and deputy ministers to compose the cabinet.
The prime minister and the cabinet formulate government policy and agencies
translate policies into action. Thailand’s parliament is bicameral with five hundred
members in the House of Representatives and one hundred fifty members in the Senate.
The House of Representatives has the main legislative, appropriations, and constitutional
amendment powers, while the Senate has primary advisory with appointment powers.
The House can also remove ministers and prime ministers with a vote. The judiciary in
Thailand is composed of three systems: a Court of Justice, an Administrative Court, and
the Constitutional Court. Thailand has had seventeen constitutions since 1932 and has
also experienced several military coups during this time (Baker & Phongphaichit, 2005;
Girling, 1981; Library of Congress, 1987; US Department of State, 2011). There are 77
provinces in Thailand, including Bangkok. Provincial governors are appointed by the
Minister of the Interior, except for the governor of Bangkok who is directly elected.

Stages of Economic Growth
Industrialization in Thailand began in the late 1950s. Government promoted
private investment, the role of state enterprises was reduced, and investment in
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infrastructure increased. The first national social and economic development plan was
drafted in 1961 and resulted in economic growth driven by private sector capitalism
(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 150-151). The Board of Investment (BOI) was created
to promote investment by providing tax and non-tax incentives and other privileges, the
Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) was created to provide financing for
industrial investments, the Small Industry Finance Corporation (SIFC) provided finance
to SMEs, and the Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research (TISTR)
began conducting R&D (Brimble, 2003, p. 337; Chairatana, 2006, p. 120).
During the 1960s, Thailand employed an import-substitution strategy with tariffs
on imports to stimulate domestic industries. By the early 1970s, a major shift in policy to
promote export was undertaken; however, some barriers and control on many products,
imports, and industrial activities remained (Brimble, 2003, p. 339).
During the 1970s and 1980s, policy favored export industries and also small-scale
and regional industries. After 1980, the contribution of agriculture to Thailand’s GDP
began to decline, and industry’s share began to rise (Chairatana, 2006, p. 121). In this
period, Thailand positioned itself as an attractive place for labor-intensive manufacturing
by combining imported capital and technology with local human and natural resources.
Products were marketed and exported through foreign partner networks (Chairatana,
2006). Rapid growth had begun and lasted through the 1980s and into the 1990s. The
economy grew at approximately 10% by the middle of the 1980s. Thailand was viewed as
an attractive investment location in the Asia-Pacific region. The BOI removed obstacles
and provided more incentives for private investment in key sectors. It promoted regional
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areas and infrastructure development, with private sector investment becoming
increasingly important.
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Thailand took steps toward more openness
and competitiveness in the economy. The economy grew by more than 8% a year
between 1991 and 1995, per capita incomes rose, and poverty decreased dramatically
(Brimble, 2003, p. 336). For the period 1985-1994, Thailand’s per capita GNP grew by
8.2% (Brimble, 2003, p. 336; Chairatana, 2006, p. 120-122).
In 1995, Thailand joined the World Trade Organization. Foreign direct investment
and exports of manufactured products were the main drivers of growth, and the share of
GDP from manufacturing reached approximately 30% (Brimble, 2003, p. 336). The rapid
growth put pressure on infrastructure and resources causing production costs to rise.
There was also intensifying competition from low-wage countries, such as India, China,
and Indonesia. In response, Thai manufacturers shifted to higher value-added and more
sophisticated products and moved up the value added ladder (Brimble, 2003, p. 336).
In 1997, however, the Thai economy went into a deep recession due to the failure
of the financial sector. This economic crisis lasted the remainder of the decade. As a
result, the currency collapsed, over 2 million people lost their jobs, consumers stopped
buying, and creditors stopped paying their loans. The economy had become fragile due to
cheap credit, weak financial controls, and excessive foreign investment. Between 1997
and 1998, the economy declined by 11%. GDP growth in 1998 was -8.3%, and inflation
rose to 8% (Baker & Pongphaichit, 2005; Bosworth, 2005, p. 2; Brimble, 2003, p. 336339; Chairatana, 2006).
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The crisis in Thailand triggered similar crises in several other East Asian
countries because of the level of integration of the regional economies. This phenomenon
was referred to as “contagion.” The IMF intervened in Thailand and some of the other
affected countries to help stabilize the situation. Friedman (1999) has referred to the
Asian Economic Crisis as the “first global financial crisis of the new era of globalization”
(p. 1).
Investment was also affected by the crisis. In the first half of the 1990s,
investment averaged 40% of GDP; however after the crisis, investment has been reduced
to only 20% (Bosworth, 2005, p. 2). The crisis caused financial and corporate
restructuring, and the government implemented reform to the financial sector (Brimble,
2003, p. 339). By the early 2000s, economic output had bounced back to the pre-crisis
level; however, economic growth was on a lower trajectory. At this point, Thailand
required “significant increases in competitiveness in the major export sectors” (Brimble,
2003, p. 337).
Thailand’s growth has been described as relatively capital intensive because the
growth of the capital stock has been greater than the growth of the output (Bosworth,
2005, p. 2). Studies conducted by domestic institutions indicate strong rates of capital
formation. Moreover, the largest improvement in total factor production (TFP) has
occurred in agriculture while TFP growth in the service sector has frequently been
negative (Bosworth, 2005, p. 16).
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Current Economic Status
Thailand is transitioning into a middle-income country. It is seen as a businessfriendly manufacturing hub, and an investment, industry, and tourism destination in the
Asia-Pacific region. Thailand’s GDP in 2010 was approximately US$153.19 billion, and
its GDP per capita was US$2,276.28 (ADB, 2012).19 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the
structure and trends of economic output and exports for Thailand in recent years. For the
period of 1990-2010, overall, Thailand’s GDP and its GDP per capita have increased
during this period. Moreover, the output of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors
of the economy have remained consistent during this period (ADB, 2012).
Exports are critical to the economy, accounting for about two-thirds of GDP
(USAID, 2011). In 2010, exports grow by 26.8% and in 2011 by 15.5% (ADB, 2012).
Export activities are concentrated along the Eastern Seaboard, where port facilities and
major industrial estates are located. Major export industries include electronics,
automotive, chemicals and heavy industry.20 The electronics industry is the country’s
largest source of manufacturing export, particularly hard disk drives. Most electronics
firms are original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for foreign multinational
corporations (MNCs). Automobiles and automotive parts exports account for 12% of
GDP. Thailand has become an important base of production for automotive firms from
Japan, the United States, and Europe. It is predicted that Thailand will be one of the top
10 motor vehicle producing countries in the world by 2015 (Intarakumnerd, 2010).

19
20

GDP and GDP per capita in constant 1988 dollars
Business Report Thailand, issue 5, February 2011
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Table 5.1 Thailand’s Output in Constant Prices 1990-2010
Indicator

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

National Accounts
GDP per capita (USD)
1,359.21 1,930.74 1,418.37 1,446.14 2,276.28
GDP (billion USD, at constant prices)
75.84
114.69
88.22
94.14
153.19
GDP by industrial origin at constant prices (billion USD)
Agriculture
10.28
10.78
9.09
8.49
12.72
Mining
1.21
1.74
1.88
2.15
3.37
Manufacturing
21.09
37.36
32.15
36.60
62.44
Electricity, gas, and water
1.82
3.08
2.86
3.15
5.46
Construction
4.55
7.16
2.24
2.29
3.40
Trade
13.18
20.14
13.92
13.22
20.36
Transport and communications
5.72
9.33
8.52
9.37
14.34
Finance
4.21
12.48
5.99
7.02
11.92
Public administration
2.39
3.02
2.79
2.84
4.24
Others
11.38
9.59
8.78
9.02
14.94
Structure of output (% of GDP)
Agriculture
10.0
9.1
8.5
9.2
10.9
Industry
37.2
37.6
36.9
38.8
40.1
Services
52.8
53.3
54.6
52.0
49.0
Source: Based on ADB, 2012
Note: The base year for constant prices is 1988; Services includes banking, finance, and tourism.

Agricultural products are also a major export. Approximately 42% of the working
population is engaged in agriculture (USAID, 2011). Thailand is the largest exporter of
rice in the Southeast Asian region and one of the largest in the world. It is also the
world’s largest exporter of shrimp and natural rubber. Besides electronics, automotive,
and agricultural products, other important exported products include gems and jewelry,
chemicals, and polymers. Currently, the United States is Thailand’s largest export market,
followed by China (ADB, 2010; ADB, 2012).
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Tourism is also a major component of the economy with approximately 15%
annual growth in numbers of tourists in 2010 (Durongkaveroj, 2010; MFA, 2010).
Typically, tourism accounts for about 6% of Thailand’s annual GDP. Tourism is more
important to Thailand’s economy than to any other Southeast Asian country.

Table 5.2 Thailand Exports 2000-2011
Indicator

2000

Exports
Exports value (billion USD)
62.2
Exports growth (%)
19.9
Key Exported Products, growth rate (%)
Automatic data processing machines
7.6
parts and accessories
Motor cars, parts, and accessories
27.2
Electronic integrated circuits
52.3
Rubber
31.5
Precious stones and jewelry
-1.4
Polymers of ethylene, propylene, etc.
53.5
in primary forms
Iron, steel and their products
n/a
Machinery and parts thereof
n/a
Refine fuels
n/a
Rice
-15.8
Rubber products
n/a
Chemical products
n/a

2005

2008

2009

2010

2011

110.9
14.9

177.8
15.54

152.4
-14.3

193.3
26.8

222.6
15.5

28.6

1.4

-9.9

9.4

-13.9

40.5
21.4
8.2
21.7
34.6

14.8
-18.0
15.1
48.0
0.9

-26.3
-7.8
-34.6
21.8
-16.1

48.3
16.3
70.5
9.9
31.8

-8.8
-6.7
59.3
1.2
32.4

16.0
26.0
33.7
n/a
n/a
27.7

12.2
-7.0
84.6
70.5
19.0
4.9

-4.4
-18.7
-27.6
-15.3
1.9
7.4

n/a
36.3
14.9
n/a
33.1
19.9

n/a
19.4
23.5
-2.3
24.4
37.0

Source: Based on MOC, 2012 (Exports) and NSO, 2012 (Key Exported Products)
Note: n/a means the product is not in the top 10 exported items.

In 2009, Thailand’s “Creative Economy” became the focus of a new economic
development strategy. The Director of the National Innovation Agency, Dr. Supachai
Lorlowhakarn said,
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The emergence of the ‘creative economy’ concept in recent years is
closely linked to innovation. In essence, a creative economy is deeply
anchored in continuous innovation wherein not only technological
advancements, but also business factors and social factors provide a
foundation for such development.21
The Creative Economy policy as defined by the National Economic and Social
Development Board (NESDB) covers four industry clusters.22 These are: (1) cultural
heritage industries, which include crafts, historical and cultural tourism, Thai foods, and
traditional medicine; (2) performing and visual arts; (3) media, including film,
publishing, broadcasting, and music, and (4) functional creation industries, which include
design, fashion, architecture, advertising, and software. These clusters comprise
“creative” domestic industries which are less dependent on foreign capital and technology
(PRD, 2011). The new strategy is referred to as “Creative Thailand.” The goals of the
Creative Thailand policy are to promote Thailand as a hub of creative industries in South
East Asia, and to boost the economic contribution of national creative industries from the
12% to 20% of GDP by 2012 (PRD, 2011).
The Thai government has identified several measures to achieve the goals of the
Creative Thailand policy, including: (1) establishing a dedicated agency to oversee policy
implementation; (2) enhancing the efficiency of the nation’s intellectual property
management system; (3) developing a next-generation ICT infrastructure to support
creative industries; (4) updating the national curriculum with courses and textbooks on

21

http://www.thailand-innovativecompanies.com/ttd_bizenterprise/Indprof/TTIC/TTIC_2010_IP04.pdf
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) describes the creative economy as a
way to drive a balanced and sustainable production restructuring strategy under the 10th National
Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2011). The major principle is the creation of value by
applying knowledge and innovation, together with strength from the diversity of natural resources, culture,
and Thai ways of life (http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/review/content.php?chapterID=76).
22
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the Creative Economy and intellectual property; (5) promoting the value of traditional
knowledge and creativity at the regional and community levels; (6) establishing new
sources of funding and new investment measures to support creative industries and
businesses, especially SMEs; and (7) allocating approximately US$670 million from
2010-2012 to lay the groundwork for the Creative Economy agenda.23

Science, Technology, and Innovation
From the late 1950s to about 1980s, science and technology policy development
started to take shape in Thailand. In 1959, the National Research Council of Thailand
(NRCT) was created to formulate and implement national research policy and
strategies.24 In 1963 the Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research
(TISTR) was created for implementing special S&T policies of the Thai government. 25
The First (1963-1966) and then the Second (1967-1971) National Economic and
Social Development Plans were launched during this period.26 In 1979, the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST) was created to formulate national policy for S&T, the
environment, and energy, and to implement these policies efficiently to bring about the
most socio-economic benefits and national stability.27 Four universities offering degrees
in engineering, computing, and other technological fields opened during 1970s: the Asian
Institute of Technology (AIT), King Mongkut’s University of Technology North

23

http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/review/content.php?chapterID=77
http://nrct.go.th/index.php?mod=contents&req=view&id=88
25
http://www.tistr.or.th/tistr_en/index_en.php?pages=us_history
26
http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=84
27
http://www.most.go.th/eng/index.php/about-the-ministry/background
24
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Bangkok (KMUTNB), King Mongkut’s University of Technology Ladkrabang (KMITL),
and Mahidol University (MU) (Inarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007).
During the 1980s, technology plans were developed and two key public
technology research institutes opened. The Fifth National Economic and Social
Development Plan (1982-1986) called for promoting S&T to raise output and
productivity and conserve factors of production for agriculture, manufacturing, and
energy. 28 The development of the 20-year S&T master plan (1990-2011) also began at
this time. The National Science and Technology Development Board (NSTDB) was
established during this period to conduct, support, coordinate, and promote efforts in
scientific and technological development in the public and the private sectors. The
National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) and the National
Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) were also created. BIOTEC
supports the creation and transfer of technology for industry, agriculture, natural
resources, and the environment.29 NECTEC undertakes and promotes the development of
electronics and computer technologies through R&D activities, and serves as a linkage
between research communities and industries through established industrial clusters.30
Between 1987 and 1997, 103 scientists and engineers and 39 technicians per
million persons were engaged in R&D in Thailand, and science and engineering students
accounted for 18% of college and university enrollments. Suranari University of
Technology opened, and planning for the Thailand Science Park (TSP) began in 1989.

28

http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=87
http://www.biotec.or.th/biotechnology-en/en/About-Us.asp
30
http://www.nectec.or.th/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=63
29
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TSP would become a major hub for technological innovation in the country
(Intarakumnerd et al., 2002).
In the 1990s, the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan
(1992-1997) called for a sectoral approach to technology development and initiated
several instruments to encourage innovation.31 The National Science and Technology
Development Agency (NSTDA) was established in 1991 with an annual budget of US$50
million. Its task was to promote a knowledge-based society through R&D, technology
transfer, human resources development, and infrastructure development and research.32
The Thailand Research Fund (TRF) was set up to strengthen Thailand’s research
infrastructure through grants provision.33 The National Synchrotron Research Center
(NSRC) was also established to conduct nationwide research in basic science, chemistry,
and biochemistry for industrial adaptation.34
In 1996, the First National Information Technology Policy, called IT 2000, was
developed. It identified three key areas necessary for IT development in Thailand: (1) an
equitable national information infrastructure, (2) human resources, and (3) enhancement
of government service. The Thailand Graduate Institute of Science and Technology
(TGIST) was established to develop human resources in S&T, and link industry and
academia.35 King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi (KMUTT),

31

http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=89
http://www.nstda.or.th/eng/index.php/at-a-glance
33
http://www.trf.or.th/en/visions.asp
34
http://www.most.go.th/eng/index.php/agencies-under-most/75-national-synchrotron-research-center
35
http://www.nstda.or.th/tgist/general.html
32
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Mahanakorn University of Technology (MUT), and the National Science Museum
(NSM), also opened during the decade.
The Asian economic crisis that struck Thailand in the late 1990s has been called a
“blessing in disguise,” because the country then became aware of the importance of
learning processes and linkage creation for supporting industries (Intarakumnerd &
Brimble, 2007, p. 263). After the crisis, the idea of “competitiveness” gained more
attention in Thailand and throughout the region. It triggered science, technology, and
innovation policy reform (Brimble, 2003, p. 340; Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p.
263).
Immediately following the crisis, Thailand re-examined its approach to economic
growth and development, led by the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra,
who emphasized the country’s economic competitiveness. Support for innovationoriented policy in the government also took shape at this critical time. Dr. Yada
Mukdapitak, the deputy secretary general of Thailand’s Science, Technology and
Innovation Policy Office, states that NIS was recognized in Thailand around 1998 by
NSTDA (discussed below). During the 1990s, Dr. Yongyut Yuthavong, the first President
of NSTDA, was searching for a way to manage the country’s S&T development in a
more systemic approach and also to understand international trends in technology transfer
and technological innovation. A two-year research project was initiated to uncover details
about systemic approaches to S&T development. Dr. Mukdapitak was one of three
NSTDA’s researchers assigned to the project. NIS came to the researchers’ attention
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because of the global trend of innovation thinking at that time (personal communication,
April 7, 2011).
Research on NIS in Thailand had begun. Its aim was to understand the concept of
NIS itself and determine how it could bring changes to the country’s S&T development
approach. Dr. Mukdapitak and her colleagues investigated what other countries were
doing with NIS, including Finland, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Interviews with key people that studied NIS and innovation policy in those
countries were conducted (personal communication, April 7, 2011).
The NSTDA study resulted in a report on innovation systems, and
recommendations to the government for a change in national direction for R&D and S&T
development. The Research and Policy department at NSTDA also invited Bengt-Åke
Lundvall, a leading NIS expert from Aalborg University in Denmark, to help explain the
NIS idea to the Thai government. The NIS concept was initially applied. NSTDA
supported the NIS approach to prioritize what needed to be done, and to direct key
system actors to accomplish innovation-related tasks (Y. Mukdapitak, personal
communication, April 7, 2011).
Description of Thailand’s NIS
The rationale for NIS adoption in Thailand is based on three main factors: the
environmental context, competition, and learning. The environmental context refers to
outward influences that cause changes in making decisions (e.g. system shocks, crisis).
Competition means that adoption occurs when the adopter enters into economic
competition. Adoption is more likely when positive economic spillovers are present.
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Negative economic spillovers discourage adoption. Learning can incorporate the
adopter’s own experiences as well as the experiences of others. Learning also involves
the processing of information which can be obtained from internal and external sources.
The Asian economic crisis of 1997 raised the awareness of competitiveness of the
country and triggered science, technology, and innovation policy reform. Concerted
learning and research efforts at this time in Thailand focused on a more systemic
approach to manage the country’s innovation development. NIS came to the country’s
attention because of the global trend of innovation system thinking at that time. Adoption
of the NIS approach was a good fit with the historic and continuing build-up of science
and technology infrastructure and capacity in the country. A long-term view of growth
and development was emphasized by both NIS and S&T build-up.
Different reasons for adopting a policy or program leads to different responses
and means of implementation, and most importantly, this can lead to different levels of
success. If the adopters are forced to adopt something into use without background
knowledge and experiences, they may not be ready and find it difficult. Similarly, when
the adopters voluntarily adopt something without learning it thoroughly, it may not be
well conceived and fail. Will different adoption types affect the performance? For
Thailand, the factors that triggered NIS adoption are the environmental context from
financial crisis, competition in global economy, and learning from experiences of NIS
leading countries. This gives us understanding of the way Thailand adopted the NIS and
why it does what it does. Is Thailand doing the thing right or is Thailand doing the right
thing?
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Implementation of the NIS is proceeding in Thailand, affected by the wider policy
environment discussed above. National Innovation Agency (NIA) and the National
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) have both shown capacity in
planning for and fostering innovation. Foreign-based firms and investors are transferring
capital and some necessary technology to suit their operations to the local affiliate firms.
This transfer takes place through the conventional branch plant arrangement. Most
domestic firms in Thailand appear to lack the resources, technical sophistication, and
stimulus to be real participants in the implementation of the NIS. Institutional structures
to facilitate innovation are taking shape; however, weak or missing linkages among
innovation actors persist in the system. Most notably, the critical linkage between
industry and universities appears to be underdeveloped. Rationalizing the system and
enhancing the credibility of actors and their incentives can have a positive impact on
policy implementation. These issues will be described in more detail and addressed
through policy recommendations in the sections below.
In Thailand, the NIS is intended to assist the innovative efforts of targeted firms in
private industry. These firms undertake R&D and innovative activities to produce
products and processes that embody technological innovation. Public organizations,
including key government agencies and research institutions are integral to facilitate the
innovative efforts of firms. Key political and social institutions create “framework
conditions” (OECD, 1997b) that also help to promote a climate for innovation in the
economy. These aspects of Thailand’s NIS are described below.
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The Private Sector
Industry accounted for approximately 45% of Thailand’s GDP in 2010 (CIA,
2010). Major industries include textiles and garments, agricultural processing, food and
beverages, cement, jewelry, electric appliances, machinery and equipment, computers
and computer parts, integrated circuits, communications equipment, furniture, rubber and
plastics, automobiles and automotive parts. The industrial production growth rate was
14.5% in 2010, which was the ninth-highest in the world. Manufacturing exports
accounted for approximately 50% of GDP in 2010, especially machinery and electronic
components (CIA, 2010; NSO, 2007). Table 5.3 below is based on Thailand’s last census
of industry in 2007. 36 It shows output from major industrial divisions in terms of value
added production. Communication equipment, food and beverages, motor vehicles, and
fabricated metals are the leading industries in terms of value added.
Large multinational corporations (MNCs) and large state-owned enterprises
dominate the economy and are the most important contributors to GDP (Intarakumnerd,
2010). The automotive and electronics manufacturing sectors include important Japanese
firms, such as Honda, Toyota, Hitachi, and Matsushita (Andrews, Chompusri, &
Baldwin, 2003).37 Between 1995 and 2004, transportation machinery and electronics
including hard-disk drive (HDD) were the top two manufacturing subsectors in terms of
FDI (Brimble & Urata, 2006).

36
37

The National Statistical Office conducts the census of industry every 10 years.
http://www.bangkokcompanies.com/categories/thai_companies_p252.htm
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Table 5.3 Industrial Value Added Production 2007
Value added
Industrial Division
(million USD)
Food and beverages
Textiles, apparel, leather products
Wood and wood products, paper and paper products,
printing
Chemicals and chemical products
Rubber and plastic products
Non-metallic, basic metals and fabricated metallic products
Machinery and equipment
Radio, television, and communication equipment and
apparatus
Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers
Furniture manufacturing
Others
Total

%

7571.0
4784.0
2519.4

14.0
8.8
4.6

3431.1
3783.6
6596.2
2971.8
7990.5

6.3
7.0
12.2
5.5
14.7

6661.8
1925.8
6047.1
54,282.6

12.3
3.5
11.1
100.0

Source: Based on NSO, 2007
Note: Value added equals gross output less production expenses

The R&D activities of most MNCs appear disconnected from local affiliates and
institutions (Brimble & Urata, 2006). In the HDD subsector, however, Seagate
Technology appears to be the only MNCs in Thailand to acknowledge the values of
innovation linkages. It is the country’s largest employer and has developed mutual
technology, human resources, and R&D connections with several of Thailand’s
universities (Brimble & Doner, 2007, p. 1029-1030; Doner, 2009, p. 136). Seagate has
taken the initiative on: (1) developing a consortium of five universities to deliver a
customized curriculum for producing engineers to manage the company’s high-tech
facilities, (2) participating in a government cooperative training program hosting 20-40
students per year, and (3) establishing joint R&D centers at Khon Kaen and Suranaree
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Universities. These have been successful efforts with benefits for both partners (Brimble
& Doner, 2007). However, Thai authorities have been unable to transfer lessons from the
Seagate example into initiatives for related industries (Brimble & Doner, 2007; Doner,
2009).
In 2006, Thailand’s small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) contributed
nearly 40% of GDP. Thailand’s BOI estimates that 99% of the companies operating in
the country in 2010 were SMEs. SMEs are defined as having no more than 200
employees and no more than US$200,000 of capital. Thailand has many SMEs which
account for 78% of employment. However, Thailand has fewer medium-sized enterprises
and more small enterprises than other Asian countries. The many small enterprises in the
country employ relatively small numbers of workers. This suggests that barriers to
growth exist in the economy (Intarakumnerd, 2010). Some SMEs, many large local firms,
and most MNCs, possess little higher order technological capabilities, as shown in Table
5.4 below (Arnold et al., 2000). Perhaps because of the lack of technological skills in
SMEs, the Office of Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion’s (OSMEP) set up the
SMEs promotion plan (2007-2011) as a strategy for upgrading their productivity and
innovative capability (Hoang, 2008).
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Table 5.4 Technological Activities and Capabilities in Thai Firms
Firm Type
Activity
Research and
technological
development

Some SMEs,
Many Large Local Firms,
Most MNCs
Occasionally present, limited in
scale, depleted by 1997 crisis in
some cases, strengthened by
pressures in many cases

Most SMEs
Very rarely present

Design and engineering

Capabilities limited but
growing, when present play a
limited technological
development role but this is
likely changing

Rarely present though
emerging in some firms

Technician and craft
skills and capabilities

Usually present, often the focus
of training efforts, selected key
skills sometimes weak

Strong skills sometimes
present, though key skills
often weak or absent

Basic operating skills
and capabilities

Present, often strong, and
regularly upgraded

Often weak with limited and
irregular upgrading

Source: Based on Arnold et al., 2000

Many Thai firms have shown slow and passive technological learning, a lack of
R&D capabilities, and long-term technological development (Arnold et al., 2000; TDRI,
1992). However, there are some business sectors in Thailand that are investing relatively
more in R&D, as shown in Figure 5.2 below. These include some key manufacturing
subsectors, such as machinery and equipment, food and beverages, and chemicals
subsectors.
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Figure 5.2 Business Sector R&D Expenditures in 2005 for High-Ranking Sectors
million USD
Machinery and Equipment
Food and Beverages
Chemicals
Radio,TV, and Comm. Equip.
Leather products and Footwear
Non-metallic
Motor vehicles
Textiles
Paper and Paper products
Other business activities
Rubber and plastics
Fabricated metal products
Post and telecomm.
Refined petrol products
Basic metals
Computer activities
Electrical machinery
Publishing and printing
Furniture
0
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Source: Based on Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009

There are two main organizations that are active in promoting innovative capacity
and diffusing innovation knowledge among domestic firms (Intarakumnerd & Brimble,
2007, p. 255). These are the Technology Promotion Agency (TPA) and the Kenan
Institute Asia (KI Asia). They serve as “bridging agents” by providing education,
training, technical services, and technology transfer to industry partners. The TPA and KI
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Asia have also become involved in government policies to enhance the capacity and
entrepreneurship of Thai SMEs (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 256).
Cluster development is seen to enhance the competitive advantages of industries.
Porter (2003) notes the progression of national economies in cluster development,
including manufacturing, service, and regional assembly. An important step is to upgrade
the sophistication of clusters to more advanced activities, such as Silicon Valley. The
Thai government has taken policy steps over the years to encourage cluster formation for
industrial development, and Thailand industrial clusters have been recognized
internationally (WEF, 2010). The greater Bangkok area has become a favorable base for
world-leading firms to produce for regional and global markets. Currently in the Bangkok
area, there is an electronic industry cluster and an automobile industry that are
particularly active and worthy of attention.
Thailand is the largest hard-disk drive (HDD) assembler in the world
(Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 249). Major manufacturing facilities in the Greater
Bangkok region are operated by world-leading firms, including Seagate, Maxtor, Western
Digital, Hitachi-IBM, and Fujitsu (Yeung, 2008). Thai firms typically import high-tech
components, and then export the assembled product worldwide, therefore local content is
low. Technology is transferred from foreign affiliates, and marketing and production
decisions are made by MNCs headquarters (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 249).
Thai HDD firms have shown strong capabilities in investment, process development, and
industrial engineering, but weak capabilities in product engineering and innovation and
linkage development. Firms have expressed interest in strengthening linkages to other
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industry stakeholders through joint efforts by industry and government (Intarakumnerd &
Brimble, 2007, p. 249).
Since 1999, NSTDA has supported cluster development programs for the HDD
industry. Representatives from the storage technology industry, the Thai government,
academia, and public research institutes have created a collective management committee
to help guide the development of the industry in Thailand. In 2004, the committee
planned several joint activities utilizing public-private partnerships. Projects were
designed to further develop human resources, industry automation, investment
opportunities, and technology “road mapping and to create a Disk Storage Institute.” As
of 2005, most of these projects are underway using public and private financing, with
NECTEC and MOST playing a supportive (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007).
In the automobile manufacturing industry, the Greater Bangkok and eastern
seaboard region of Thailand is now Southeast Asia’s leading production center. More
than 20 world-leading assembly firms and hundreds of suppliers are active (Yeung,
2008). The automobile industry is now Thailand’s second largest export industry after
electronics and electrical products (Yeung, 2008, p. 27).
In the automobile cluster, both foreign and Thai-owned assemblers and suppliers
gain the benefits of lower transport and logistics costs, increased certainty in inter-firm
transactions, reduced time-to-market, and just-in-time production flexibility. These
advantages come from the geographic proximity of firms in the cluster. The Thai
government has played an important role in facilitating cluster development by creating
sector-specific industrial estates, and securing regional economic cooperation. The
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National Innovation Agency (NIA, discussed below) has become increasingly involved in
the automobile cluster. These efforts have helped to connect Thailand’s automobile
cluster with global automobile production networks.
Yeung (2008) investigated the emergence of industrial clusters in Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore, including the HDD and automobile clusters. He describes three
models for the existence of industrial clusters: (1) an “agglomeration economies model”
which results from local specialized labor, local provision of non-traded inputs, and the
flow of product and market knowledge; (2) an “industrial complex model” which results
from lower transport and logistics costs and greater certainty in transactions; and (3) a
“social network model” which results from localized trust and interpersonal relationships,
institutionalized practices, conventions, and norms. Yeung finds that aspects of the HDD
and automobile clusters in Thailand can be explained by the agglomeration economies
and industrial complex models, but not the social network model.

Public Sector Organizations
In Thailand’s NIS, several public organizations help to create a supportive climate
for innovation by connecting potential innovators with resources and with each other. As
noted above, there are few linking organizations in the private sector; therefore public
institutions serve as the main linkages in Thailand’s NIS. These include: the Ministry of
Science and Technology, the National Science and Technology Development Agency,
the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, the National Innovation
Agency, the National Research Council of Thailand, the Thailand Research Fund, four
public research institutes, and the Thailand Science Park.
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The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was established in 1979. Its
responsibilities are formulating, coordinating, and implementing national policy for S&T,
the environment, and energy. It oversees the work of fourteen agencies and enterprises,
including the National Science and Technology Development Agency, the National
Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, and the National Innovation
Agency).38 The Permanent Secretary of MOST Pornchai Rujiprapha states,
We must capitalize on our competitive advantages by investing in R&D. It
is our goal that we invest in research and innovation in the advancedindustrial clusters . . .We realize that to escape the middle-income trap,
Thailand must invest in research to stay ahead in the international
economy. We plan to become an innovation hub in Southeast Asia,
capitalizing on a well-trained science-and-technology workforce, scienceand-technology training services, cost effectiveness in R&D, a foreigndirect-investment-friendly policy, government support and incentives for
investment and our well-known hospitable culture.39
The National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand
(NSTDA) is an autonomous agency within the MOST. It was created by the Science and
Technology Development Act of 1991 and tasked with conducting, supporting,
coordinating, and promoting efforts in scientific and technological development in the
public and the private sectors.40 NSTDA enables scientists and experts to meet and work
on scientific and technological issues of national and international priority. NSTDA is the
home of the four national research centers discussed below: BIOTEC, MTEC, NECTEC,
and NANOTEC. In 2008, NSTDA’s R&D budget was approximately US$64 million
(1,910 million baht) (Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009).
38

http://www.most.go.th/eng/index.php/executive-ministry-of-science-and-technology/history-of-most
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/03/01/technology/Ministry-pushes-R&D-investment30149798.html
40
http://www.nstda.or.th/eng/index.php/about/nstda-in-brief
39
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The Technology Management Center (TMC) is the commercial department of
NSTDA and facilitates the growth of high-tech industry in Thailand.41 It encourages
researchers to transform their results into SMEs and other firms commercial applications
in assisting them toward knowledge-based, higher value-added operations. The TMC
offers financial assistance to firms through research grants, R&D loans and tax incentives
(in conjunction with the Revenue Department), and loans for company start-ups and new
technology. It also co-invests in pioneering or high priority national projects. Other
programs operated by TMC include the Industrial Technology Assistance Program
(ITAP), which helps firms overcome technical obstacles, and the Support for Technology
Acquisition and Mastery Program (STAMP), which helps firms acquire and utilize new
technology.
The National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) is under the
MOST and was created by the National Science, Technology, and Innovation Act of 2008
(discussed below).42 Its objective is to develop science, technology, and innovations for
national economic and social development. STI’s major responsibilities are: (1)
formulating national STI policies and plans; (2) developing standard measurements,
indicators, and databases, and conducting research on science, technology and innovation
policy; (3) providing support and advice to other government agencies in formulating
their own STI implementation plans; (4) coordinating and monitoring the development of
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http://library.stks.or.th:8080/dspace/bitstream/123456789/1067/1/Summary%20Biotecnology%20in%20Th
ailand_Book-01.pdf
42
http://www.sti.or.th/th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224&Itemid=105
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a national S&T workforce; and (5) monitoring and evaluating national STI
implementation actions.
The STI sees three elements important for innovation: (1) Thailand’s NIS; (2)
technical requirements, including hardware, software, engineering technology, and basic
science; and (3) the goals of innovation, including new and emerging industries and
businesses, economic growth, and social development (Durongkaveroj, 2010). It enacted
a 10-year Science and Technology Action Plan (2004-2013) to strengthen industrial
clusters and innovation capabilities. The plan includes targets for measuring innovation
progress which concern levels of R&D expenditure and manpower. Indicators, databases,
indexes, reports, and research on comparative STI policies are also provided. STI
coordinates and monitors the development of human STI resources in the country, and
ensures consistency between other innovation-oriented agencies and the STI policy and
plan.
The National Innovation Agency (NIA)43 was established by the Ministry of
Science and Technology in 2003 as an autonomous organization. NIA was tasked with
enhancing the national innovation system through a broad-based approach. The
establishment of the NIA combined the Innovation Development Fund, previously under
the NSTDA, and the Revolving Fund for Research and Technology Development,
previously under the MOST. The intention is to set up a single agency to undertake and
support national innovation development.

43

http://www.most.go.th/engCMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=84

99

NIA serves as a central coordinator in the innovation system by linking different
organizations from the fields of education, technology, finance, manufacturing and
management. It provides technical advice, financing and investment, industry and
innovation markets assessment, post-R&D support for commercialization. NIA uses
knowledge management and promotes a cluster format for achieving three objectives: (1)
inducing innovations in economic units, (2) creating a supportive atmosphere for
innovation culture, and (3) strengthening organizations in innovation direction. Five
innovation cluster projects are ongoing in NIA: (1) food and herbs, (2) indigenous rubber
and derived products, (3) software and mechatronics, (4) automotives and parts, and (5)
engineering and industrial designs.
The NIA is implementing the STI Policy goals at firm level. Acting as a “matchmaker and integrator” (Lorlowhakarn & Ellis, 2005), it supports research in areas that
meet business needs, and encourages development of start-up companies, especially
SMEs. NIA has initiated and partnered in several schemes to manage the risks of
investing in innovative businesses and facilitate the emergence of new companies
involved in knowledge-based R&D. For example, with one scheme, NIA bears the
interest payments incurred on behalf of the recipient for the first three years
(Lorlowhakarn & Ellis, 2005).
The NIA has performed these activities on a variety of recent projects. These
include: (1) the University Business Incubator program with the Commission on Higher
Education and several universities, (2) the Innovation Management for Executives (IME)
training course supported by 17 universities and companies; (3) five-minute diagnostic
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test kits for H5N1 Avian Influenza and Salmonella; (4) R&D, commercialization, and
cluster building for native herbal extracts with five universities, eight suppliers, and the
spa industry; (5) the Design and Branding Innovation Project of the Ceramics
Development Cluster in Lampang province, which seeks to establish CeraLampang as a
world-renowned Thai national brand; (6) the National Organic Agriculture Model to
stimulate the organic sector’s product and process-based innovations; (7) consortium
building between four software companies and shrimp producers and exporters for a
computer-based traceability system to verify product safety and quality for the Thai
shrimp industry; and (8) introduction of new technologies, funding, and strategic
innovation projects for the natural rubber industry in order to increase the international
competitiveness of the sector and stimulate private sector investment (Lorlowhakarn &
Ellis, 2005).
Recently, NIA is granting approximately US$10 million (300 million baht) to
Thai companies to set up a pilot plant for bioplastic production. This is part of NIA’s plan
to offer 30% funding support for investments in bioplastic production. The manager of
the NIA’s Innovation Strategy Department, Sura-at Supachatturat said, “Without the NIA
sharing the risks, it would be very difficult to persuade companies to set up the plant in
Thailand due to the relatively high cost.” Moreover, NIA director, Supachai
Lorlowhakarn said, “If the project succeeded, it could also help to promote efforts to
restructure Thailand’s agricultural system.”44

44

NIA hopes to kickstart new industry with B300m (2011, April, 18). Bangkok Post.
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The National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT)45 was established in 1959 as
the government’s highest council on issues of scientific research relating to national
development. To carry out this mission, NRCT: (1) formulates the national research
policy and strategy; (2) develops research standards, research systems, and conducts
research monitoring and evaluation; (3) promotes local and international research
cooperation; (4) promotes and supports research, inventions, innovation, and technology
transfer to social, industrial, and commercial sectors; (5) reports on national research
status and research indicators; and (6) serves as a knowledge center for research.
In 2009, the NRCT initiated Thailand’s research system reform to establish
linkages among domestic and foreign research agencies, stakeholders, researchers, and
other related parties. In the process of the research system reform, NRCT has been
working closely with other research agencies, including National Science and
Technology Agency (STI), Thailand Research Fund (TRF), National Science and
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA), Health System Research Institute (HSRI),
Agricultural Research Development Agency (ARDA), National Economic and Social
Development Board (NESDB), and Office of Educational Council (OEC). The reform
program intended to bring clarity and more efficient administration to Thailand’s research
system. In 2009, NRCT had an R&D budget allocation approximately US$23 million
(677 million baht) (NRCT, 2009).

45

http://www.nrct.go.th
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The Thailand Research Fund (TRF) was established by the 1992 Research
Endowment Act to enable greater efficiency in research support.46 Its objectives are to:
(1) build up professional researchers and strengthen the research community, (2) support
basic and applied research significant to national development, (3) promote the
dissemination and use of research findings, and (4) raise funds for national R&D efforts.
In 2008, TRF had an R&D budget allocation of approximately US$43 million (1.3 billion
baht) (Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009).
There are four major public research institutes in Thailand that innovate new
technological products and processes: The National Center for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology, The National Metal and Materials Technology Center, The National
Electronics and Computer Technology Center, and The National Nanotechnology Center.
These centers are administered by NSTDA.
The National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) was
first set up under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy (discussed below) in
1983. The BIOTEC became one of the NSTDA centers in 1991. Operating outside the
framework of civil service and state enterprises allows BIOTEC to better support and
transfer technology to users. BIOTEC operates research units at Thailand Science Park
(discussed below) and also at specialized university laboratories. It develops
biotechnology innovations for industry, agriculture, natural resources, and the
environment. It conducts research in genetic and biotechnology applications in

46

http://www.trf.or.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=122
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agricultural science, biomedical science, and environmental science; and also conducts
policy-related research, and outreach, training, and international relations activities.47
The National Metal and Materials Technology Center (MTEC) was established in
1986 as a project under the Office of the Permanent-Secretary of the then Ministry of
Science and Technology. Its main objective is to support R&D in metals and materials
instrumental for the industrial sector and the overall development of the country. The
MTEC became one of the NSTDA centers in 1991. Its research became more integrated
with all of Thailand’s major industrial clusters: food and agro; medical and public health;
automotive and transportation; software, microchips, and electronics; energy and
environment, and textiles and chemicals.48
The National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) was
established in 1986 and became a specialized national center under NSTDA in 1991.
NECTEC’s responsibilities are to undertake and promote the development of electronics
and computer technology innovations. These responsibilities carry out R&D activities;
design and engineering; technology transfer to industries and communities; human
resource development; and policy research, industrial intelligence, and knowledge
infrastructure. NECTEC also provides a linkage between research communities and
industries through established industrial clusters.49
The National Nanotechnology Center (NANOTEC) was established in 2003 as an
autonomous research agency under NSTDA and the Ministry of Science and Technology.

47

http://www.biotec.or.th/EN/index.php/about-us
http://www.mtec.or.th/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=567&Itemid=155
49
http://www.nectec.or.th/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=63
48
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Its mission is to design and conduct R&D and support technology transfer for
nanotechnology applications to Thailand’s industrial sector. Its goals are to strengthen
the nation’s global competitiveness, promote public awareness of nanotechnology
development trends, and protect the environment.50
The Thailand Science Park (TSP) came into operation in 2002 with 140,000
square meters of space, outside of Bangkok. A new phase of development, called
Innovation Clusters 2, adds a further 127,000 square meters of space for private
companies.51 The TSP is an important component in Thailand’s in research and
innovation system. Currently it hosts NSTDA headquarters, TMC, BIOTEC, MTEC,
NECTEC, and NANOTEC, and over fifty-nine corporate tenants. The park is also located
close to three of Thailand’s leading universities: the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT),
Thammasat University (TU), and Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology (SIIT).
The park offers state-of-the-art facilities and business space and value-added
services, including subsidized facility rates, technology and technical support, human and
legal resources, financial support, intellectual property and licensing services, contract
research and collaborative research support, and participation in a joint investment fund
administered by the NSTDA Investment Center (NIC). Tenants of the park also enjoy the
most attractive BOI incentives. The Thailand Science Park-Incubator (TSP-I) programs
help start-up companies and entrepreneurs transfer product ideas into businesses.
Successful start-ups may become fulltime tenants of the park.

50
51

http://www.nanotec.or.th/en/?page_id=1899
http://www.sciencepark.or.th/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
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From the above discussion, Figure 5.3 illustrates the public organizations in
Thailand’s NIS.
Figure 5.3 Public Organizations of Thailand’s NIS

Source: Author

Framework Conditions
Some key political and social institutions surround Thailand’s private and public
organizations involved in the NIS. These institutions help to create “framework
conditions” (OECD, 1997b) that are conducive to innovation by providing rules and
resources, and creating incentives and expectations. In Thailand, framework conditions
include laws, plans, and policy statements directed at science, technology, and
innovation; rules and regulations governing capital investments and intellectual property;
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the ICT infrastructure; and the higher education system, which provides human resources
with the capacity for innovation.

Laws, Plans, and Policies
The National Science, Technology and Innovation Act was created in 2008 to
guide the formulation of policy and plans for STI in Thailand, as well as strengthening
S&T manpower and infrastructure (Intarakumnerd, 2010). The Act addresses: (1)
production, development, and mobility of STI human resources; (2) collaboration among
research institutes and educational institutions; (3) protection of intellectual property
rights; (4) use of public fiscal, financial, and procurement mechanisms to expand the
market for innovation; (5) collaboration among state agencies, the private sector and the
civil sector for technology transfer; (6) development of STI infrastructure for knowledge
dissemination and exploitation; (7) revision of relevant laws, by-laws, rules, or
regulations; and (8) recognition of distinguished STI organizations or persons.52 The Act
created a supra-ministerial body called the National Science, Technology and Innovation
Policy Committee which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The committee is tasked with
monitoring and reporting the results of the national STI Plan (discussed below) including
the performance of government agencies (Intarakumnerd, 2010). The Act also established
the National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Office to implement the law.53
The current 10-year Science and Technology Strategic Plan (2004-2013) is
focused on enhancing the NIS and industrial clusters. The plan emphasizes the strength of

52
53

http://www.sti.or.th/th/files/National20Science_Tech_Inno_Act.pdf
Ibid.
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human resources; an encouraging environment for S&T development; and the capacities
of four core technologies for the future, including information and communications
technology, biotechnology, material technology, and nanotechnology. The Strategic Plan
also sets three targets for increasing Thailand’s innovation competitiveness by the year
2017. These targets are: (1) approaching 1% of GDP on R&D expenditure, (2) creating
10 R&D personnel (full-time equivalent: FTE) for every 10,000 persons, and (3)
achieving a ratio of 50:50 private sector to government expenditure on R&D
(Durongkaveroj, 2010).
Thailand’s National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy expands the
Strategic Plan. It covers the 10-year period from 2012 through 2021. The policy sets
goals, strategies, and measures for guiding innovation. These concern the innovative
capability of localities and communities, industrial sectors, STI human resources,
financial instruments, markets and infrastructure, and laws and regulations to encourage
STI development.54

Investment Rules
Industrial development in Thailand is primarily financed by banks. However,
banks are relatively risk-averse therefore entrepreneurial start-ups have been less likely to
obtain funding. Some industrial development banks exist, but reportedly they are
inefficient, not well known, and have misevaluated past innovation projects. Instead,
industrial development banks have contributed through innovation awards, public

54

http://www.sti.or.th/th/images/stories/files/Draft_Plan_ST.PDF
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relations, and training programs (Intarakumenrd, 2010; Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007,
p. 256-257).
The Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) is a subunit of the Thailand stock
exchange (SET) for trading technology and SMEs shares. However, start-up companies
and most SMEs have difficulty participating because of required capitalization levels.
Several venture capital funds have been supported by the Thai government with a
combined value of over US$500 million. Tax incentives to promote more venture capital
investment have been considered, however, the venture capital industry and its effect on
innovation in Thailand remains underdeveloped. As a result, SMEs seek loans from
informal sources where they can get credit more quickly (Intarakumnerd, 2010;
Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 256-257).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a significant role in the Thai economy,
which contributed to GDP growth and employment through capital formation, exports,
and imports (Montreevat, 2006). Most FDI has been attracted by industrial
manufacturing, however, in recent years the service sector’s share of FDI has been
increasing. In 2004, 41% of total FDI came from Singapore, 20% from Japan, 13% from
the EU, and 9% from the US (Montreevat, 2006).
The Board of Investment (BOI) has authority to grant tax incentives to promote
investment. Its “investment zones” policy supports government goals of decentralizing
Thailand’s industrial base away from the Bangkok metropolitan area. Three investment
zones exist: Zone 1, including Bangkok and the five surrounding provinces; Zone 2,
including the 12 provinces surrounding Zone 1; and Zone 3, including the remaining 58
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provinces, many of which are under-developed. To encourage projects in the less
developed areas, projects located in Zone 3 receive the most generous tax privileges,
while those in Zone 1 receive the least.
The BOI has identified priority projects in basic transportation systems, public
utilities, environmental protection, technological development, machinery and equipment,
vehicle parts, electronic appliances, and computers. These projects are automatically
entitled to a corporate income tax exemption for eight years, and an import duty
exemption on machinery, regardless of project location. Strategic industries are also
targeted with a customized incentive scheme to promote cluster-based investment.
Customized incentives are also granted to skills, technology, and innovation industries,
such as the HDD industry, semi-conductors, software, the automotive industry, mold and
die, iron and steel, alternative energy, business process outsourcing, and regional
operating headquarters (ROH).
The standard company tax rate in Thailand is 30% of net profits, which is
relatively high compared to other countries in the region. However, concerning FDI and
innovation, there is a 10% corporate tax rate for Regional Operating Headquarters (ROH)
and SMEs. Venture capital investment in SMEs is also incentivized through tax
exemptions (Rochananonda, 2006). Table 5.5 below outlines these incentives.
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Table 5.5 Investment Incentives
Types of Companies
Regional operating
headquarters
SMEs companies

Listed companies

Venture capital
companies investing
in SMEs

Tax Incentives
10% corporate income tax on net profits, interest and royalties for
ROH
Reduced company tax rates for small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) are as follows:
- 15% on net profits up to 1 million baht
- 25% on net profits of 1 to 3 million baht
- 30% on net profits above 3 million baht
Reduced tax rates for companies listed on the Stock Exchange of
Thailand (SET) and the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) are
as follows:
- 25% for companies listed on the SET from September 6, 2001
to December 31, 2005
- 20% for companies listed on the MAI from September 6, 2001
The reduced rate will applied for 5 consecutive accounting periods only
Corporate tax exemptions are granted to venture capital companies
that invest in SMEs.
Dividends received from SMEs and gains arising from the transfer of
shares in SMEs are granted exemption from corporate tax.

Source: Rochananonda, 2006

Intellectual Property Rights
In Thailand, intellectual property rights have been often abused, particularly
through copyright infringement (Kelly & Chuenjaipanich, 2002).55 Despite aggressive
legislation to facilitate enforcement, there is still an excessive amount of infringing goods
in the Thai marketplace. Actually, there is less patent infringement issues (Kelly &
Chuenjaipanich, 2002). The Thai Patent Act of 1979 allows applicants to file for patent
for inventions, designs, and petty patents. The criteria for patents are novelty, inventive
step, and industrial applicability. There is no business method patent in Thailand and
computer programs are not patentable subject matter. Thailand is not a member of the
55

Thailand “top IP pirate,” Bangkok Post 3/05/2011
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Patent Cooperation Treaty but it is bringing its examination procedures in line with
international standards (DIP, 2009; Kelly & Chuenjaipanich, 2002).
In Thai culture, intellectual property infringement has not been viewed as
criminal. Therefore there is less public sentiment to protect IPRs. Moreover, IPR
protection is often seen as imposed by western standards and disrespectful to Thai
culture. The Thai Department of Intellectual Property (DIP) has attempted to raise
awareness that counterfeiting has damaged Thailand’s ability to compete in the global
marketplace (Kelly & Chuenjaipanich, 2002).
The Thai government has continued to increase efforts on prevention and
suppression of intellectual property violation. Intellectual property issues were raised by
the Abhisit Vejjajiva government as a part of the strategy to achieve a creative and
knowledge driven economy. As a WTO member, Thailand has taken steps to comply
with international intellectual property standards (DIP, 2009).

ICT Infrastructure
In 1987, the National Information Technology Committee (NITC) was formed to
oversee policy aspects of IT development and usage in Thailand. In 1997, NITC created
six laws to facilitate and regulate IT:56 (1) the Data Protection Law, (2) the Computer
Crime Law, (3) the Electronic Data Interchange Law, (4) the Electronic Transaction Law,
(5) the Electronic Funds Transfer Law, and (6) the Universal Access Law. This legal
framework reduces the risks to individuals and private firms in using ICT.
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http://www.nectec.or.th/users/htk/e-commerce/e-commerce-escap
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National policies also aid the development of ICT in Thailand. Following IT 2000
policy (discussed above), IT 2010 was created to cover the period 2001-2010 and help
Thailand transition into the Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE)/Knowledge-Based
Society (KBS) (NECTEC, 2003). The IT 2010 policy seeks to: (1) raise the capability of
the country from a technology adopter to a technology leader, (2) increase the proportion
of “knowledge workers” in the country to 30%, and (3) increase the share of “knowledgebased industries” within the overall economy to 50%. IT 2010 noted that organizational
reforms and inter and intra sectoral partnerships would be required to implement these
goals.
In 2006, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology conducted
an assessment of IT 2010’s progress toward its three goals. In terms of the goal of
becoming a technology leader, Thailand had moved up from “dynamic adopter” to
“potential leader” status.57 In terms of the goal of increasing Thailand’s knowledge
workers, the assessment noted that based on National Statistics Office figures, 21.1% of
the country’s labor force could be considered “knowledge workers.” In terms of the goal
of increasing the share of knowledge industries in the country, the assessment found that
this percentage had remained relatively consistent between 2004 and 2006 at 25%
(MICT, 2009). These results show that midway through IT 2010’s time horizon, Thailand
had made important gains in fulfilling its information technology goals (MICT, 2009).
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The MICT assessment used the United Nations Development Program’s Technology Achievement Index
(TAI) for 2005 to evaluate Thailand’s progress towards the technology leader goal. The TAI groups
countries into four categories based on their capacity to create new technology, diffuse the adoption of new
technology, diffuse long-existing technologies, and build human skills for technology creation and
adoption. The four categories are leaders, potential leaders, dynamic adopters, and marginalized (Desai et
al., 2002, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2002/papers/ip_desai-2.pdf).
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The first ICT Master Plans (2002-2006) were created to further develop ICT in
Thailand for R&D, expansion into international markets, utilization by SMEs, and
provision of government administration and services (Kaonantakool, 2006). The second
ICT Master Plan (2009-2013) established “a fair and competent regulatory body for
telecommunications and broadcasting, bridging the digital divide, and building
confidence in e-commerce” (Koanantakool, Udomvitid, & Thuvasethakul, 2010, p. 342).
The Strategic Master Plan on Electronic, Computing, Telecommunication, and
Information (ECTI) Technologies (2000-2009)58 was also developed to strengthen R&D
in ECTI and transfer ECTI technologies and products to the industrial sector.
Several studies have reported the progress of ICT development in Thailand. These
include IT legal and regulatory infrastructure; network infrastructure in schools and
universities; increased telephone penetration, fiber-optic cable, and microwave
communication services; networking government agencies and delivering e-Government
services; development of the Thailand Software Park and the Electronic Commerce
Resource Center; and increased numbers and funding of IT-related research projects
submitted by government agencies, universities, and private sectors (Koanantakul, 2006;
NECTEC, 2003; UNESCAP, 2009).

Higher Education
Currently Thailand’s higher educational system is composed of 78 public
universities, including 11 autonomous universities, 34 private universities, and 34 private
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colleges, with approximately 2 million students.59 The number of public universities has
increased dramatically because public institutes were upgraded to universities in 2004.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the higher educational system was expanded with the
creation of provincial, open, vocational, and agricultural universities, and teacher training
colleges. Between 1970 and 2000, 3.4 million Thais earned a tertiary education. This is
20-fold increase. Most of these became professionals, technicians, executives, and
managers in the growing economy (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 207).
In 2002, Thai public universities became “semi-autonomous” meaning that while
still subsidized by the government, they gained more financial freedom. The universities
were expected to generate more income from other sources, especially the private sector.
While public funding would mainly cover teaching expenses, research agencies supported
collaboration with industry and commercialization. These changes helped to promote
R&D, however, difficulties remained because academic promotion is more dependent on
teaching than research (Doner, 2009; Schiller & Liefner, 2007). There is a lack of high
quality research transferable to industry, and universities’ rules do not encourage
conducting personal projects with industry (Schiller & Leifner, 2007). By 2007, only six
universities had become autonomous, and university-industry linkages (UILs) remained
weak.
Thai universities’ primary concern is educating students. Private firms have little
interest in linking with universities, except for a few cases such as Seagate (Doner, 2009,
p. 135; Termpittayapaisith, 2006). In the early 2000s there was
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. . . a consensus that Thai universities performed poorly in training
personnel and exposing companies to new ideas . . . overall research
output was low, research topics were inconsistent with industrial needs,
and faculty ties with business were individual and temporary. These
weaknesses were in part the result of low demand: in most sectors, local
firms’ technological and absorptive capacities were insufficient to
stimulate much demand for university inputs. More technologically
advanced foreign firms were either uninterested or sceptical as to the
institutions’ capacities to provide needed service. But the incentives and
structure of the universities themselves were also a key part of the problem
. . . their funding has been largely unrelated to research productivity,
teaching-effectiveness, or market-related services . . . (Doner, 2009, 134135, 138).
In closing, it is important to consider how Thailand’s overarching science and
technology policy framework compares with the recent creative economy effort
mentioned above. There are key elements of the nation’s science and technology policy
that match up well with components of the creative economy agenda. Where the science
and technology policy offers support for industrial clusters and collaborative efforts, the
creative economy identifies which industries: the “creative” ones involved with culture,
art, media, design, software development, and related. It also identifies which
collaborators: university centers of excellence, SMEs, local- and community-level actors,
and the Ministry of Commerce. Thailand’s science and technology policy advocates
enhanced intellectual property protection and improved ICT infrastructure for the nation.
The creative economy acknowledges that improvements in both of these areas can
encourage innovation and creativity among emerging, targeted industries and among
traditional knowledge-holders at local levels. With 99% of the business sector in Thailand
composed of small, medium, micro, and informal enterprises in 2010, accounting for
approximately 39% of GDP, the S&T policy and the creative economy agenda are right
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to encourage the innovation potential at this level (Durongkaveroj, 2010). In this sense,
some objectives of the creative economy are compatible with the broader directions
provided by Thailand’s science and technology policy.
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CHAPTER 6
ASSESSMENT OF THAILAND’S NIS PERFORMANCE
Formally evaluating the performance of Thailand’s NIS can help to make
decisions about improving it. Evaluation provides critical feedback in the policy
assessment process, and there are a variety of ways to evaluate the NIS, both quantitative
and qualitative. In this chapter, evidence for the performance of the Thai NIS is
presented. It discusses innovation effectiveness in terms of both international and
domestic quantitative indicators and the opinions of government officials with knowledge
of the system. It also discusses the performance of Thailand’s NIS in terms of the
outcomes of innovation. Innovation outcomes are the long-term, broad-scale effects of
innovation on the economy. With an idea of the effectiveness of the NIS, barriers to
innovation performance are identified, and policy recommendations to improve the
performance of the NIS are made.

International Indicators
In the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) for 2012,
Thailand received an innovation system score of 5.95 on 10-scale, ranking 55th out of 146
countries. This was up four places from the 2009 KAM ranking. The KAM collects data
on 80 variables which serve as proxy measurements for a country’s innovation system, its
educational system including training, its information infrastructure, and its institutional
and economic incentives regime. The 29 innovation system indicators collected in the
KAM and their scores for Thailand are shown in Table 6.1 below.
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Table 6.1 KAM for Thailand Innovation System Indicators
Indictor

Score

FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008

4.92
5.14

Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.), 2009

8.80

Royalty and license fees payments (US$/pop.), 2009
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.), 2009

7.12
7.38

Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.), 2009

5.95

Royalty payments and receipts (US$ mil.), 2009

8.48

Royalty payments and receipts (US$/pop.) 2009

6.80

Science and engineering enrollment ratio (%), 2009

n/a
n/a
6.30

FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008

Science enrollment ratio (%), 2009
Researchers in R&D, 2009
Researchers in R&D/mil. People, 2009
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2008
Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2009

3.42
2.38
9.28

S&E journal articles, 2007
S&E journal articles/mil. People, 2007

7.10
7.24
5.17

Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2010
Patents granted by USPTO, avg. 2005-2009
Patents granted by USPTO/mil. People, avg. 2005-2009

7.02
7.53
5.89

High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2009
Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2010

8.93
6.56

Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2010

5.50

Value chain presence (1-7), 2010

7.48

Capital goods gross imports (% of GDP), avg. 2005-2009
Capital goods gross exports (% of GDP), 2005-2009

9.48
9.48

S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%), 2008

3.68

Avg. number of citations per S&E article, 2008
Intellectual property protection (1-7), 2010

7.29
4.05

University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2010

Source: Based on World Bank, 2012
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Although the KAM collects data for 29 indicators, it assesses the innovation
system performance for a given country using only three of them: (1) total royalty
payments and receipts, (2) patent applications granted by US Patent and Trademark
Office, and (3) scientific and technical journal articles.60 Its score for total royalty
payments and receipts was 8.48 (on a 10-scale), 7.53 (on a 10-scale) for patent
applications granted by USPTO, and 7.24 (on a 10-scale) for scientific and technical
journal articles.
The WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2012-2013 ranks Thailand’s
innovation system 68th out of 144 countries, with a score of 3.19 on the 1-7 scale. The
Table 6.2 below shows Thailand’s ranking on the seven innovation indicators. According
to the report, Thailand has little competitive advantage on any of these innovation
indicators. Its mid-range rankings for the indicators in Table 6.3 make sense for a middle
income country that is attempting to advance from the efficiency-driven growth stage and
close the gap with innovation leaders. There is clearly room for improvement on all of the
GCR indicators, however. The intellectual property protection indicator shows the most
potential for improvement. As a technology and innovation adopter and adapter, it may
not be surprising that weak intellectual property protection exists. However,
strengthening institutions that govern IP is one measure that can help Thailand to advance
to higher innovation, growth, and development stages.

60

The innovation system is the simple average of the normalized scores on these three variables. Retrieved
from http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp
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Table 6.2 GCR for Thailand Innovation Indicators
Indicator

Rank

Capacity for innovation
Quality of scientific research institutes
Company spending on R&D
University-industry collaboration in R&D
Government procurement of advanced technological products
Availability of scientists and engineers
Patents per million population
Intellectual property protection

79
60
74
46
98
57
72
101

Source: Based on WEF, 2012

Both the KAM and GCR collect data for an extensive set of innovation system
and other relevant indicators, as discussed in Chapter 3. They provide quantitative
measurements and rankings determined through scientific research. The full breakdown
of Thailand’s KAM and GCR entries are included in Appendix A and B, respectively. By
analyzing data on internationally accepted innovation indicators, the World Bank and the
WEF give Thailand’s NIS a fair rating. Thailand’s NIS is not as good as that of
innovation-leading countries such as Finland, Korea, or Singapore, but it is also not as
bad as with innovation laggard countries, particularly ones in least developed countries
(LDCs), such as Angola and Bangladesh and ones in the Southeast Asian region, such as
Laos and Myanmar.
Table 6.3 below compares Thailand’s KAM innovation system rank to several
least developed countries (LDCs). The table shows that Thailand, a middle-income
country in the efficiency-driven growth stage, has a better-performing innovation system
than the poorer, lesser-developed countries in the KAM. From the table, the closest LDC
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to Thailand is Senegal, whose innovation system rank is 111th. Contrary, the GCR ranks
Senegal (62nd) higher than Thailand (68th) along with Rwanda (51st), Gambia (52nd),
Liberia (54th), Zambia (61st), and Cambodia (67th).61

Table 6.3 KAM and GCR Innovation Rank
for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) versus Thailand
Innovation Rank

Innovation Rank

Country
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Chad
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Haiti
Lao PDR
Lesotho
Liberia

Country
KAM

GCR

146
135
112
123
n/a
124
n/a
143
128
129
n/a
144
139
136
131
n/a

n/a
130
84
107
140
67
113
n/a
n/a
114
52
125
143
n/a
138
54

Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
Uganda
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia

KAM

GCR

119
114
130
137
133
145
121
134
111
140
142
n/a
55
118
127
125

106
99
88
121
122
n/a
133
51
62
139
n/a
75
68
82
144
61

Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 and WEF, 2012
Note: KAM rank out of 146 countries, GCR rank out of 144 countries, n/a denotes data not
available

Table 6.4 below shows how Thailand’s innovation rankings compare with those
of the other countries in the region. Among the other eight Southeast Asian countries in
61

The following LDCs do not appear in both KAM and GCR – Afghanistan, Bhutan, Central African Rep.,
Comoros, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Niger, Samoa, Sao Tome
and Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Togo, Tuvalu,and Vanuatu.
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the KAM, only Singapore’s (4th) and Malaysia’s (42nd) innovation rank is higher than
Thailand’s (55th). Among the other eight Southeast Asian countries in the GCR,
Singapore’s (8th), Malaysia’s (25th), Indonesia’s (39th), Brunei’s (59th) and Cambodia’s
(67th) innovation rank is higher than Thailand’s (68th). Table 6.4 below supports the
notion that Singapore is Southeast Asia’s innovation leader. Using the KAM, Thailand
fits into a second tier of innovation in the region with Malaysia as its peer. Using the
GCR, Thailand is in a third tier of innovation with Brunei and Cambodia, behind
Malaysia and Indonesia in the second tier. Overall, Thailand’s innovation is in the middle
range for the region. It is not in the lead position but also not in a lagging position.

Table 6.4 Innovation Rankings for Southeast Asian Countries
Innovation Rank
Country
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Vietnam

KAM

GCR

n/a
124
103
136
42
145
93
4
55
n/a
113

59
67
39
n/a
25
n/a
94
8
68
134
81

Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 and WEF, 2012
Note: KAM rank out of 146 countries, GCR rank out of 144 countries, n/a denotes data not
available
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These international indicators can be useful for countries to identify strengths and
weaknesses in their innovation systems. Policymakers can use these to benchmark their
country’s NIS performance with other countries. Thailand has scored well on several
internationally-accepted innovation indicators including availability of scientists and
engineers, manufacturing trade, high-tech exports, imports and exports of capital goods,
and royalty and license fees payments and receipts (WEF, 2012; World Bank, 2012).
These represent Thailand’s strengths; areas in which Thailand has some comparative
advantage. Relatively strong performance on these indicators could be expected for a
newly-industrialized country with a favorable business climate that is a key base of
production in global assembly and manufacturing chains.
Thailand has scored poorly on other innovation indicators, however, including
government procurement of advanced technology, intellectual property protection,
numbers of researchers in R&D, expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP, and coauthored science and engineering publications (WEF, 2012; World Bank, 2012). These
represent Thailand’s weaknesses; areas in which Thailand needs to improve so that it can
continue to close innovation and development gaps. Weaker performance on these
indicators could be expected for a developing country with a less-than-robust educational
system that has relatively recently transitioned into an efficiency-driven stage of growth
and is trying to catch up with innovation leaders.
While policymakers in Thailand will want to continue to play to the country’s
innovation strengths, greater gains may be available by focusing on its innovation
weakness. In terms of benchmarking, policymakers can take note of innovation-leading
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countries’ performance in areas where Thailand is weak, for instance Finland, Korea, and
Singapore. Thailand’s policymakers should ask: “What have innovation leaders done in
the areas where we are weak?” With this knowledge in hand, Thailand can then attempt
to emulate these “innovation best practices” with adjustments to its own policies.
Although these international indicators of innovation performance can be useful,
they must be viewed appropriately and caution is advised. The KAM uses only secondary
data that is self-reported by firms and national governments, which could introduce
distortions. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report also uses selfreported data, and its rankings can be confusing for innovation benchmarking. The report
indicates that innovation is the most important of all factors for improving economic
competitiveness (WEF, 2010, p. 8). However, countries’ performance on innovation
indicators and their innovation ranking are not used to determine their stage of economic
growth, either factor-driven, efficiency-driven, or innovation-driven (WEF, 2010, p. 10).
Therefore a country can be in the “innovation-driven” stage of growth regardless of its
“innovation” performance.
Furthermore, some countries’ innovation rankings in the KAM and the GCR are
very similar, for example Sierra Leone (140th in the KAM and 139th in the GCR) and
Philippines (93rd in the KAM and 94th in the GCR). However, other countries have very
different innovation rankings between the KAM and the GCR, for example Rwanda
(134th in the KAM and 51st in the GCR) and Indonesia (103rd in the KAM and 39th in the
GCR). These inconsistencies appear even though the KAM and the GCR have a similar
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sample size and use much of the same data.62 The different indicators used to measure
innovation appear to account for these inconsistencies. The KAM uses three innovation
indicators: royalty payments, patents, and science and technology articles published. The
GCR uses eight: Innovation capacity, quality of science/research institutes, company
R&D spending, university-industry linkage, government procurement, availability of
scientists and engineers, patents per million persons, and intellectual property protection.
NIS policymakers should therefore be aware of the different methods and indicators used
in international innovation measurement and their implications for NIS evaluation.

Domestic Indicators
The performance of Thailand’s NIS can also be evaluated with domesticallyproduced indicators, including innovation goals recommended by STI, the output of R&D
institutions including the higher education system, and the firm-level innovation survey
conducted in Thailand in 2003.
STI Goals
The National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) set three goals
for improving Thailand’s science, technology, and innovation competitiveness, to be
achieved by the year 2017. These are: (1) total expenditure for R&D as 1% of GDP, (2) a ratio
of 50:50 private sector to government expenditure on R&D, and (3) 10 R&D personnel
(FTE) for every 10,000 persons. Progress toward these goals is shown in Table 6.5 below.

62

KAM sample size = 146 countries, GCR sample size = 144 countries
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Table 6.5 Improvement of Thailand’s
Science, Technology, and Innovation Competitiveness
Strategic Plan
Total expenditure on R&D as % of GDP
Ratio of private sector to government R&D
expenditure
R&D personnel (FTE) per 10,000 persons

Performance
2005
2007
2010

Goals
2017

0.24
49:46

0.21
48:52

0.24
40:60

1
50:50

3.29

6.76

9.01

10

Source: Based on Durongkaveraj, 2010; NRCT, 2010; and Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009

With respect to the goal of total expenditure for R&D as 1% of GDP, STI notes
improvements in government, private, and state enterprise R&D spending. Yet, as Table
6.5 above shows, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP have not grown in the five
year period from 2005 through 2010 but have remained stable at around 0.25%. Private
sector investment in R&D comes mainly from a relatively few large MNCs
(Intarakumnerd, 2010). The numerous SMEs and microenterprises in Thailand likely
have few resources to devote to R&D. Moreover, government tax incentives and
subsidies for firms’ R&D investment are too narrowly defined and most firms do not take
advantage of these incentives (Intarakumnerd, 2010). In terms of expenditures on R&D
as a percentage of GDP, it is known that Thailand lags well behind the region’s leaders
Singapore (2.61% in 2007) and Malaysia (0.64% in 2006) (Intarakumnerd, 2010). To
meet the 1% R&D expenditure goal shown in the table above, STI recommends enhanced
use of venture capital, FDI, and research centers (Durongkaveraj, 2010). However, these
options may not be enough, given their current status as reviewed in this study. R&D
expenditure is an area where government has the capacity to channel significant
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resources. To meet the 1% of GDP target set for 2017, Thailand’s government should
increase its financial commitment to the national R&D effort.
The public and private shares of R&D expenditure are a related issue. Table 6.5
above shows the strategic plan goal of a 50:50 contribution for R&D spending from the
public and private sectors for 2017. The table also shows a decline in the share of private
investment (from 49% to 40%) and an increase in the share of government investment
(from 46% to 60%) in R&D between 2005 and 2010. Since we know that overall
expenditures on R&D in Thailand lag behind neighboring countries, we cannot be certain
that increased government expenditure accounts for the increase in the government’s
share. A more likely explanation for the imbalance may be continued disinvestment in
R&D on the part of the private sector. Some of that decline may be tied to the recent
recession although, STI found a 9% decline in R&D expenditures in Thailand’s
manufacturing and service sectors between 2006 and 2008 as the recession was just
beginning to surface (STI, 2009). To balance public and private investments in R&D, STI
notes the incentives offered for R&D investment, including BOI tax and non-tax
incentives and projects undertaken by NSTDA and NIA, discussed earlier. The STI
further recommends other alternatives, including personal income tax exemptions or
reductions, enhanced venture capital, improved IP management, and enhancing the
competitiveness of SMEs. Some of these recommendations have also been discussed
above (Durongkaveraj, 2010). It should be noted that measures to encourage a greater
share of private sector investment in R&D such as enhanced venture capital availability
and SME competitiveness will likely require still many more years before taking effect.
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Thailand’s government should be prepared to shoulder a greater share of R&D
expenditure in the near term and perhaps reconsider its 2017 goal of a 50:50 publicprivate ratio.
Concerning the goal of R&D personnel, Table 6.5 above shows that R&D
personnel have increased dramatically between 2005 and 2010 and has almost reached
the target of 10 researchers per 10,000 persons set for 2017 by the Strategic Plan. STI
finds that no policy measures exist for developing R&D human resources, so perhaps the
increase in researchers is due to market forces alone. According to NRCT, between 2005
and 2009, while the number of lead researchers on R&D projects remained stable,
research assistants and technical support personnel grew (NRCT, 2010). Including
support staff in official counts could also account for the growth experienced in R&D
personnel. Thailand is within reach of its R&D personnel goal for 2017. To better ensure
the realization of this goal, STI recommends improving university-industry linkages
(UILs); science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education; labor
mobility; and scholarships/outstanding student programs (Durongkaveraj, 2010). These
suggestions should be followed, especially in the face of an increasingly competitive
regional market for R&D and innovation talent (Intarakumnerd, 2010).
The Strategic Plan developed by STI can be useful for evaluating R&D aspects of
Thailand’s NIS. The plan identifies future benchmarks for R&D expenditures and human
resources, including percent of GDP devoted to R&D, the ratio of private to government
R&D expenditure, and numbers of R&D personnel per 10,000 persons. Between 2005
and 2010, personnel numbers had improved, while the expenditure ratio became more
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unbalanced and the percent of Thailand’s GDP on R&D had declined. It is important to
note that NRCT is only now clarifying what activities can be formally classified as R&D
in Thailand. Also, with relatively few Thai firms innovating, the ratio of public to private
R&D expenditure must be viewed with caution. Most importantly, the combined level of
R&D expenditures by both the public and private sectors is far behind leading Southeast
Asian countries. Since innovation policy in Thailand has only been formalized for a few
years (with the creation of STI in 2008), more time may be needed before clear trends in
the Strategic Plan benchmarks and the effect of the STI can be seen. Still, the Strategic
Plan’s 2017 goals can be helpful to evaluate Thailand’s innovation performance.

R&D Output
STI human resource development is another indicator for evaluating Thailand’s
NIS. Thailand’s R&D output grew between 1998 and 2008. Specifically, scientific
publications grew by over 300% and patents granted grew by 12% (Intarakumnerd,
2010). Furthermore, Intarakumnerd (2010) reports that in the ten year period 2001-2010,
approximately 56% published scientific articles were published with international coauthorship, showing Thai researchers’ integration into global research networks.
Performance on these R&D output indicators suggests that Thailand’s R&D institutions
contributing toward the development of STI human resources.
However, there is evidence that Thai universities have underperformed in
developing STI capacity. Thailand’s universities have been described as relatively weak,
with research that is less relevant to industry and publication that is less internationally
recognized (Intarakumnerd et al., 2002; Krishna, n.d.; Sakunsriprasert, 2009; Schiller,
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2006). Formal university-industry linkages are in the early stage of development, with
few activities and less-developed institutional mechanisms (Krishna, n.d.). Universityindustry linkages have been based on personal connections between researchers and
companies, not long-term organizational commitments. These linkages primarily involve
short-term training, consulting, or research activities in low levels of technology. There
appears to be little incentive within the universities to encourage linkages with industry
(Brimble & Doner, 2007; Sakunsriprasert, 2009).
From the other side of the university-industry linkages, Thai firms appear to value
innovation information gathered from parent or associate companies much more. Table
6.6 below shows that, on a 100 point-scale, internal sources of information are more
important for innovation activities in Thai firms than external ones.

Table 6.6 Importance of Innovation Information Sources
Source
Internal
External

Sources within the enterprise (unspecified)
Patent disclosures
Exhibitions
Internet
Universities, educational institutions
Research institutes
Clients
Competitors
Parent/associate company
Business service providers
Technical service providers
Specialist literature
Professional conferences and meetings

Source: Based on Intarakumnerd, 2007

131

Result
82.0
32.0
53.1
63.0
35.8
35.8
77.4
42.1
61.2
33.1
40.2
56.6
55.2

This result could indicate: (1) a lack of absorptive capacity necessary to interact
with and learn from universities and R&D institutes, (2) universities and public research
institutes are of limited quality, and uninteresting to firms as an innovation information
source, (3) a mismatch between what universities and public research institutes can
provide and what firms want, or (4) communication between the two are underdeveloped
(Intarakumnerd, 2007, p. 11-13). Overall, the evidence from both sides indicates
university-industry linkages are weak.

Firm-Level Innovation Surveys
A firm-level Innovation Survey was conducted by NSTDA in 2003 to assess the
innovation activities and capabilities of private firms in Thailand (Intarakumnerd, 2007).
The survey serves as a useful NIS evaluation instrument. It adopted definitions and
methods used by OECD in the Oslo and Frascati Manuals, as well as those used by other
Asian countries, including Korea and Singapore. In the 2003 survey, 6,031 firms were
surveyed, with a response rate of 42.8%. Of these firms, 6% reported that they performed
R&D activities and 5.8% reported that they carried out innovation activities. These
innovation activities included detailed design work and reengineering, which are catch-up
actions (Intarakumnerd, 2007). Large companies are more likely to be innovative than
SMEs. The chemicals, machinery, electronics, and food sectors appear to be more
innovative than others, but still at small percentages. These results correspond to the
R&D investments in these sectors, shown in Figure 5.2 above (see p. 94).
Overall, the survey shows a relatively small percentage of firms in Thailand
performing innovation activities. According to the firm-level innovation survey of 2002,
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in Korea, 42% of firms were innovating (Intarakumnerd, 2007, p. 8). Table 6.7 below
contains key results from the survey.
Firm-level evaluations show Thai firms’ absorption and diffusion of technology,
their output of innovative products and processes, and their awareness and utilization of
innovation partnerships and resources. Comparative analysis indicates that Thai firms can
improve their innovativeness. Although many firms in Thailand now work in high-tech
manufacturing industries, surveys show that most firms are not involved in globallycompetitive innovation activities (Intarakumnerd, 2007).
Table 6.7 Selected Results of Thailand’s Innovation Survey in 2003
Firm Indicators

Result

No. of manufacturing and service firms
Sample size
Response rate
R&D performing firms
Innovating firms
Innovating firms, SME
Innovating firms, large company
Innovating firms, Thai-owned
Innovating firms, partial MNC-owned
Share of innovating firms by sector
Food, beverage, tobacco
Wood, wood products, furniture
Paper, paper products, printing/publishing
Chemicals, chemical products, coal, petroleum, rubber and plastic products
Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
Jewelry, diamond, gem and ornament

21,653
6,031
42.8%
6.0%
5.8%
7.3%
14.4%
10.2%
12.2%

Source: Based on Intarakumnerd, 2007
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18%
10%
10%
11%
13%
10%

Thailand NIS Government Official Interviews
Finally, individuals with knowledge and experience in Thailand’s NIS were asked
for their evaluations of the system. These government officials discussed implementation
and measurement issues, coordination and linkages, and the role of the Creative Economy
in Thailand’s NIS. Their comments are summarized below. The interview questions are
presented in Appendix C.

Dr. Yada Mukdapitak, Deputy Secretary General of STI
Dr. Yada Mukdapitak is the Deputy Secretary General of National Science
Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI). Dr. Mukdapitak notes that the NIS
cannot be set out with a single rule or policy. Instead, NIS is a new paradigm for
stimulating many policies related to STI development. Dr. Mudapitak says the term
“NIS” may not be commonly known but it is embedded in all dimensions of STI policy in
Thailand. It is known that an NIS for one country may be different from that of other
countries. This implies that an NIS for one sector may be different from the others from
the same country. This idea can be applied when implementing NIS and measuring its
performance (personal communication, April 7, 2011).
Dr. Mudapitak believes that implementing the NIS requires understanding the
roles and characters of each system component. Implementation means unique and
creative application of the NIS scheme to each system component and on a sector,
subsector, or even product basis. Effective implementation means recognizing what is the
most appropriate in the context of Thailand such as components, sectors, or products. In
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Thailand, innovation can be something that already exists; the key issue is to use what
you have. The usage may be from your own R&D or someone else’s which you extend.
The mechanism in building innovation is the linkages among private business,
educational institutions, financial institutions, and government. Implementing the NIS
framework means identifying and matching key players, but when players are
approached, they must become the most important, rather than the system itself (personal
communication, April 7, 2011).
In terms of NIS performance measurement, Dr. Mukdapitak states that the whole
system cannot be measured effectively because of its scale and complexity. The more
effective way in NIS performance measurement is focusing on each component, sector,
or product, and building up its own indicators based on its roles and characters. The
macro picture will be completed by integrating several pieces of micro ones. Dr.
Mukdapitak uses the term “chain links” to describe the relationship among components in
the system, meaning that missing one link will shorten the life of the whole system
(personal communication, April 7, 2011).

Prof. Dr. Soottiporn Chittmittrapap, Secretary General of NRCT
Prof. Dr. Soottiporn Chittmittrapap, the Secretary General of National Research
Council of Thailand (NRCT) states that the main reason for the use of the NIS strategy is
to further the utilization of research results and innovation for commercialization.
Increasing innovation activities can help Thailand leapfrog in terms of social and
economic development, therefore the NIS is significant. However, the NIS has not been
as successful as it could be due to the poor performance and lack of cooperation among
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relevant organizations in the system. Adopting the innovation system strategy for
promoting innovation in Thailand led to the formation of the NIA. To this point,
however, NIA has had limited success in connecting industries and universities in
innovating partnerships. Also public-private partnerships do not get support from the
funding system, and producers of research results and innovation have weak IPRs.
Cooperation is the main factor for successfully implementing the innovation system. In
Thailand, coordination between innovation laws, public-private partnerships, and
readiness can be improved (personal communication, September 22, 2011).
An NIS consists of three things: (1) innovation creation or value creation, (2)
innovation protection, and (3) innovation utilization. Currently in Thailand, relevant
stakeholders are forming an NIS that fits the Thai context and puts organizations in
charge of each of these three areas. In terms of innovation creation, NRCT motivates and
promotes research and innovation. It has been studying international practices in
innovation promotion; collecting inputs from relevant stakeholders, including research
institutes, funding agencies, and research users; and promoting laws and regulations
related to innovation activities. NRCT stimulates SMEs’ innovation activities by
matching SMEs and research institutes; the result of these collaborations is intended to
meet the needs of markets and end users. NRCT is addressing the issue of
commercialization of research results and innovation, which is in need of reform. Based
on past research projects that NRCT has overseen; it can serve as an innovation database
or clearinghouse. It has a stock of knowledge that could be tapped into for innovation and
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commercialization purposes (S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, September 22,
2011).
In terms of the protection of innovative works, DIP acts as an IPR protector.
Industry is reluctant to fully invest in R&D because the ownership of the research result
would belong to the financial supporter, i.e. the government. There are risks in further
investing in product lines derived from R&D so industry is unlikely to put money into
R&D. Firms may be willing to invest more in R&D if ownership of the R&D results
funded by the government belong to the firm. Creating this motivation comes through
giving ownership of the innovation to the innovator. When firms receive benefits from
R&D and innovation, the country gains too (S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication,
September 22, 2011).
The protection of IPRs and related issues for the benefit of innovators are being
improved. However, DIP is more of an innovation regulator than an innovation supporter
that makes linkages between innovation and utilization. This situation creates obstacles
for researchers and innovators. It is up to DIP, in particular, to determine how to be more
flexible in terms of IPR management. If government acts as a partner with firms instead
of a regulator, for example, it can more easily monitor financial flows within those firms
(S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, September 22, 2011).
Promoting the utilization of innovation can come from, for example, creating
“pilot plants” for innovators by organizations like NSTDA, changing the mindset of
researchers, and adjusting the promotional method for universities’ professors from
producing papers for publication to creating innovations that can be commercialized.
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NRCT also acts to help with innovation utilization, but there should be a separate
organization acting as a linkage between the market and R&D performers to help proof of
technology, technology licensing, and negotiating between researchers and innovators.
Currently, universities have been creating their own technology licensing offices (TLOs).
However, the volume of research in Thailand is relatively small and these offices create
additional transaction costs, so it may not be worth the investment (S. Chittmittrapap,
personal communication, September 22, 2011).
To be successful with the NIS approach, integration and a comprehensive process
are needed. The relevant organizations in Thailand need to adjust and adapt to serve the
system. A change in understanding of the roles of actors in the system, including
researchers, innovation producers, and funding agencies, is needed. All sectors and
stakeholders involved with the NIS need to realize their role and make changes so that the
system can perform better. Mindset is important. How to change the mindset of
researchers to realize the importance of R&D for social and economic development as a
whole, rather than focusing on their own benefits? How to make individuals realize that
they are part of the system, not just an isolated mind? (S. Chittmittrapap, personal
communication, September 22, 2011).

Mr. Alongkorn Ponlaboot, Deputy Minister of Commerce
Mr. Alongkorn Ponlaboot is Thailand’s Deputy Minister of Commerce. He notes
that the only results that have come from the present innovation infrastructure are reports
and books, nothing tangible. The same problems continue to occur. The Creative
Economy is the new trend focused on ideas or innovations in the country. It goes back to
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basics by asking “what is the research for?” The Creative Economy’s surrounding
organizations and clusters constitute another mechanism to drive innovations to
commercialization, in addition to the conventional R&D structure in Thailand. Patenting
is low in Thailand, and the Creative Economy can help to improve this. (personal
communication, April 27, 2011).
In the Creative Economy, the focus is on applied research and commercializable
research for value creation. In working with intellectual property, there are patent and
prototype holders who cannot reach the market. Part of the reason for the Creative
Economy is because some “local wisdom” innovations will not be funded by banks, so
the Ministry of Commerce has grants and loans available. Investment is the most
important aspect. The creative academy or institute will act like a funding agency, but
also make recommendations to the Budget Bureau to allocate funds for “creative
organizations.” Also a “creative bank” will be able to do memorandum of understandings
(MOUs) with industry (A. Ponlaboot, personal communication, April 27, 2011).
Deputy Minister Ponlaboot indicates that basic research is good but eventually
you have to commercialize it, that’s the key issue. Research may conform to the Creative
Economy by putting 50% to creative industries, 25% to basic research, and 25% to
researchers’ preferences. The business man is the most important person that can tell you
what research to do and what to innovate. If the private sector wants R&D, they need to
cooperate with universities to meet their demands since they may not have their own
facilities. Instead of doing research or innovating from your own idea you “place an
order” and there is no worry that the innovation will be commercialized as the private
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sector has already targeted the market. This is the bottom line of the Creative Economy
strategy (personal communication, April 27, 2011).
The strategy is somewhat like the triple helix model of the private sector,
government, and universities. Fifteen creative industries have been identified and an
organization has been created to assist them. Ten “creative academies” will also be
developed from the existing universities to act as a coordinator and the core of a creative
industry, like in a Center of Excellence model. Other universities will also be in the
network. Government helps in this process as it can, for example, creative partnerships
where investors and innovators are brought together in a virtual market (A. Ponlaboot,
personal communication, April 27, 2011).
The Ministry is trying now to make links between trade associations, industrial
clusters, and the Industrial Council and connect them with the Creative Economy
infrastructure. Deputy Minister Ponlaboot says that Thailand does not lack resources, but
needs to do a better job of coordinating them (personal communication, April 27, 2011).
The opinion of government officials who actually work in Thailand’s NIS is
useful for assessing NIS performance. In one view, a well-performing NIS is one which
creates and commercializes tangible products. It uses basic and applied research from
universities and R&D institutes to meet the innovation demands of the private sector. In
this view, 50% of the research effort should be directed to “creative industries,” 25% to
basic research, and 25% to the preference of the individual researcher (A. Ponlaboot,
personal communication, April 27, 2011). In another view, NIS effectiveness requires
linking business, educational institutions, financial institutions, and government. It also
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requires recognizing the appropriate components, sectors, and products in the system.
Therefore, individual performance measurement for system components, sectors, and
products is advised (Y. Mukdapitak, personal communication, April 7, 2011). Another
view sees that linkages and cooperation are the main factors for successfully
implementing the innovation system. These linkages extend beyond partnerships of
innovators to the wider environment including policy and laws. Technological readiness
as well as the cooperation between innovators and organizations can be improved in
Thailand. A successful NIS approach in Thailand requires integration and a
comprehensive process (S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, September 22,
2011).
Outcomes of Innovation
The performance of Thailand’s NIS can also be evaluated in terms of the
outcomes of innovation. Innovation outcomes are the longer-term, broader-scale effects
of innovation on the economy. What is the system delivering in terms of socioeconomic
results?
Indicators for assessing Thailand’s innovation outcomes are shown in Table 6.8
below. Some of these indicators, such as those concerning new business creation and
royalty and license payments, give us an idea of how innovation in Thailand is impacting
business and industry. Other indicators, such as those concerning high-tech products
exported to foreign markets and the competitiveness of the Thai economy on a global
scale, give an idea of how Thailand’s innovation is impacting the larger economy. The

141

last indicator in Table 6.8, Thailand’s ranking on the Human Development Index, can
give an idea of how innovation in its broadest sense affects social welfare.
Some of these indicators have appeared earlier in this study and are presented
again here because they are helpful measures of innovation outcomes. The indicators
dealing with competitiveness from the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the
International Institute for Management Development (IMD) have not appeared to this
point. As the global competitiveness of an economy is an important outcome of
innovation, these well-known indices were selected. The Human Development Index
score also has not appeared to this point. Economic and technological innovation can
effect improvements in the socioeconomic development of a country generally; therefore
the widely-used United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s Human Development
Index was a logical choice to capture these trends in Thailand.
The table shows that during the period of available data, business creation was
relatively flat while receipts for royalties and licenses rose considerably. High-tech
exports as a percentage of all exports have declined slightly but their value in real US
dollars has risen. The global competitiveness of Thailand’s economy has remained
relatively stable. The World Economic Forum typically ranks Thailand’s competitiveness
just within the upper third of all countries in the study while the International Institute for
Management Development typically ranks it in the middle of its study group. Finally,
Thailand’s Human Development Index score has remained stable since 2001, with a
slight decline in 2010 and 2011.
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Overall, indicators such as these can be used to represent prosperity and societal
well-being in Thailand. Table 6.8 below shows that some positive outcomes have resulted
from innovation efforts in Thailand. By continuing to improve the NIS, even greater
positive outcomes can be achieved. Continuing to monitor the outcomes of innovation in
Thailand using these and other indicators will be important to understand the full impact
of the NIS and related public policies.
Royalty and license fees and the value of high-tech exports have risen over the
past decade. This is likely due to Thailand’s increasing participation in higher value
added global supply chains, such as automobiles and electronics. However, other
indicators of innovation outcomes are falling over the past decade. New businesses
created and the percent of high-tech exports both have declined. This trend may reveal
the barriers to business development and lack of technological learning and development
in firms noted by Intarakumnerd (2010) and Arnold et al. (2000) (see p. 92). While
Thailand’s World Competitiveness Yearbook ranking is stable, there has been a slight
decline in its Global Competitiveness Index ranking in the last few years. Several new
countries entered the Global Competitiveness Report study during this time including
Angola, Belize, Cape Verde, Haiti, Iran, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Yemen. However, since
this decline coincides with the formalization of innovation policy in Thailand and the
creation of the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI), it may
be of some concern. As noted in Chapter 1 above, the drive for a globally competitive
economy is an important reason for innovation policy. Thailand’s ranking in the Human
development Index had been relatively stable until 2009 when a noticeable decline
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occurred. While recent political instability in Thailand may account for this, some losses
in innovation and competitiveness may as well.
The outcomes from economic and technological innovation take time before their
impact can be known. The indicators presented in Table 6.8 should be revisited in five or
ten years’ time to take note of changes to these trends. Overall, attention to innovation
outcomes demonstrates that Thailand’s NIS needs to be proactive to promote
development, enhance global competitiveness, and serve as a means to keep the country
from falling behind in the evolving global economy.

Table 6.8 Selected Indicators of Innovation Outcomes
Indicators
New business registered
(number)a
New business density (new
registrations per 1,000
people ages 15-64)a
Royalty and license fees,
receipts (current US$mil.)a
High-technology exports
(% of manufactured
exports)a
High-technology exports
(current US$bil.)a
World ranking by the
Human Development Index
(rank/no. of countries)b
World ranking by the
Global Competitiveness
Index (rank/no. of
countries)c
World ranking by the
World Competitiveness
Yearbook (rank/no. of
countries)d

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

n/a

31,013

30,119

27,654

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.70

0.67

0.60

n/a

n/a

n/a

14.3

46.4

100.8

153.1

n/a

30.78

28.13

27.39

24.55

24.02

n/a

15.69

20.61

27.05

31. 30

34.16

n/a

76/177

74/177

73/177

77/177

92/169 103/173

31/80

34/104

35/117

34/134

38/139

39/142

n/a

26/51

29/53

27/55

26/59

27/59

Source: Based on World Bank, 2012a; UNDP, 2012b; WEF, 2012 c; and IMD, 2012d
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2011

Synthesis of Evidence from the Thailand NIS Case
Table 6.9 below presents the assessment framework seen in Chapter 4, with
evidence from the Thailand case now included. The table reveals some key information
about Thailand’s NIS. NIS theory identifies private firms as the primary innovators in a
national economy. The intent of the NIS is to facilitate firms’ innovative efforts.
Currently in Thailand there appears to be relatively few private firms performing
innovation activities. Technology absorption among firms is low (WEF, 2012). Among
most large multinational corporations (MNCs), many large local firms, and most small
and medium enterprises (SMEs), research and technological development is infrequent
(Arnold et al., 2000). In a survey of private manufacturing and service firms in Thailand,
only 5.8% were determined to be “innovating” in contrast with 42% in Korea
(Intarakumnerd, 2007).
Several government agencies, research institutes, and the Thailand Science Park
actively work to facilitate innovation in the private sector through linkages between firms
and innovation resources. Industrial clusters are one form of innovation system linkage
that is working well in Thailand. The booming electronics and automobile industries in
Thailand have clearly benefitted from the cluster approach, and government agencies
have played a key role in cluster development.
The Thailand Science Park hosts technology-based firms and the nation’s four
public research institutes, provides ready access to major universities, and helps to
incubate start-up companies. The National Innovation Agency (NIA) has become a lead
agency in working to connect firms in strategic sectors. It provides funding, shares
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financial risks, and offers technical advice and other partnering services. It works to
further develop partnerships between universities, R&D institutes, and firms in the
targeted sectors. Some innovative products, discussed above, have resulted from NIAenabled linkages.

Table 6.9 NIS Assessment Framework: Thailand Case
Question

Evidence from Thailand NIS Case

What is NIS?

Few private firms are innovating; some public
research institutes are innovating; some links
between firms, institutes, and universities, but
typically weak; industry clusters provide some
linkages in some sectors; public organizations
work to promote innovation and are linked to each
other and possibly overlap; institutional
environment for innovation is improving; output
of higher education and IPRs are concerns

Why is NIS adopted?

Regional economic crisis/Thailand’s financial
crisis of 1997; desire to compete in global
economy; concerted learning and research efforts
focused on other NIS/innovative countries to find
suitable policy alternative

How is NIS implemented?

The 2008 Innovation Law, the Strategic Plan, and
the STI Policy create a framework of goals and
allocation of resources; NIA and STI are leading
policy implementation agencies; key capital
investment and technology from foreign sources

How can NIS performance be
evaluated?

Conventional quantitative indicators used by
OECD, WEF, and World Bank; firm-level
innovation surveys; measures of success offered
in Strategic Plan; evaluation of key government
officials; socioeconomic outcomes of the

system

Incompatibilities and past disappointments between industry and universities
cause these linkages to remain weak. Despite some autonomy among universities and

146

growing research outputs, universities’ research does not appear to be significant for
firms. Many firms do not have a strong demand for STI human resources. There are only
two organizations in the private sector that can facilitate innovation in firms, which do
not appear to be very active. Based on firm surveys, there is an interest in innovation
linkages. But these firms are either unaware of existing linkage opportunities, or
unwilling to participate. Thailand’s industrial clusters provide benefits for the firms
involved. However, the advantages of Thailand’s industrial clusters are related to
efficiency rather than innovation gains. These clusters do not appear to link firms
together for enabling “knowledge spillovers,” as NIS theory predicts. Links between
firms and domestic investors to allow financial resources for innovation to flow also
appear to be weak or absent.
Social institutions and infrastructure in Thailand create an environment that can be
conducive for firms’ innovation. Physical infrastructure in Thailand, including ICT and
industrial estates, and the investment regime for foreign capital, are viewed favorably.
However, the regime governing intellectual property rights, the investment regime for
domestic capital, and the provision of innovation-oriented human resources from higher
education are lagging (WEF, 2010). Thailand’s recent innovation law and the
corresponding innovation policies and plans help to guide private sector, public sector,
and academic innovation activities. The law and supportive policies set goals and
expectations for innovation outcomes, target strategically important industries and
sectors, and channel resources to innovation actors.
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Figure 6.1 below presents a conceptual model of the structure of Thailand’s
current NIS. It shows relationships between innovators and supporting actors in the
system including firms, universities, research institutes, and government agencies. Some
of these relationships involve strong linkages between actors in the system portrayed with
a bold connecting line. However, in other cases the linkages between actors in the system
Figure 6.1 Conceptual Model of Thailand’s NIS

Note:

= Strong Linkage;

= Weak Linkage; No Line = Absent Linkage

are weak shown with a dashed connecting line. Some actors in the system may not be
linked to the others at all; these isolated actors in the system are portrayed with no
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connecting line. Surrounding these actors and linkages is Thailand’s innovation
environment composed of the nation’s innovation laws, plans, and policies; rules
governing investment and intellectual property; the higher education system; and the
nation’s ICT infrastructure. This institutional environment guides and also constrains the
interactions of the actors in Thailand’s innovation system.

Barriers to Innovation in Thailand
Synthesizing the details of the Thailand NIS case within the assessment
framework is very useful because it helps to identify the major barriers to innovation in
the country. With this knowledge, problem areas that Thailand’s NIS must address
become clear. There are four critical barriers to innovation in Thailand related to the
overall direction and rationale of the country’s innovation policy, and the organization
and functioning of key system components and processes. More specifically, these
barriers concern resource allocation, the nature of industry in Thailand, the integration of
R&D into the innovation system, and the organization of the public sector component.

Strategic Allocation of Resources
Thailand’s current innovation policy creates obstacles instead of advantages in
moving the country toward innovation-based growth and competitiveness. Currently, a
two-track innovation policy is pursued. One track is focused on science and technology.
It is outward looking and recognizing the importance of global trends and participation. It
has been building for decades with many important successes along the way. This track
takes a long-term view. The other track is the “Creative Economy” approach which is
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focused partially on cultural arts and local cuisine rather than high technology, the more
common focus in terms of innovation. Some elements of the Creative Economy agenda
look inward to “local wisdom” and heritage and turn back from the global technology
frontier mentioned in Chapter 2 towards a more factor-driven stage. Other elements of the
Creative Economy however emphasize contemporary, cutting edge fields such as film,
software design, and fashion. The problem with a two-track policy is that it can
misallocate resources. For a country like Thailand, with relatively limited resources, it
must be strategic in the way that it allocates resources for innovation. Pursuing both of
these tracks simultaneously and independently means there are relatively fewer resources
available to either.
Firms’ Incentives for Innovation
Chapter 5 showed that private industry in Thailand is not oriented toward R&D
and technological learning, and therefore not conducive to innovation. This fact is
demonstrated by Table 5.4 above which plainly shows that most Thai firms do not
possess higher-order technical capacity. Most firms in Thailand are SMEs, and most of
these SMEs are small. Furthermore, though the rise of industry brought significant
economic benefits to Thailand, many successful industrial firms in the country are
foreign-owned ones with large global operations. Thai affiliates in this arrangement are
“branches” of larger MNCs.
SMEs do not conduct R&D for innovation purposes because, very simply, they
cannot afford it. SMEs often function to meet more immediate needs of larger firms in a
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wider supply or value chain. They do not have the capital and resources to devote to
higher-order, skill-intensive, technology-intensive activities like R&D.
The branch plant organization of industry that exists in Thailand means that as
“host” country for a parent MNC, relatively simpler technical work will be performed in
Thailand. Simpler technology will be present in the local affiliate firms and relatively
less-advanced skills will be required in the work force. At the headquarters of these
MNCs, which reside in the “home” countries, higher-order work is conducted, including
executive-level functions, marketing, design, engineering, and R&D. The branch plant
arrangement means innovation occurs in MNCs’ R&D institutions in Japan, Europe, and
America, not in Thailand. Little local learning occurs, little indigenous innovation
emerges.
Size and structure explain the lack of R&D orientation in Thai firms. They further
explain why Thailand performs well on some internationally-accepted innovation
indicators, such as foreign investment and technology transfer, imports of capital goods,
value chain presence, manufacturing trade, high-tech exports, and royalty and license fees
payments, but not others, such as higher education and training, firms’ technology
absorption, venture capital access, intellectual property protection, numbers of
researchers in R&D, expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP, science and
engineering publications, and royalty and license fee receipts. Performing well on the
former set of indicators makes perfect sense for a newly-industrialized country with a
favorable business climate that is a key base of production in global assembly and
manufacturing chains. Performing worse on the latter set of indicators makes perfect
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sense for a developing country with a less-than-robust educational system that has
relatively recently transitioned into an efficiency-driven stage of growth.
Several steps can facilitate a move to the next stage of development for Thailand’s
firms: allocating more capital to R&D and innovation activities from government;
improving university-industry links; and overcoming disincentives for innovation in firms
by broadly defining tax incentives and subsidies for R&D, strengthening intellectual
property rights, reducing barriers to labor mobility and business development, and
attracting a portion of MNCs’ R&D facilities to Thailand. However, this is not very likely
except in subareas where there is a large concentration of activity. These are the types of
measures taken by global and regional innovation leaders as their private sectors
advanced to higher stages of development.

Isolated University Research
Industrially oriented applied research can be conducted in university R&D
facilities in close collaboration with firms. Firms can identify their needs to university
labs and contract with them to undertake the innovative activities. In this way, the
demand from industry pulls innovation from R&D institutions into the market place. As
Chapter 5 showed, industry in Thailand is not supportive of university research and this
“innovation pull” does not occur. This is because industry does not need university R&D.
As mentioned above, the branch plant structure means R&D activities occur in the home
country not the host country, and with predominantly small supporting firms, the need
and resources for innovation is absent.
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This scenario becomes a self-reinforcing, vicious circle. Industry does not need
university innovation, so universities are not incentivized to provide it; universities have
no need to produce innovation, so there is none available to industry. Innovation-capable
human resources are not demanded by industry, so universities supply fewer of them. If
those that exist cannot find jobs, “brain drain” occurs as they relocate to other countries
where their qualifications are in demand.

Complicated Public Sector Component
Thailand’s NIS has several policy statements, plans, objectives, initiatives, and
agencies. There are several plans with a five-year time frame that require coordination
within the government to follow the plan. However, the coordination issues were not
considered a significant threat. With most agencies working on their own innovation
efforts independently, this resulted in significant policy and program overlap across
agencies as well as bureaucratic in-fighting against what they saw as interference from
one another.
Like Finland, Korea, and Singapore, Thailand also created a single agency, the
NIA, to lead innovation efforts. NIA has shown itself to be a dynamic agency in
implementing various project-based linkages between innovators and resources. In this
manner, NIA plays a similar role as TEKES and ASTAR do in the Finnish and
Singaporean NIS. However, NSTDA and STI are also key agencies in Thailand’s NIS. In
Thailand’s NIS, an excessive amount of initiatives by different agencies can lead to
overlap, unclear bureaucratic boundaries, and conflict in the public sector component of
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the NIS, and too much “red tape” for the private sector. Potentially-innovative firms may
become overwhelmed by a complicated system.
The NIS evaluation in Finland showed the NIS was seen as too complicated by
firms. The transaction costs with the system were too high and firms decided not to
participate. Thailand’s NIS policymakers must make sure the system is coordinated so
firms do not ignore innovation linkages and opportunities. It is important for clearly
defined organizational responsibilities and boundaries to be imposed on the system. Socalled “lean government” principles can be used to reduce public sector waste by
eliminating unneeded approval cycles, reporting, and other processes and simplifying and
streamlining needed processes. Its aim should be increasing efficiency and effectiveness
of the NIS.
Policy Recommendations to Improve Thailand’s NIS
Understanding the barriers to innovation that currently exist in Thailand enables
making specific policy recommendations that should be considered to improve the NIS.
In response to these impediments, conflicts in resource allocation must be minimized for
more efficient use; incentives for domestic innovation must be created by attracting
foreign-based R&D institutions to relocate and encouraging large domestic firms R&D
that have the capital resources required for innovation; strengthening the linkages
between university and industry should be done to affect university R&D; and trust and
credibility within stakeholder partnerships must be created for these links to form. An
effectively organized government sector can accomplish these through well-designed
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policy. Thailand’s government should address these problems using the recommendations
provided here.

Reconcile the S&T Track and the Creative Economy Track
To gain the most innovation benefits, the current Creative Economy innovation
track should be reconciled with Thailand’s science and technology efforts and policies for
pursuing innovation. By reconciling these two tracks, resources dedicated to innovation
in Thailand will not conflict or overlap. To do so requires developing links between
innovation policy and programs and creative industries. Niche markets exist for Thailand
in terms of fashion, food, and culture, especially in the context of the growing tourist
industry. In areas where advanced technology can assist the development of these
industries, innovation policy and the innovation system should be present to provide that
boost. It goes without saying that in the high-tech fields associated with the Creative
Economy such as media and software design; innovation policy should be supportive and
allow needed resources to flow. Within Thailand’s NIS, these two innovation tracks
should be complimentary and not competitive. By complimenting one another and
efficiently allocating resources, larger benefits of innovation can be available.

Stimulate Private Sector Innovation
To overcome the innovation barriers posed by the branch plant structure and the
predominant firm size in Thailand, the government must attract foreign-based MNCs’
R&D institutions to Thailand. It must also encourage R&D in its large domestic firms
that have the capital and resources required for innovation. It must do both of these to the
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extent possible. Additionally, a privately-managed fund for technological upgrading in
firms should be created. These three steps together can encourage domestic innovation.
How should foreign R&D institutions be attracted to Thailand? The BOI has a
Regional Operating Headquarters (ROH) tax credit program, as discussed in Chapter 5
above. It needs to complement this scheme with an additional Regional R&D
Headquarters (“RRDH”) tax credit program. The RRHD would offer a further reduction
in the corporate tax rate for companies that locate not only their Regional Operating
Headquarters, but also their R&D facilities, to Thailand. The ROH tax rate provided by
the BOI currently stands at 10%, well below the standard 30% corporate tax rate. For
those firms that locate their ROHs and their RRDHs to Thailand, perhaps the rate could
be revised downward to 5%, for example.
The Thai government should couple this approach with further investment in
university and public sector R&D labs and facilities. Thailand should focus on niche
areas – what it does well or where opportunities exist and promote innovation within
target industries. A key lesson learned from the case studies of Finland, Korea, and
Singapore was that major government-led investment in R&D is critical to successful
NIS development. Thailand must continue with, and enhance, its plans to upgrade science
parks and industrial estates. Centers of Excellence at universities need to be ready for
action. These investments will go further in drawing foreign MNCs’ R&D institutions to
Thailand by creating the innovation infrastructure these MNCs need. MNCs used to be
drawn to Thailand by its low-cost opportunities alone. Now, Thailand needs to draw
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MNCs by its low-cost opportunities along with its state-of-the-art facilities and industrial
clusters to provide them the best return on their investment.
How should domestic firms’ R&D be stimulated? It is important to remember that
not all industries in Thailand are foreign owned. Though most firms in Thailand are
relatively small in size there are some, significant, large domestic firms in the country.
These are the other private sector organizations necessary for Thai innovation which must
be targeted by the NIS. These firms include, for example, Boonrawd Brewery,63 Charoen
Pokphand Group (CP),64 Petroleum Authority of Thailand Plc. (PTT), and Siam Cement.
Why are these large firms targeted for R&D and innovation support rather than directly
supporting R&D in SMEs? Thailand’s SMEs are so numerous and, overall, so small that
supporting their innovation through direct government subsidy would end up spreading
resources out so much as to be ineffective. These SMEs would have to start up internal
R&D efforts from scratch and would need years to attain only marginal innovation
results. Thailand would realize better return on its investment by offering a measure of
support to complement the ongoing activities of larger firms that are operating in strategic
fields.
These large domestic firms are now expanding their markets and operations in the
Southeast Asian region and in wider Asia. Their competitive success will depend on their
ability to innovate. These firms compose a select group in Thailand that are in a position
to compete internationally and to innovate near the global technology frontier. Tax breaks
63

Boonrawd Brewery is the first and largest Brewery of Thailand. Its products include beer, soda water,
drinking water, and various energy drinks and beverage. The company serves customers throughout
Thailand as well as in nearly 50 countries worldwide, including Europe and North America.
64
Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) is a Thailand-based global conglomerate with operations and investments
in agribusiness and food, retail and distribution, and telecommunications industries.
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and supportive investments directed at these types of firms, in a similar fashion as those
for foreign R&D institutions described above, provide the best return on public
investment.
Large domestic firms indicate areas in which Thailand holds some comparative
advantages, such as agriculture, automobiles, electronics and ICT, energy, and food and
beverages. As shown in Table 5.1-5.3 (see p. 80-81) and Figure 5.2 (see p. 91), these
sectors are the top producers and exporters, with the most value added, and the most
investment in R&D. Thailand’s innovation policy must identify and target areas where
the country holds a comparative advantage. It cannot afford not to play to its strengths.
Moreover, these advantages should be viewed in the context of how they can meet
(1) the country’s future needs, and (2) regional and global opportunities that are available
for exploitation. CP, one of the country’s largest food and agricultural firms, provides an
excellent example as it diversifies into aquaculture operations in Thailand. Aquaculture
can be seen as a prime area for R&D and innovation as concerns over local, regional, and
global food supplies are rising and world fish stocks are falling. These types of innovative
efforts in areas of critical need should be viewed by government as strategic opportunity
and supported appropriately. Other areas exist in which firms have strengths and local,
regional, or global needs are emerging, such as energy, next generation vehicles,
sustainable tourism, and management of water supply and water quality. These areas
require the kind of innovation that comes from science and technological advancement.
Government can play a matchmaking role to help make and support strategic connections
in fields of future critical need.
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Encouraging R&D in firms as described above can encourage domestic
innovation even further because of the external effects of innovation. As larger firms
undertake a new strategic phase of R&D, it can spill over and pull the relatively few midsize SMEs in Thailand into their own phase of innovative activity in support of the larger
firms. Indeed, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, the director-general of ASEAN, has recently
recommended that Thailand actively facilitate large firm-to-small firm innovation
spillovers by using state funds to establish mentoring relationships for Thailand’s
SMEs.65 These two approaches complement one another in helping to maximize the
external benefits of innovation for Thai firms. However, a question may arise here as to
whether large firms would be willing to bear the burden of SME innovation mentoring.
Making large firm R&D assistance conditional on SME mentoring may be met with
resistance. In this situation, it may be best to let the market allocate the gains of
innovation spillovers. SMEs can still benefit indirectly from large firms R&D because of
the public goods aspects of innovation.
Some innovation occurs in small start-ups as well. These start-ups are sometimes
spun off from university research or other industrial concerns. To support relatively small
innovation activities that often need small amounts of funding or resources, at least a few
steps can be taken. Business incubators can be created in strategic locations such as
within or nearby universities or other research institutes or labs. Similarly, entry into
larger innovation hubs such as the Thailand Science Park can be facilitated for start-ups

65

The Nation on Sunday. (2012, April 8). Small Thai firms should eye opportunities around the region,
Surin says. The Nation.
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by reducing their rent or other through concessions. Finally, small seed fund grants can,
of course, be made available to start-ups with few or no strings attached.
As mentioned above, there are only two organizations in Thailand’s private sector
for encouraging innovation among firms, the Technology Promotion Agency (TPA) and
the Kenan Institute Asia (KI Asia). These organizations play a relatively minor role in the
system. NIS policymakers could enhance the role of these private sector organizations, or
help to create a new private sector organization, by implementing a levy-grant program
for firms’ technological development, similar to the ones in Korea and Singapore. The
system requires qualified firms to contribute some percentage of their wage bills to a
general fund. Firms can then apply to receive a grant from the fund to sponsor
technological skill training and other innovation-related development activities for
employees. In Thailand, NIS policymakers should serve as monitors and consultants to
the program, but the private sector firms themselves should be in charge of managing the
fund. TPA or KI Asia can serve as fund manager, or an entirely new organization created
by private sector firms themselves could perform this role. This program enhances private
innovators by providing incentives for innovation-related activities and also giving some
ownership of innovation management to firms themselves. By managing the fund, the
relationship between private firms and the larger NIS can be deepened. By serving as
consultant, NIS policymakers can better understand the innovation needs of firms. A pilot
program could be tested before full implementation.
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Incentivize Universities’ Participation in the System
The reward system for universities, their staffs, and their students in Thailand
should be reconfigured to help this institution become better integrated into the NIS.
Enabling better linkages between industry and universities helps to achieve this. When
industry and universities have a collaborative relationship, students learn about real-world
issues in business and industry. Students can also have hands-on learning by participating
in joint projects between universities and industry. These experiences create higher
quality STI workforces that are ready to be hired. Seagate has created these types of
linkages with universities, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Promoting private sector innovation by taking the steps described above creates
the demand for STI human and knowledge resources. Thailand’s academic sector must be
prepared when this innovation pull takes effect. Several approaches can be taken.
Scholarships and other educational subsidies should be targeted at the country’s best and
brightest science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) students.
Commercializable outputs of R&D should be incorporated into university professors’
promotion schemes, as appropriate. Collaboration between private firms, R&D
institutions, and universities for encouraging innovation should be facilitated by all
means necessary.
Sakunsriprasert (2009) showed that trust and commitment among innovation
actors in Thailand is important for successful collaboration. The structure of innovation
grants can incentivize repeated interaction between industry and university for innovation
projects. This can help to create trust and credibility. Funding agencies including TRF
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and the NIA can do this by increasing the amount of funding to a pair of industryuniversity collaborators that remains stable over time. Table 6.10 below illustrates this
approach.

Table 6.10 Incentivizing Repeated Interaction
Innovation Partners

Time Period

Payoff

A and B
A and B
A and B
A and B
A and B

t
t+1
t+2
t+3
t+n

x
0.5x
1.5x
2.5x
(n-0.5)x

The table shows that in the first year of a collaborative innovation project,
innovator A and innovator B receive the payoff/award x to assist their work, for example,
an innovation grant worth US$100,000 (x = 100,000). The table shows that by year five
the same partners receive US$450,000 [(5 – 0.5)100,000]. With this policy, innovator A
and innovator B are incentivized to maintain their relationship instead of just a one-time
collaboration. This creates the opportunity for trust and credibility to form and a stronger
innovation linkage develops. This is one option but another form could work in reverse.
Start-up funds can be supplied to kick-start the process with lower funds for maintenance
provided over time.
Industry-university linkages can also be enabled by reducing the risks of
collaboration through risk management. Project partners can leave the partnership or the
results of the project may not turn out as planned. Managing risks such as these help
partners in an innovation project to commit to each other. Funding agencies can require
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some amount of an innovation grant to be placed in an escrow fund. This policy provides
insurance for innovation project risks. The fund can compensate the other partners in case
one of them leaves the partnership. It can also compensate investors in case an innovation
project does not produce the required results. With this policy, funds in escrow serve as a
form of “innovation insurance.” To mitigate the moral hazard aspects of innovation
insurance, however, funding agencies must have a rigorous ex-ante review and ongoing
monitoring process to ensure the feasibility of the projected outcome.

Rationalize the Public Sector
Rationalizing the government bureaucracy components of the NIS can also help
enable linkages and improve the functioning of the NIS. There are several agencies
involved with innovation in Thailand. Overlapping and redundant activities in the various
agencies need to be streamlined. Bureaucratic boundaries and responsibilities have to be
better defined. Government initiatives and points of contact for the private sector must be
clear and well-managed, otherwise private actors will be less encouraged to engage with
the NIS, as occurred in the Finland case.
The NRCT is well positioned to help rationalize the system and provide linkage
by providing critical information. It performs this role to a great extent now, but can do
still more. As mentioned by NRCT’s Secretary General above, the NRCT is a central
repository of R&D activities which received government funding since 1950. In this way,
NRCT serves as a rich “database” or “clearinghouse” of research results which can be
drawn upon for innovation and commercialization purposes. NRCT has formulated the
2008-2012 Master Plan to support the development, management and public access to the
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National Research Database System (NRDB). The NRDB aims to create a national pool
of innovation knowledge by linking, exchanging, and sharing research data with other
institutes and agencies, including the National Science and Technology Development
Agency (NSTDA), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Ministry of Labour
(MOL), Ministry of Social and Human Security Development (MSO), Kasetsart
University (KU), and Chulalongkorn University (CU). NRCT is also involved in
implementing internationally-accepted standards for R&D and other critical innovation
activities and benchmarks.
Most importantly, an independent agency with an independent budget and a long
term view to direct resources to the national innovation effort is needed. This should not
be a newly created agency however, as there are already a number of agencies involved
in Thailand’s NIS. Instead, the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy
Office (STI) should be reconfigured with independent budget control so that it can make
more strategic choices about the direction of Thailand’s NIS.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From linear innovation processes to innovation systems, the National Innovation
System (NIS) approach is a recent paradigm for organizing innovation in national
economies. This systems approach represents a more holistic view of innovation
processes and has the potential to improve innovation outputs and outcomes for firms,
industrial sectors, and nations.
This study developed a framework for assessing the status and performance of a
country’s NIS by investigating the theoretical concept of the National Innovation System
(NIS) and the experience with NIS in innovation-leading countries including adoption,
implementation, and evaluation. Together this approach provides an understanding of the
fundamental components of the NIS, the relationship among them, and the system as a
whole. These components were used to develop a framework for assessing the status and
performance of the NIS in a given country.
The framework calls for an understanding of, first, what the NIS is, i.e. its
theoretical conceptualization and its basic system components; second, why the NIS
approach is adopted, i.e. the rationale for incorporating the approach in encouraging
innovation; third, its implementation in terms of the organizational structures and
functions in place; and fourth, potential methods by which the performance of the NIS
can be evaluated. Understanding the questions, the theories behind them, and real-world
experiences provides guidance for policymakers in acquiring relevant data to create their
own indicators for NIS assessment.
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The NIS assessment framework was applied to a case study of a developing
country, Thailand. Background information on Thailand’s economic and science and
technology policy development was presented, and the details of Thailand’s NIS were
then described. Examining the evidence from the Thailand case using the assessment
framework identified aspects of the system where things have gone “right” and also areas
of on-going challenges. Moreover, it provides a better understanding of both the
functioning of the NIS and the barriers to innovation in the country. These barriers
concern resource allocation, the nature of industry in Thailand, the integration of R&D
into the innovation system, and the organization of the public sector component.
It is important that the barriers to innovation in Thailand be removed. Policy
recommendations to improve the functioning of the NIS and overcome barriers include:
(1) minimizing the conflicts in resource allocation for more efficient use; (2) creating
incentives for domestic innovation by attracting foreign-based R&D institutions to
relocate, encouraging large domestic firms R&D that have the capital resources required
for innovation, and building internal capacity to encourage domestic firms to develop
R&D components to allow them to compete more favorably in evolving global economy;
(3) strengthening the linkages between university and industry affect university R&D;
and (4) creating trust and credibility within stakeholder partnerships for these links to
form. An effectively organized government sector can accomplish these objectives
through well-designed policy.
Most importantly, a new strategic direction for innovation policy and a truly
“country-specific” framework for assessing Thailand’s NIS in the future can be
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developed. This framework allows Thai NIS policymakers to determine their own
indicators that are “made to measure” their specific system. Besides assessing the
components that make up the NIS by focusing on the questions mentioned above, the
country-specific assessment framework emphasizes: (1) the rationale and goals for NIS,
(2) the necessary instruments for NIS, (3) the functioning of NIS components, and (4)
measures of NIS success. This country-specific assessment framework is presented in
Table 7.1 below. This, in turn, allows policymakers to better identify opportunities and
target available resources to areas with the greatest potential return.
The policy recommendations just mentioned become the assessment framework
for the future. The emphasis should now be on assessing whether the recommended steps
are being taken, and evaluating their effects on achieving global competitiveness and
economic growth and development. This assessment is done by asking, first, whether the
rationale for the policy is logical and its objectives are clear, second, whether the
necessary instruments for innovation are contained in the NIS, third, whether the
components are functioning properly, and fourth, whether indicators of success are
suitable.
Each question itself suggests appropriate measures for judging success, however
the needs for policy and the actions government should take regarding NIS will change
over time. Therefore we need to have a way to monitor and evaluate NIS status and
performance and make necessary adjustments as needed. This country-specific
assessment framework serves this role, as a feedback mechanism for Thailand’s
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innovation system. The four questions within it are the key questions to continue to ask
and answer into the future.
Table 7.1 Country-Specific Assessment Framework for Thailand’s NIS
Question

Criteria

Is the rationale for Thailand’s
NIS policy logical and are its
objectives clear?

Continuing to build S&T capacity and infrastructure;
increasing and enhancing R&D and innovation in
Thailand; combining STI with strategic comparative
advantages to facilitate global competitiveness and
sustainable growth.

Are the necessary instruments
to make innovation happen
contained in Thailand’s NIS?

Incentives and support to attract foreign R&D;
incentives and support to stimulate domestic firm R&D
and technological upgrading; reconfigured university
reward system to facilitate R&D collaboration with
industry; clearly defined public sector roles,
responsibilities, and initiatives; independent budget
control and long-term outlook for STI as lead NIS
agency.

Are Thailand’s NIS
components functioning
properly?

Firms: Conducting R&D and innovation; universities:
increasing R&D and innovation and providing STI HRs;
firms and universities: collaborating for mutually
beneficial R&D; government: facilitating to other NIS
actors, providing strategic, long-term STI direction.

Are suitable indicators used to
measure the success of
Thailand’s NIS?

Public and private R&D expenditure; quantity and
quality of STI HRs (including relocated foreign MNCs’
R&D personnel); quantity and quality of (joint industryuniversity) patents; quantity and quality of (joint
industry-university, joint international partner) STE
publications and citations; opinion of domestic NIS
experts; development of “Thai brand”; creation of new
businesses; enhancement of global competitiveness;
enhancement of human development.

The NIS is a fundamental component of the nation’s overall economic
development strategy. In the case of Thailand, innovation will affect the country’s
competitive position both globally and regionally. Referring back to the flying geese
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analogy, Thailand’s economic development depends on keeping up with innovation
leaders in the region, like Singapore and Korea, who are flying ahead at a fast pace.
Falling behind these leaders means Thailand’s economic development will suffer. By
closing the gap with the leading geese, however, Thailand stands to move to higher tiers
of industrial and technological capability and more sophisticated stages of economic
growth. At this point in time, focusing on regional innovation leaders in an increasingly
competitive Southeast Asia makes sense for Thailand.
From this big-picture view, the NIS becomes an important means to an important
end. This is the reason that outcomes of innovation, such as the creation of new
businesses, the competitiveness of the economy in an international context, and the social
development of the nation must also be measured when assessing NIS status. Enhancing
these outcomes moves Thailand forward through subsequent stages of economic
development. Enhancing these outcomes is the goal of the NIS and justifies its inclusion
within a broader economic development strategy.
Thailand’s economy can become more innovative by incorporating this study’s
policy recommendations for the NIS, keeping innovation outcomes and regional
innovation leaders in sight, and addressing the questions of the country-specific
framework above. Innovation is the key. As Thailand’s economy becomes more
innovative it will also become more competitive in the evolving global economy. In this
process, further development of the economy will naturally occur. This is the reason for
developing the NIS in the first place and the nation’s global competitiveness and
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development performance are the most important benchmarks against which it should be
assessed.
Developing country policymakers can look to the experiences of innovationleading countries including innovation systems adopted, how they were implemented,
and how they are evaluated. This approach provides a framework for developing a
comprehensive NIS. Ultimately however, they must determine a way forward for NIS
development that is most appropriate for the unique context in their own country’s
economy. While “best practices” implemented elsewhere can offer useful guidance, “one
size fits all” solutions are unlikely. Likewise, measures for evaluating NIS performance
from international analyses can provide helpful insights, but the most applicable
standards for evaluating a country’s NIS, whether quantitative or qualitative, will most
likely be domestically determined based upon concurrent conditions, resource availability
and competitive advantage. A failure to develop a well-formulated and comprehensive
innovation strategy will make it increasingly difficult for developing countries to compete
in a rapidly changing global economy.
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Appendix A
Thailand’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology Entry

Variable
Economic Performance
Annual GDP growth (%), 2005-2009
GDP per capita (in/nal current $ PPP), 2009
GDP (current US$ bill), 2009
Human development index, 2010
Multidimensional poverty index, 2008
Gender inequality index, 2008
Seats in parliament held by women (as % of total), 2009
Composite risk rating, 07/2010-06/2011
Economic Regime
Gr. capital formation as % of GDP, 2005-2009
Trade as % of GDP, 2009
Tariff & nontariff barriers, 2011
Soundness of banks (1-7), 2010
Exports of goods and services as % of GDP, 2009
Interest rate spread, 2009
Intensity of local competition (1-7), 2010
Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP, 2009
Cost to register a business as % of GNI per capita, 2011
Days to start a business, 2011
Cost to enforce a contract (% of debt), 2011
Governance
Regulatory quality, 2009
Rule of law, 2009
Government effectiveness, 2009
Voice and accountability, 2009
Political stability, 2009
Control of corruption, 2009
Press freedom (1-100), 2010
Innovation System
FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008
FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2004-0208
Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.), 2009
Royalty and license fees payments (US$/pop.), 2009
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Score
3.40
4.47
7.78
7.29
8.49
4.63
3.38
4.84
7.54
8.44
3.99
7.94
8.87
7.29
7.33
8.38
5.89
3.05
9.57
5.96
5.41
5.75
3.70
1.58
5.00
3.68
4.92
5.14
8.80
7.12

Variable
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.), 2009
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.), 2009
Royalty payments and receipts(US$ mil.), 2009
Royalty payments and receipts(US$/pop.) 2009
Science and engineering enrollment ratio (%), 2009
Science enrollment ratio (%), 2009
Researchers in R&D, 2009
Researchers in R&D/mil. People, 2009
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2008
Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2009
University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2010
S&E journal articles, 2007
S&E journal articles/mil. people, 2007
Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2010
Patents granted by USPTO, avg. 2005-2009
Patents granted by USPTO/mil. people, avg. 2005-2009
High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2009
Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2010
Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2010
Value chain presence (1-7), 2010
Capital goods gross imports(% of GDP), avg. 2005-2009
Capital goods gross exports (% of GDP), 2005-2009
S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%), 2008
Avg. number of citations per S&E article, 2008
Intellectual property protection (1-7), 2010
Education
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above), 2007
Average years of schooling, 2010
Average years of schooling, female, 2010
Gross secondary enrollment rate, 2009
Gross tertiary enrollment rate, 2009
Life expectancy at birth, 2009
Internet access in schools (1-7), 2010
Public spending on education as % of GDP, 2009
4th grade achievement in math (TIMSS), 2007
4th grade achievement in science (TIMSS), 2007
8th grade achievement in math (TIMSS), 2007
8th grade achievement in science (TIMSS), 2007
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Score
7.38
5.95
8.48
6.80
n/a
n/a
6.30
3.42
2.38
9.28
7.10
7.24
5.17
7.02
7.53
5.89
8.93
6.56
5.50
7.48
9.48
9.48
3.68
7.29
4.05
5.00
3.15
2.99
3.45
6.10
3.52
6.95
4.59
n/a
n/a
4.13
5.87

Variable

Score

Quality of science and math education (1-7), 2010
Quality of management schools (1-7), 2010
15-year-olds’ math literacy (PISA), 2009
15-year-olds’ science literacy (PISA), 2009
School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross), 2009
School enrollment, tertiary, female (% gross), 2009
No schooling, total, 2010
No schooling, female, 2010
Secondary school completion ,total (% of pop. 15+), 2010
Secondary school completion ,female (% of pop. 15+), 2010
Tertiary school completion ,total (% of pop. 15+), 2010
Tertiary school completion ,female (% of pop. 15+), 2010
Labor
Unemployment rate, total (% of labor force), 2005-2009
Unemployment rate, male (% of male labor force), 2005-2009
Unemployment rate, female (% of female labor force), 2005-2009
Employment in industry (%), 2008
Employment in services (%), 2008
Prof. and Tech. workers as % of labor force, 2008
Extent of staff training (1-7), 2010
Brain drain (1-7), 2010
Cooperation in labor-employer relations (1-7), 2010
Flexibility of wage determination (1-7), 2010
Pay and productivity (1-7), 2010
Reliance on professional management (1-7), 2010
Local availability of specialized research and training services (1-7), 2010
Difficulty of hiring index, 2010
Rigidity of hours index, 2010
Difficulty of redundancy index, 2010
Redundancy costs (weeks of wages), 2010
Labor tax and contributions (%), 2011
Employment to population ratio, total, 15+ (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, male, 15+ (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, female, 15+ (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, total, ages 15-24 (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, male, ages 15-24 (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, female, ages 15-24 (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, total, 25+ (%), 2005-2009

5.95
6.11
2.46
2.62
3.31
5.70
3.15
3.70
2.36
2.28
7.72
7.72
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9.91
9.82
10.00
3.37
0.71
n/a
5.88
7.18
7.94
3.89
8.32
5.95
5.27
5.39
10.00
10.00
3.81
8.58
8.94
8.52
8.73
7.25
6.97
6.69
8.73

Variable

Score

Employment to population ratio, male, 25+ (%), 2005-2009
Employment to population ratio, female, 25+ (%), 2005-2009
Share of unemployment with tertiary education , 2007
Share of unemployment with secondary education, 2007
Labor force participation rate, total, 15+, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, male, 15+, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, female, 15+, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, total, 15-24, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, male, 15-24, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, female, 15-24, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, total, 15-64, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, male, 15-64, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, female, 15-64, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, total, 65+, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, male, 65+, 2005-2009
Labor force participation rate, female, 65+, 2005-2009
Youth unemployment rate, total, 2005-2009
Youth unemployment rate, male, 2005-2009
Youth unemployment rate, female, 2005-2009
Adult unemployment rate, total, 2005-2009
Adult unemployment rate, male, 2005-2009
Adult unemployment rate, female, 2005-2009
Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, total, 2005-2009
Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, male, 2005-2009
Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, female, 2005-2009
Long-term unemployment, total, 25+, 2005-2009
Long-term unemployment, male, 25+, 2005-2009
Long-term unemployment, female, 25+, 2005-2009
Labor force with tertiary education (% of total), 2007
Labor force with secondary education (% of total), 2007
Firms offering formal training (% of firms), 2009
Females in Labor Force (% of total labor force), 2009
ICT
Total telephones per 1000 people, 2009
Main telephone lines per 1000 people, 2009
Mobile phones per 1000 people, 2009
Computers per 1000 people, 2008
Households with television (%), 2008

7.68
8.87
10.00
4.22
8.45
7.54
8.38
5.49
5.14
5.42
8.24
8.03
7.96
6.48
5.77
7.25
9.70
9.69
9.79
9.90
9.90
10.00
1.01
1.34
0.82
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7.11
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6.14
3.70
8.00
6.23
4.69

Variable
Daily newspapers per 1,000 people, 2004
International internet bandwidth (bits per person), 2009
Internet users per 1000 people, 2009
Fixed broadband internet access tariff (US$ per month), 2009
Availability of e-government services (1-7), 2008
Government online service index (1-7), 2010
ICT expenditure as % of GDP, 2008
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 (scores on 10-scale for 146 countries)
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Score
n/a
4.79
4.28
7.71
7.36
4.96
7.61

Appendix B
Thailand’s Global Competitiveness Report Entry
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Source: WEF, 2012
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Appendix C
Thailand NIS Government Officials Interviews: Questions and Schedule

Interview Questions
Since National Science, Technology and Innovation Act (2008), Thailand has
engaged in a formal strategy to enhance the nation’s competitiveness by encouraging
economic innovation in firms. The strategy takes a systemic, coordinated approach by
creating and connecting both public and private institutions to promote innovation.
Specific measures include creating dedicated government agencies, upgrading the legal
and regulatory landscape (FDI rules, IPR regime), making grants and loans, and
encouraging industrial clusters, R&D parks, and similar collaborative ventures.
1. In your view, is the NIS approach being implemented effectively?
2. How can NIS be improved?
3. What is your agency’s role in this system?
4. How would you evaluate the status and the overall performance of NIS?

Thailand NIS Government Official Interviewees
1. Mr. Alongkorn Ponlaboot
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Commerce (MOC)
Interview date: April 27, 2011
2. Prof. Dr. Soottiporn Chittmittrapap
Secretary General
National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT)
Interview date: September 22, 2011
3. Dr. Yada Mukdapitak
Deputy Secretary General
National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI)
Interview date: April 7, 2011
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